University of Baltimore Law Review

“Let Them Eat Cake!” … Well, Maybe Not All of Them: The Supreme Court May Take a Huge Slice Out of Anti-Discrimination Legislation

Reba Letsa*

The dispute over a wedding cake that ultimately made its way up to the Supreme Court of the United States began in 2012 at Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado.  Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Set to Take Up LGBT Rights and Religious Liberty, CNN (Sept. 5, 2017, 1:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/05/politics/supreme-court-lgbt-rights-religious-liberty/index.html.  David Mullins and Charlie Craig, a couple who were in the process of planning their upcoming nuptials, visited the bakery and requested a custom cake.  Id.  The owner, Jack Phillips, informed them that he would be unable to design a cake for a same-sex wedding due to his religious views on same sex-marriage.  Id.  Mullins and Craig subsequently filed complaints against the bakery with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which ruled in their favor, citing a violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.  Id.  Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act provides in pertinent part:

It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation . . . .

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West 2018).

A. BACKGROUND

The Colorado Civil Rights Commission affirmed the cease and desist order issued by an Administrative Law Judge and ruled against Phillips, who appealed to the Court of Appeals of Colorado.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276–77 (Colo. App. 2015).  The court upheld the commission’s ruling, holding that there was enough of a nexus between the bakery’s refusal to provide the customized cake and the couple’s sexual orientation to constitute a violation of the Act.  Id. at 283.  Furthermore, the cease and desist order imposed upon the bakery did not compel speech, nor abridge Jack Phillips’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.  Id. at 288, 291–92.  With oral arguments completed on December 5, 2017, the Supreme Court will issue a decision that could potentially set a dangerous precedent, which would allow businesses that are open to the public to refuse services to patrons simply because of their sexual orientation.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, SCOTUSblog,  http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).

B. MULLINS AND CRAIG’S ARGUMENT

With the support of the ACLU, Mullins and Craig posit that the Colorado statute, which was enacted to prevent the discrimination of marginalized groups in places of public accommodation, is constitutionally sound.  See Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 15–28, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111).  In their Brief in Opposition to Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Petition, the Respondents rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rumsfeld, in which an association of law schools and faculty posed a constitutional challenge to the Solomon Amendment.  Brief in Opposition at 7–10, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No. 16-111); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).  The Solomon Amendment permitted the federal government to withhold funding from institutions that refused military recruiters access to students.  Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 51.  The law schools believed that allowing an organization with controversial policies, such as the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, to speak to its students implied that the institution was in support of the policy.  Id. at 64–65.  The Court rejected this argument in Rumsfeld on the basis that students are able to make the distinction between an institution endorsing a particular message and permitting speech based solely upon an equal access policy.  Id. at 65 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).

The Court of Appeals of Colorado used the same rationale in ruling against Phillips.  See Craig, 370 P.3d at 286–87.  The court reasoned that “it is unlikely that the public would view Masterpiece’s creation of a cake for a same-sex wedding celebration as an endorsement of that conduct.  Rather, we conclude that a reasonable observer would understand that Masterpiece’s compliance with the law is not a reflection of its own beliefs.”  Id. at 286.

In 2013, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in deciding Elane Photography, LLC. v. Willock, addressed a similar issue when a wedding photographer who refused to photograph same-sex weddings was found to have violated a state anti-discrimination statute.  309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013).  The court distinguished Elane Photography from prior decisions such as Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), because, in those cases, the challenged legislation compelled speech, while in Elane Photography, the petitioner was not required to speak or affirm the government’s message.  Id. at 64–65.  The law merely stated that if Elane Photography wanted to operate and maintain a business open to the public, it could not discriminate against potential clients on the basis of their sexual orientation.  Id. at 60.  Based upon the factual similarities in Craig and in Elane Photography, it is likely that the Supreme Court will determine that although the nature of Phillips’s business does largely involve creativity and artistic expression, since he chooses to commercialize his creations, they must be made available to everyone.  See id.

Furthermore, Mullins and Craig argue that if the Supreme Court were to side with the baker on First Amendment grounds, the decision could establish a loophole for businesses that involve some form of artistic expression to use their religious beliefs as a pretext to discriminate against other marginalized groups.  The Right to Equal Treatment: Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, ACLU (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/lgbt-nondiscrimination-protections/right-equal-treatment-masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v.  If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Masterpiece Cakeshop, this decision could become the slippery slope that would ultimately grant businesses that are open to the public the constitutional right to discriminate.

C. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S FREE SPEECH ARGUMENT

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution proscribes that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The provisions of the First Amendment have also been incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, argues that he has a constitutional right to refuse to prepare a custom cake for a ceremony that his religion does not support.  See Client Story: Jack Phillips, Alliance Defending Freedom, https://www.adflegal.org/detailspages/case-details/masterpiece-cakeshop-v.-craig (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).  Phillips compares the amount of artistic expression and creativity that goes into making his wedding cakes, to an artist sketching on canvas or a sculptor using clay and deems that the cake sends the message using his voice that the marriage should be celebrated.  Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No. 16-111).  Furthermore, Phillips argues that that being forced to use his art to promote a message that he does not agree with is tantamount to being compelled to speak the message.  Id. at 16–35.

As authority for his proposition, Phillips cites Wooley v. Maynard, a United States Supreme Court case in which a New Hampshire couple, who were devout Jehovah’s Witnesses, obscured the motto “Live Free or Die” from visibility on the license plates of their jointly owned non-commercial family vehicles because it conflicted with their religious beliefs.  430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).  The Court ultimately sided with the couple, holding that the First Amendment protects the rights of individuals and permits them to have a point of view which deviates from the majority, as well as that a state cannot mandate that individuals perpetuate an ideology which they find to be morally objectionable.  Id. at 715.

In deciding Wooley, the Court relied heavily on Barnette, which involved religious opposition to a West Virginia school board action compelling public school children to stand and salute the American flag.  Id. at 714–15; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626, 629 (1943).  The Barnette Court articulated the proposition on which Phillips bases his argument; specifically, the Court stated that the right to speak freely and the right to not speak at all are protected by the First Amendment.  319 U.S. at 642.

The United States Department of Justice has also submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court supporting the Colorado baker, arguing that his cakes are a form of expression and the government cannot compel him to utilize his talent to support something he does not believe in.  Robert Barnes, In Major Supreme Court Case, Justice Dept. Sides with Baker Who Refused to Make Wedding Cake for Gay Couple, Wash. Post (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/in-major-supreme-court-case-justice-dept-sides-with-baker-who-refused-to-make-wedding-cake-for-gay-couple/2017/09/07/fb84f116-93f0-11e7-89fa-bb822a46da5b_story.html?utm_term=.9229eb6113c6.  To prevail on his First Amendment defense, Phillips will likely have to make a sufficient showing that the amount of creativity and detail that go into making his cakes is far greater than that of any business that has previously challenged similar laws on the same grounds.

D. CONCLUSION

Considering precedent, it is unlikely that Masterpiece Cakeshop will prevail.  Several businesses have also challenged similar state laws, citing religious beliefs as their reasoning, but at least one court has upheld its state anti-discrimination law and held that preventing or remedying discrimination is a compelling interest.  See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 70. However, the decision in this case has the potential to either mark the Supreme Court’s commitment to equality and social justice or contribute to the erosion of state legislation enacted to prevent the discrimination of targeted groups.  This is a pivotal case either way you slice it.

*Reba Letsa is a second-year law student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she currently serves as a staff editor for Law Review.  Reba is also a member of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society.  In the fall of 2017, Reba worked in the District Court Screening Unit of the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office.  For the summer of 2018, Reba will join Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz P.C. as a summer associate.

Hey Beautiful or Heck, No!: Street Harassment Catcalling and the First Amendment

Andrew Berg*

            French officials are fed up with street harassment and verbal abuses by men.  The trending hashtag on social media in France is #BalanceTonPorc, translated to “Expose Your Pig.”  Dan Bilefsky & Elian Peltier, France Considers Fines for Catcalls as Women Speak Out on Harassment, N. Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/europe/france-harassment-twitter-weinstein.html?emc=edit_th_20171018&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=25519591.  Women in and out of the French government are encouraging more women to speak out against harassment they have experienced from men.  Id.  The #MeToo social media campaign in the United States, becoming popular in response to Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein’s decades-long alleged engagement in sexual harassment, is also contributing to the broader conversation to protect women from male aggression.  Id.  The French social media campaign is moving the conversation towards the creation of a new law that would make street harassment, like catcalling and unwanted verbal behavior towards others, a finable offense.  Id.  Men make women feel uncomfortable in several facets of American society, across generations, races, and ethnicities.  See generally Talia Hagerty et al., Stop Street Harassment, Know Your Rights: Street Harassment and the Law (2013), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/SSH-KnowYourRights-StreetHarassmentandtheLaw-20131.pdf.  While touching another person is an obvious and well-established common law tort, sometimes even characterized as a crime, saying something that bothers another person is not thought of as such an offense in American law.  See id. at 6, 11.  Words alone are rarely a tort, or rarely a crime, but they can be objectionable.  As such, the First Amendment often protects language and words that some find offensive and bothersome.  See id. at 11.

I. FRENCH “PORC”

In France, a bill has been introduced by Marlène Schiappa, a minister for gender equality, to make catcalling a crime.  Bilefsky & Peltier, supra.  Similar laws are in place in multiple European countries, including Portugal and Belgium.  Id.; see also Elizabeth King, 6 Countries That Are Fighting Back Against Catcalling, Complex (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.complex.com/life/2016/01/international-catcalling-policies/ (listing Belgium, Portugal, Argentina, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States).  Essentially, the existing laws make catcalling a finable offense, in hopes to deter anti-women and anti-gender speech that undoubtedly make women feel uncomfortable and undermine their own rights to walk in peace.  See King, supra; see also Hagerty et al., supra, at 15–268 (analyzing state street harassment laws in the United States).  These laws make words alone, communicated in public, a criminal offense.  See King, supra; see also Hagerty et al., supra, at 15–268.  While a private party still cannot sue based on the catcalling, the State can impose fines, and even sentence the perpetrator to prison.  See King, supra.  These laws aim to modify behavior and can help educate people about ingrained systemic sexism.  Id.  The proposed French law could help increase the number of sexual harassment convictions.  In 2014, a paltry six-percent of French sexual harassment cases led to a conviction.  Bilefsky & Peltier, supra.

II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

Speech is generally protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  See U.S. Const. amend. I.  However, in the interest of safety, many localities have statutes, including those on college campuses, that attempt to curtail gendered language that could make a person feel unwelcome or uncomfortable.  King, supra; see also Hagerty et al., supra, at 14 (describing laws that protect harassment that takes place in and near schools and universities).  Nevertheless, many of those American statutes have failed muster, being struck down by courts, asserting “the right, however moronic, to say what we’d like.”  Maureen Sherry, France Wants to Outlaw Catcalling. Here’s Why the U.S. Shouldn’t, Fortune (Aug. 31, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/31/france-catcalling-street-harassment-marlene-schiappa/.

While it is admirable to protect people from feeling uncomfortable, there are times when the First Amendment triumphs.  For example, universities across the country have attempted to implement policies that mimic the proposed French law’s intent, but those policies have failed to withstand constitutional challenges.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 961 (18th ed. 2013).  Concern for protecting students on college campuses from verbal harassment was prevalent in the 1980s, and it continues in today’s society.  See id.  Both federal and state courts have held that university policies that curtail speech on college campuses are unconstitutional, mainly on the basis that they are vague and overbroad.  Id.; see also Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding the University’s policy on discrimination and harassment to be “so vague that its enforcement would violate the due process clause”).  A policy at the University of Michigan stipulated disciplinary actions for “[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of . . . sex, [and/or] sexual orientation . . . .”  Doe, F. Supp. at 856.  A similar Stanford University policy that was struck down by a California Superior Court in 1995 read: “Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if it: a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual . . . on the basis of their sex . . . ; and b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes . . . .”  Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cty. Feb. 27, 1995); Sullivan & Feldman, supra, at 961 (quoting the Stanford policy).  These universities were trying to protect their students, including female students, from the aggressions and verbal abuses by men, but were not successful because of the strong free speech culture that persists on campuses, and throughout American society.  Sullivan & Feldman, supra, at 961.  In Corry especially, the court ruled that the overbroad statute infringed on people’s ability to speak “insults that did not threaten to provoke immediate violence.”  Id. at 961–62.  Essentially, speech without the threat of immediate violence is protected speech.  Id. at 961.  This is the standard that courts often use in assessing how much protection the First Amendment affords to speakers.  Id.

A statute that could exist in France would probably have an uphill battle in the United States due to the existence of the First Amendment.  Traditional public forums, including  sidewalks and streets, have been held to allow the broadest and deepest free speech protections.  See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554–55 (1965); see also Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“[U]se of the streets and public places [for assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions] has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”).  Thus, many manners and matters of speech are enjoyed in American public forums, including the likes of catcalling, name-calling, religious speech, anti-government speech, and more.  Cox, 379 U.S. at 551–52.  Speech can be provocative, prejudicial, and unsettling.  Id. at 552.  States can, however, institute time, place, and manner restrictions as long as proper notice and limited content-neutral restrictions are made.  Id. at 558.

Accordingly, American laws cannot realistically prevent a man from catcalling a woman on the street.  The Constitution’s First Amendment free speech principles are quite strong in allowing the expression of speech that is “porc.”  American society will have to stop this type of verbal harassment without the assistance of state action if it wants to protect women from uncomfortable situations of catcalling and street harassment.  Private suits against catcallers and exposing catcallers and harassers publicly may prove to be the most effective means of changing catcalling culture.

*Andrew is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where he serves as a staff editor for Law Review.  Andrew is also a member of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. In the summer of 2017, Andrew served as an Equal Justice Works AmeriCorps JD Student interning at the Bar Association of Baltimore City’s Senior Legal Services organization.  Andrew currently works at the litigation firm of Schlachman, Belsky, & Weiner, P.A. as a law clerk.  Additionally, Andrew will be participating in the National Telecommunications and Technology Moot Court Competition, while also sitting on the Moot Court Board.

The Legality of “Safe Injection Facilities” in Baltimore, MD

Elizabeth Barry*

In 2016, Baltimore City experienced 454 heroin-intoxication deaths, an increase of 194 deaths from 2015.  Md. Dep’t of Health, Drug- and Alcohol-Related Intoxication   Deaths  in  Maryland  14 (2017), https://bha.health.maryland.gov/OVERDOSE_PREVENTION/ Documents/Quarterly%20Drug_Alcohol_Intoxication_Report_2017_Q1%20(2).pdf. 2017 was on track to be even more deadly, with 90 reported heroin-intoxication deaths in just the first quarter of 2017, as compared to 67 deaths in the first quarter of 2016.  Id. at 10.  These statistics do not account for the terrifying rise of the lethal drug fentanyl.  In 2016, Baltimore City suffered 419 fentanyl-intoxication deaths, as compared to 120 deaths in 2015.  Id. at 15.  Similarly, 2017 was on track to be worse with 123 fentanyl-intoxication deaths in just the first quarter of 2017, compared to 46 deaths in the first quarter of 2016.  Id. at 11.  What can be done to curb these alarming statistics?

Susan G. Sherman, PhD, MPH, professor in the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University, suggests that a safe space for illegal drug consumption would greatly help.  Susan Gail Sherman, PhD, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. Pub. Health, https://www.jhsph.edu/faculty/directory/profile/924/susan-gail-sherman (last visited Mar. 1, 2018); Susan Sherman et al., Abell Found., Safe Drug Consumption Spaces: Implications for Baltimore City 2–3 (2017), http://www.abell.org/sites/default/files/files/ Sherman%20Full%20length%20Report%20_final%20(002).pdf. These facilities would provide a clean environment where people can use their own drugs with medical personnel on hand to stop overdoses should they occur.  Sherman et al., supra, at 2.  According to Sherman, operation of the facilities would “reduc[e] needle re-use and sharing and therefore incidence of HIV/HCV and SSTI [(skin and soft tissue infections)], by reducing the costs to society of addictions and overdose deaths.”  Id. at 10.

I. Proposed Legislation: House Bill 0519

Maryland Delegate Dan Morhaim from Baltimore County proposed a bill in January 2017 titled “Overdose and Infectious Disease Prevention Safer Drug Consumption Facility Program.”  H.D. 519, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017).  If passed, this bill would permit Overdose and Infectious Disease Prevention facilities throughout Baltimore City to “[p]rovide a location supervised by health care professionals or other trained staff where drug users can consume preobtained drugs.”  Id.  Additionally, staff at these facilities would provide “sterile injection supplies” and “[a]dminister first aid, if needed, monitor participants for potential overdose, and administer rescue medications . . . .”  Id.

Furthermore, the proposed legislation contains a provision excluding participants of the facility from criminal prosecution.  Id.  The legislation states:

Any of the following persons acting in accordance with the provisions of this subtitle may not be subject to arrest, prosecution, or any civil or administrative penalty, including a civil penalty or disciplinary action by a professional licensing board, or be denied any right or privilege for involvement in the operation or use of services of the Program.

Id.  Clearly this is a direct contradiction of state and federal drug laws.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841–843 (2010); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 5-601–5-628 (West 2018).  Therefore, how will these facilities be able to operate legally in Maryland?  Despite harsh drug laws, “safer injection facilities” (SIFs) operate in Australia, numerous European countries, and Canada.  Sherman et al., supra, at 2, 4.

II. Canada v. PHS Community Service Society

In 2003, Vancouver, Canada, became home to Insite, the first SIF in North America.  Canada v. PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc’y, [2011] S.C.R. 134, 136 (Can.).  The facility operates under a “medical and scientific purpose[]” exemption from the operation of criminal laws in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, enacted in response to the problem of illegal drug use across Canada.  See id. at 151.  The legality of Canada’s SIF was tested in 2008 when the Minister of Health refused to extend the facility’s exemption.  Id. at 143.  In Canada v. PHS Community Services Society, the Supreme Court of Canada wrestled with the question of whether the Insite facility was “exempt from the federal criminal laws that prohibit the possession and trafficking of controlled substances, either because Insite is a health facility within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Province, or because the application of the criminal law would violate the [Canadian] Charter [of Rights and Freedoms].”  Id. at 143–44.

The court not only held that the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) was constitutional and applied to the activities at Insite, but also that the “Minister of Health’s actions in refusing to exempt Insite from the operation of the CDSA [we]re in violation of the respondents’ s[ection] 7 Charter rights.”  Id. at 193.  The rights referred to by the court were the right to “life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, s 7 (U.K.).  The court added that since there is evidence that Insite “will decrease the risk of death and disease, and there is little or no evidence that it will have a negative impact on public safety,” the Minister of Health should grant the exception.  PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc’y, [2011] S.C.R. at 192.  Furthermore, the Minister’s discretion of determining who is granted an exemption “must be exercised in accordance with the Charter.”  Id.  Ultimately, the court concluded that denying the exemption “would cause deprivations of life and security” to the people who use Insite’s services.  See id.

III. What’s Legal in Canada May Not Be Legal in the U.S.

Will it be legal to exempt SIF-type facilities from state drug laws in the United States?  Furthermore, even if such facilities were exempted from state drug laws, the facilities would still have to overcome federal drug laws.  As noted before, Maryland House Bill 519 includes a provision excluding participants and staff of the facilities from criminal and civil prosecution.  H.D. 519, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017).  Proponents of the facilities argue that this exemption is well within the state’s “police power” to protect and promote the welfare of their citizens.  See Sherman et al., supra, at 15.  Additionally, states may be able to circumvent federal law by merely authorizing community organizations to open and operate the facilities, similar to how some states authorize marijuana dispensaries.  Id. at 17.  The House Bill mimics this argument by calling for the operation to be done by “community-based organization[s],” rather than the State of Maryland.  H.D. 519 (emphasis added).  Community organizations include hospitals, clinics, substance abuse treatment centers, medical offices, “federally qualified health centers,” and mental health facilities.  Id.

As no-tolerance drug policies are proven unsuccessful with the continued increase in drug-related deaths, we will likely see the rise of SIFs across the United States.  Maryland is not the only state proposing safe injection facilities; California, New York, and Washington are also at the forefront.  Sherman et al., supra, at 12–14.  In September 2017, California’s “Safe Injection Facility” bill came before the state’s Senate for a vote.  Melanie Mason, Bill to Create ‘Safe Injection Sites’ for Drug Users Fails in California Senate, L.A. Times (Sept. 12, 2017, 8:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-drug-injection-1505265354-htmlstory.html.  The bill came up only two votes short of passing.  Id.  This is the closest any bill of this type has come to passing in the United States.  See id.  Despite the good that these facilities would seemingly bring, they will be met with understandably harsh criticism, including the legality of their operation.  Until a “Safe Injection Facility” opens and begins operating in the United States, the legality surrounding their use will remain unclear.

*Elizabeth Barry is a second-year law student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she currently serves as a staff editor for the Law Review.  She is also a member of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society.  During summer of 2017, Elizabeth worked as a law clerk at Coon & Cole, L.L.C and served as a legal intern for the Honorable Nicole Pastore Klein on the District Court for Baltimore City.  Currently, she is a law clerk at the Organized Crime Unit in the Maryland Office of the Attorney General.

Take a Knee: The $17 Million Cost of an Athlete’s First Amendment Right

Joseph Samuels*

I. Introduction

            In the past year, the National Football League (NFL) and other professional sports organizations have been at the center of national attention as numerous players protest racial injustice and police brutality in America by taking a knee and/or linking arms when the national anthem is played before a game begins.  Mark Sandritter, A Timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s National Anthem Protest and the Athletes Who Joined Him, Sbnation (Sept. 25, 2017, 10:28 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/2016/9/11/12869726/colin-kaepernick-national-anthem-protest-seahawks-brandon-marshall-nfl.  This is not the first occasion where professional athletes have been the focus of national criticism for their stance on prominent social issues.  See, e.g., Jonathan Falk & Brad Eric Scheler, Note, The Professional Athlete and the First Amendment: A Question of Judicial Intervention, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 417, 417–18 (1976) (discussing Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s public attack on the gag-rule, a provision in many professional athletes’ contracts limiting their freedom of speech).  See generally Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971) (reversing the conviction of Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, for refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces due to his moral objection to certain types of war, as well as his political and racial objections).  (more…)

 The Rape Kit Backlog: Having the Answers Without the Resources to Decipher Them

Emily Schreiber*

            Across the country, states are confronted with a daunting dilemma: they may have the DNA to prosecute those who have committed sexual assault, but are lacking either the policies or financial support necessary to make the link.  See, e.g., Christopher Connelly, Donations from Drivers Might Help End Rape Kit Backlog in Texas, NPR (Apr. 12, 2017, 4:32 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/12/523588098/donations-from-drivers-might-help-end-rape-kit-backlog-in-texas; Why the Backlog Exists, End Backlog, http://endthebacklog.org/backlog/why-backlog-exists (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).   (more…)