*Elle Johnson
I. Introduction
Approximately 150,000–200,000 adolescents are enrolled in the residential facilities, wilderness programs, and boot camps of the nation’s troubled teen industry.[1] Parents, courts, and foster care systems send kids away to remote reform camps, expecting them to return with improved mental health and reduced behavioral issues.[2] Yet, many children do not come home,[3] and those that do are often haunted by the abuse they suffer under the guise of “tough love.”[4]
Caleb Jensen, a fifteen-year-old boy from Utah, was sent to Alternative Youth Adventures (AYA) in 2007 and never came home.[5] In the State’s custody after a “bout with the law,”[6] Mr. Jensen was court-ordered to attend AYA’s Colorado wilderness program despite his well-documented vulnerability to bacterial infections.[7] He was forced daily to hike mountains without shoes,[8] made to clean dishes by licking them and using dirt,[9] ordered to wear diapers, isolated from his peers, and restricted from bathing.[10] Mr. Jensen was “ravaged” by a bacterial disease, yet AYA employees rejected his pleas for help and minimized reports from his concerned peers, dismissing Mr. Jensen’s suffering as “manipulative” and “fak[e].”[11] Despite Mr. Jensen’s obvious decline as he uncontrollably soiled his sleeping bag, the staff declined to even check his vitals.[12] After a week of watching Mr. Jensen suffer, AYA staff found him dead in his sleeping bag.[13] In the final letter he sent his family, his last words were “P.S. I want my mommy.”[14]
II. The Potential for an Eighth Amendment Claim
Despite reports of deaths in twenty-eight states and a federal study revealing widespread abuse,[15] the troubled teen industry remains largely unregulated at the federal level.[16] Abusive programs are held accountable through litigation by victims and their families;[17] however, immunity often shields state actors from liability and forecloses the opportunity of a civil rights action. So, plaintiffs frequently pursue torts claims without alleging civil rights violations.[18] Litigants could invoke the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment, which is enforceable under 14 U.S.C. § 1983 against government officials or private individuals acting “under [the] color of state law.”[19]
For example, Caleb Jensen’s mother, Dawn Boyd Woodson, sued state agencies and AYA employees for wrongful death.[20] In theory, she could have sought justice under the Eighth Amendment by pursuing a 14 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim.[21]
Mr. Jensen’s tragic death exemplifies the inhumane criminal punishment which the Eighth Amendment prohibits state actors from imposing.[22] State employees placed Mr. Jensen in AYA’s custody for correctional purposes, and AYA employees exercised the state authority that was contracted to them to facilitate his criminal sentence.[23]
The Supreme Court interprets the Eighth Amendment to reflect “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”[24] The Court recognizes that unlawful punishment presents itself in various forms, including the deprivation of humane living conditions and medical care.[25] Mr. Jensen’s sentence demonstrated the “deliberate indifference”[26] to his rights and “failure to comport with human dignity” that the Court attributes to Eighth Amendment violations.[27] The willful disregard State employees showed for Mr. Jensen’s vulnerable health and AYA staff showed for his obvious suffering “shock[s] the general conscience of civilized society,” as cruel and unusual punishments do.[28]
State actors must possess a certain “mental culpability” to violate the Eighth Amendment.[29] With knowledge of Mr. Jensen’s vulnerable health and AYA’s history of inadequate childcare, State employees sent him there even though it “never proved to be more effective than other correctional programs.”[30] The AYA staff were not merely negligent or mistaken in brushing off Mr. Jensen’s condition—they recognized his symptoms, yet refused to check his vitals, discouraged others from caring for his wellbeing, and sent him to sleep in his soiled sleeping bag while he had open wounds.[31] The State employees and AYA staff betrayed their constitutional duty to protect the safety and wellbeing of a child in their custody, and they did so with the mental culpability required to violate the Eighth Amendment.[32]
III. Regulating the Troubled Teen Industry Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Originally enacted to help Black Americans vindicate their Equal Protection rights in the Reconstruction Era, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to seek relief from certain private citizens, municipalities, and state employees for violating their constitutional rights.[33] Ms. Woodson could have used this procedural device to hold AYA staff and Utah employees accountable for violating her son’s Eighth Amendment rights.[34] She could have sued AYA employees for violating Mr. Jensen’s rights under the color of the law, as they were contracted by the State to exercise custodial and correctional authority on its behalf.[35] Ms. Woodson could have also sued the State caseworkers and treatment team members in a personal capacity for their management of Mr. Jensen’s custody and correctional placement.[36]
Ms. Woodson could have overcome the obstacle of qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim.[37] Although qualified immunity shields state actors from liability for many constitutional violations, it does not extend to “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”[38] Here, qualified immunity would not have protected the AYA staff and State treatment team members because their “gratuitous infliction of ‘wanton and unnecessary’ pain” upon Mr. Jensen “violated the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is nothing less than the dignity of man.’”[39] Still, it is likely that Ms. Woodson sued AYA, its parent company, and a doctor for torts claims without alleging that they acted under the color of state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the chilling effect of qualified immunity.[40]
IV. Conclusion
Although the State of Utah failed to shield Mr. Jensen from the perils of the troubled teen industry,[41] the Eighth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could have protected his rights in the posthumous search for justice.[42] If the troubled teen industry persists in evading federal oversight, civil rights litigation will give its victims the opportunity to hold their abusers accountable.[43]
*Elle Johnson is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she is a Staff Editor for Law Review and a member of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. Elle received her bachelor’s degree in Criminology and Criminal Justice with minors in History and Music Performance from the University of Maryland. She has interned for Maryland Office of the Public Defender and the Hon. Douglas R. M. Nazarian of the Appellate Court of Maryland, and she is currently interning with the Gun Violence Enforcement Division of the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office.
[1] Leora Arnowitz & Sara M. Moniuszko, A 12-Year-Old Boy Died at a Wilderness Therapy Program. He’s Not the First., USA Today, https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/health-wellness/2024/02/20/north-carolina-wilderness-therapy-death-12-year-old-boy/72669232007/ (Feb. 20, 2024, 12:47 PM).
[2] Elizabeth Morgan, Retribution Without Rehabilitation: How the “Troubled Teen Industry” Infringes on the Rights of Privately Placed Youth, 58 U. Ill. Chi. L. Rev. 181, 241 (2024).
[3] The Industry: Program Deaths, Unsilenced Project, Inc., https://www.unsilenced.org/facility-deaths/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2025) (documenting 399 deaths since the 1930s).
[4] Kelly-Leigh Cooper, Troubled US Teens Left Traumatised by Tough Love Camps, BBC News (June 18, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57442175.
[5] Jacob Hancock, Son’s Death at Camp Prompts $45M Suit, Deseret News (Jan. 31, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.deseret.com/2009/1/31/20299412/son-s-death-at-camp-prompts-45m-suit/.
[6] Id.
[7] Nancy Lofholm, Mother: My Son Fought to Live, The Denver Post (May 7, 2016, 9:22 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2007/05/15/mother-my-son-fought-to-live/ (“He was treated for three infections while he was in other juvenile justice programs in Utah before being sent to the camp.”).
[8] Suzanne Ashe, Grieving Mom Sues Camp for Son’s Death, Courthouse News Service (Feb. 2, 2009), https://www.courthousenews.com/grieving-mom-sues-camp-for-sons-death/.
[9] Lofholm, supra note 7.
[10] Hancock, supra note 5.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Safety Team, 12 Teens Who Died at Wilderness Camps, Safer America (June 7, 2024), https://safer-america.com/12-teens-who-died-at-wilderness-camps/.
[14] Hancock, supra note 5.
[15] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-08-696T, Residential Facilities: State and Federal Oversight Gaps May Increase Risk to Youth Well-Being 3 (Apr. 24, 2008).
[16] Corinne Milnamow, The Trouble Team Industry: Should the Federal Government Intervene?, U. Miami L. Rev. Insights (Dec. 4, 2022), https://lawreview.law.miami.edu/the-trouble-team-industry-should-the-federal-government-intervene/.
[17] Jenna Greene, As ‘Troubled Teen’ Industry Scrutiny Builds, Litigation Follows, Reuters: Legal Action, https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/column-troubled-teen-industry-scrutiny-builds-litigation-follows-2024-07-12/ (last updated July 12, 2024, 11:39 AM).
[18] Alicia Maule & Keli Young, What You Need to Know About Qualified Immunity and How It Shields Those Responsible for Wrongful Convictions, Innocence Project: News (Apr. 22, 2024), https://innocenceproject.org/what-you-need-to-know-about-qualified-immunity-and-how-it-shields-those-responsible-for-wrongful-convictions/; Troubled Teen Industry Abuse, Roden Law: Class Actions, https://rodenlaw.com/class-action/troubled-teen-industry-abuse/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2025).
[19] Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999).
[20] Hancock, supra note 5.
[21] 42 U.S.C. § 1983; U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
[22] U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
[23] Hancock, supra note 5.
[24] Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
[25] See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1981).
[26] Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
[27] Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
[28] Ronald H. Rosenberg, Constitutional Law — The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform, 51 U. N.C. L. Rev. 1539, 1540–41 (1973).
[29] James Rosenzweig, State Prison Conditions and the Eighth Amendment: What Standard for Reform Under Section 1983?, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 411, 417.
[30] Hancock, supra note 5.
[31] Id.
[32] Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31–32 (1993) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 US 189, 200 (1989)).
[33] Id.
[34] See Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 290.
[35] Jack C. Hanssen, Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Ratification Theory of City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik: An Analysis of Federal Circuit Treatment, 27 Notre Dame J. Legis. 361, 363 (2001).
[36] Thomson Reuters, What Are the Elements of a Section 1983 Claim? (June 13, 2022), https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/blog/what-are-the-elements-of-a-section-1983-claim/.
[37] See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
[38] Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
[39] Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (quoting Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100). The Hope court held that, even though Larry Hope did not cite “fundamentally” or “materially” similar case law for support, his Eighth Amendment right was clearly established because it was so obviously violated by the challenged prison conditions. The prison conditions deemed unconstitutional by the Hope court closely resemble the abuse that Mr. Jensen suffered at AYA. Mr. Hope was handcuffed to a hitching post and isolated from his peers while he was in prison. The prison guards “subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and the restricted position of confinement for a 7-hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.” Id.
[40] Hancock, supra note 5.
[41] See supra Parts I, II.
[42] See Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 290.
[43] Id.
University of Baltimore Law Review 