*Manna Alexander
I. Introduction
Numerous plaintiffs filed suit against the Archdioceses of Washington and Baltimore following the effective date of Maryland’s Child Victims Act (CVA) in October of 2023.[1] The CVA allows survivors of child sexual abuse to bring suit against non-perpetrator defendants at any point in a defendant’s life.[2] In doing so, the CVA amends 2017 legislation that set the statute of limitations for such claims at twenty years after a claimant reaches the age of majority.[3]
The change in legislation was prompted by the release of the 2023 Attorney General’s Report on child sexual abuse that occurred under the Archdiocese of Baltimore.[4] The Attorney General’s nearly 500-page report detailed over a hundred instances when authority figures in churches, schools, and other institutions under the Archdiocese of Baltimore abused their power against children.[5] Although records detailing instances of child sexual abuse in the Archdiocese of Baltimore date back to the 1940s, the Attorney General found the Archdiocese of Baltimore had never taken substantial steps toward preventing or eliminating abuse.[6] Rather, the report asserts the Archdiocese swept abuse under the rug by denial and simple removal of the abusers from the parishes or schools and did not act to rectify the situation for the survivors.[7]
In response to the report, the Maryland General Assembly eliminated time as a barrier to relief by giving survivors the right to sue their abusers and the organization responsible for their injuries at any time in their lives.[8] Since the enactment of the CVA, the Archdiocese of Baltimore has introduced a new barrier to relief by filing for bankruptcy.[9] In a separate action, the Archdiocese of Washington (Archdiocese) challenged the constitutionality of the CVA by arguing the prior law from 2017 created a statute of repose to the organization.[10]
II. What is a Statute of Repose?
Statutes of repose automatically grant potential defendants a substantive right not to be sued for a certain cause of action after a stated period of time has passed.[11] This substantive right cannot be repealed.[12] Here, the Archdiocese argues that the 2017 law barred survivors from suing the Archdiocese for child sexual abuse after survivors turn 38 years old.[13] The Archdiocese asserts the plain meaning of the statute provides repose to non-perpetrator defendants prospectively and retroactively.[14] The Archdiocese reference subsection (d) from the 2017 law to support their argument:
In no event may an action for damages arising out of an alleged incident or incidents of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was a minor be filed against a person or governmental entity that is not the alleged perpetrator more than 20 years after the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.[15]
Furthermore, the Archdiocese uses the following language from the 2017 bill to support their claim: “[f]or the purpose of . . . establishing a statute of repose for certain civil actions relating to child sexual abuse[.]”[16]
The Archdiocese asserts that the plain language shows the General Assembly intended the 2017 legislation to be a statute of repose, and therefore conferred a vested right not to be sued for claims covered by the statute.[17] The Archdiocese’s assertion relies on the statutory interpretation principle that when the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, then there is no need to further investigate it’s intended meaning.[18] The Archdiocese claims that the CVA unconstitutionally repeals the substantive right by allowing any survivor to sue the Archdiocese of Baltimore at any point in their life in violation of Maryland’s due process clause in Article 24.[19]
III. How do the Plaintiffs Respond?
The survivors respond to the Archdiocese’s argument by asserting the 2017 law did not create a statute of repose, but instead amended the statute of limitations for the cause of action.[20] The survivors rely on four factors established by Anderson v. U.S. to distinguish a statute of repose from a statute of limitations.[21]
The first factor explains that statutes of repose are normally triggered by an event based on the defendant’s actions unrelated to plaintiff’s injuries.[22] The survivors allege the twenty-year time period only triggers after suffering an injury, so the triggering event relates directly to a potential plaintiff’s injury.[23] In other words, the triggering event does not depend on a defendant’s actions, but only on when the plaintiffs suffered their injuries as minors.[24]
The second factor is that statutes of repose eliminate potential claims that have not yet arisen.[25] For example, if a law states a construction worker cannot be sued for an accident occurring on a property ten years after its construction, but in the eleventh year an individual is hit with a piece of improperly installed drywall, the individual cannot sue the construction worker because the claim is barred. Here, the survivors argue that because the 2017 statute only applies if the injury already occurred, then by nature there are no unaccrued claims that would be barred.[26] In other words, since there are no unaccrued claims that would be barred, then the 2017 statute must be interpreted to be a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose.[27]
The third factor states that statutes of repose cannot be tolled for any reason.[28] The survivors argue the fraudulent concealment doctrine[29] applies in this case and therefore opens the 2017 law to a tolling exception.[30] Survivors assert that the 2017 statute is subject to tolling, and therefore should be construed as a statute of limitations.[31]
Finally, the fourth factor explains that statues of repose are created to promote public policy favoring absolute shelter for certain groups of people from certain claims.[32] The survivors assert there is no reasonable or good public policy to protect institutions who allowed sexual abuse to occur against minors and failed to protect children.[33] The survivors rely on the legislative purpose and the history of the bill to assert that the intent of the statute was not to create a vested right for those individuals or institutions,[34] but to create an avenue for all survivors to receive damages for their injuries when they are ready to pursue legal action.[35]
The survivors use all four factors to demonstrate the 2017 law did not resemble a statute of repose, and therefore should be construed as a revision to the statute of limitations for their claims.[36]
IV. Conclusion
The Maryland Supreme Court, since hearing the final challenge to the CVA,[37] will now decide on the constitutionality of the CVA and the future of litigation regarding child sexual abuse claims. If the Supreme Court of Maryland agrees with the survivors and holds the 2017 law is merely a statute of limitations, then no substantive right to not be sued related to child sexual abuse would be created for the Archdiocese and other non-perpetrator defendants, and no issue of constitutionality or due process will remain. Therefore, any survivor of child sexual abuse will be able to sue non-perpetrator defendants regardless of the survivor’s age. If the Supreme Court of Maryland finds the arguments from the Archdiocese persuasive, then the court will rule the CVA unconstitutional, and will leave numerous survivors unable to receive damages for the injuries they suffered as children. The court’s ruling will shed light onto the rights held by survivors and institutions like the Archdiocese, as well as how statutes of repose differ from statutes of limitations in child sexual abuse cases.
*Manna Alexander is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law. She enjoys being a Law Review staff editor and a Law Scholar for Professor Knowles’s Criminal Law class. In September 2024, she was inducted to the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. While getting her undergraduate degree in Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida, Manna worked as a tutor for Orange County Public Schools and is now interested in education law. During her free time, Manna enjoys volunteering at her church and baking for her friends.
[1] See Irvin Jackson, Federal Judge Calls for State Supreme Court to Review Maryland Child Victims Act Constitutionality, BishopAccountability.org (Mar. 27, 2024), https://www.bishop-accountability.org/2024/03/federal-judge-calls-for-state-supreme-court-to-review-maryland-child-victims-act-constitutionality/.
[2] Id.; See also Md. Code Ann., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 5-117 (West 2023).
[3] See Md. Code Ann., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 5-117 (West 2017).
[4] See Jackson, supra note 1.
[5] Anthony G. Brown, Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General’s Report on Child Sexual Abuse in the Archdiocese of Baltimore 1 (2023).
[6] Id. at 1–2.
[7] Id. at 2, 9.
[8] See Jackson, supra note 1.
[9] Scott Maucione, Maryland Supreme Court Set to Hear Challenge to Child Victims Act, WYPR News (Sept. 3, 2024, 1:55 PM) https://www.wypr.org/wypr-news/2024-09-03/maryland-supreme-court-set-to-hear-challenge-to-child-victims-act.
[10] Mem. in Supp. of Def. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 18, (No. C-16-CV-23-004497). See also § 5-117 (2023).
[11] Anderson v. U.S., 46 A.3d 426, 437–38 (Md. 2012).
[12] Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 805 A.2d 1061, 1078 (Md. 2002).
[13] Mem. in Supp., supra note 10, at 18.
[14] Id. at 22.
[15] Md. Code Ann., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 5-117(d) (West 2017).
[16] H. B. 642, 437th Sess. (Md. 2017).
[17] Mem. in Supp., supra note 10, at 22-27.
[18] Anderson v. U.S., 46 A.3d 426, 441–42 (Md. 2012).
[19] Id. at 3.
[20] Pls.’ Mem. of Points and Authorities in Sup. of Their Opp’n To Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2, (No. C-16-CV-23-004497).
[21] Id. at 8.
[22] Id.; Anderson, 46 A.3d at 440–41.
[23] Pls.’ Mem., supra note 20, at 10-11.
[24] See id.
[25] Id. at 8; Anderson, 46 A.3d. at 438.
[26] Pls.’ Mem., supra note 20, at 11-12.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 8; See also Anderson, 46 A.3d. at 437 (stating that tolling through fraudulent concealment is a characteristic found in statutes of limitations).
[29] See Blondell v. Littlepage, 991 A.2d 80, 94 (Md. 2010) (quoting Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 274 (Md. 2007) (stating the elements of fraudulent concealment doctrine include “(1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to disclose a material fact; (2) the defendant failed to disclose that fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud or deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff took action in justifiable reliance on the concealment; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant’s concealment.”).
[30] Pls.’ Mem., supra note 20, at 12-13; see Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, 689 A.2d 634, 643 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (explaining that plaintiffs must rely on the fraudulent concealment doctrine to invoke the tolling exception).
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at 8; Anderson, 46 A.3d. at 437–39.
[33] Pls.’ Mem., supra note 20, at 13-14.
[34] Id. at 15.
[35] Id. at 16.
[36] Id. at 8.
[37] Maucione, supra note 9.
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