The Maternal Trap: How the Loss of Access to Hospitals Presents a Reproductive Justice Issue for Incarcerated Women in Rural Areas

*Alexis Berry

I. Introduction

Cuts to Medicaid following the passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) in July 2025[1] are expected to result in the closure of many rural hospitals, leading to higher healthcare costs and limited access to essential medical care.[2] With “almost 60% of people in prisons and 25% of those in local jails [being held] in rural counties,” rural hospital closures will likely present a public health care crisis for incarcerated individuals.[3] Incarcerated women requiring reproductive health services may encounter additional difficulties due to rural hospital closures, which may implicate their constitutional Eighth Amendment rights to adequate medical care.[4]      

Continue reading “The Maternal Trap: How the Loss of Access to Hospitals Presents a Reproductive Justice Issue for Incarcerated Women in Rural Areas”

Coming to a Courtroom Near You: Universal Jurisdiction and the Waning Era of Impunity

*Taylor Smith

I. Introduction

As conflicts erupt across the globe, justice for human rights abuses often feels elusive. Beyond the well-known International Criminal Court (ICC) or hybrid tribunals, a little-known legal principle is emerging as a viable tool for accountability: universal jurisdiction. Through this mechanism, “national judicial systems [are able] to investigate and prosecute [some] of the most serious crimes . . . no matter where they [a]re committed, and regardless of the nationality of the suspects or their victims.”[1]

Recently, the United States, using universal jurisdiction, convicted a former Gambian soldier of torture and conspiracy to commit torture under the U.S. torture statute.[2] This marked the first conviction of a non-U.S. citizen under the statute in U.S. history.[3] This decision represents an important moment for the United States’ engagement with international criminal law and signals the growing normalization of universal jurisdiction as a legitimate tool for justice.[4] By expanding the circumstances under which U.S. courts may prosecute atrocities committed abroad, contrary to its former posture, the United States is contributing to a broader effort to close the “safe havens” that have historically allowed perpetrators of international crimes to evade accountability.[5] Universal jurisdiction’s use prompts both hope and concern about the concept of justice without borders while also offering an alternative to the gaps left by the ICC.[6]

II. Background and Legal Framework

Customary international law consists of unwritten norms derived from consistent and widespread practices, coupled with the belief that these practices are legally binding (opinio juris).[7] Customary international law applies to all states, unlike treaties, which bind only their signatories.[8] States cannot invoke domestic law to excuse noncompliance with international obligations and are therefore expected to integrate treaties and customary law into national frameworks.[9]

Following World War II, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established to prosecute new international crimes, such as crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, under the emerging principle of universal jurisdiction.[10] The courts’ prosecutions maintained the doctrine that the alleged crimes were so grave that they were concerns of all states, or erga omnes, and violated the very substance of jus cogens, the peremptory norms that bind international law to all.[11]

            In the following decades, many countries have incorporated international crimes into domestic law.[12] For instance, in 2024, Germany enacted the Act on the Further Development of International Criminal Law to strengthen its framework for prosecuting international crimes.[13] In the same year, Denmark implemented reforms that incorporated war crimes, torture, and crimes against humanity into its penal code, while also expanding jurisdiction to cover anyone present in Danish territory.[14]

U.S. law criminalizes genocide, torture, and the recruitment of child soldiers.[15] Initially, with regard to the crime of genocide, jurisdiction applied when the acts were either committed within the United States or the nationalities of the victims or perpetrators were Americans.[16] “In . . . 2023, President Biden signed into law the Justice forVictims of War Crimes Act, which [expands the jurisdiction of] 18 U.S.C. § 2441 . .  to include any offender present in the United States, regardless of the nationality of the victim or offender.”[17]

III. Case Studies and Recent Developments

The landmark case on universal jurisdiction arose from Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, which lasted from 1973 to 1990.[18] On October 16, 1998, Pinochet was arrested in London, England, under “a Spanish [warrant] charging [him] with human rights [abuses,] including murder, torture, and [enforced d]isappearance[s] committed . . . in Chile” against nationals of various countries while president.[19] Although he ultimately evaded trial on health grounds and died in 2006, the case set a clear precedent. It affirmed that even former heads of state could be subject to prosecution for international crimes committed abroad.[20]

            European courts expanded this precedent.[21] In Germany, Anwar Raslan, a former Syrian intelligence officer with the General Intelligence Service, was convicted of crimes against humanity and received a life sentence for torturing over 4,000 individuals, committing sexual violence, and killing twenty-seven people while they were in a Syrian detention center.[22] Additionally, in Switzerland, Ousman Sonko, Gambia’s former interior minister, was sentenced to twenty years in prison for crimes against humanity.[23] In France, Kunti Kamara, a Liberian commander of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy, was convicted of various crimes against humanity committed during Liberia’s civil war and was sentenced to life in 2022.[24]

            Most recently, in August 2025, a U.S. federal court convicted Michael Sang Correa, a Gambian national and alleged former member of the Junglers paramilitary group,[25] of torture and conspiracy to torture during the dictatorship of Yahya Jammeh.[26] Correa’s conviction marked the first time a non-U.S. citizen with no direct connection to the United States, other than his presence on U.S. soil, was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A for acts of torture committed abroad.[27] After a five-day trial in April 2025, a federal jury unanimously found Correa guilty on all counts.[28] In August 2025, “a federal judge [formally] sentenced . . . Correa to 810 months or 67.5 years in prison for torture committed in The Gambia in 2006.”[29] The Correa conviction underscores a turning point: U.S. courts now recognize universal jurisdiction not merely as a theoretical principle but as an actionable legal strategy.[30]

IV. Political Tensions from Its Usage

Early criticisms of universal jurisdiction were led by Americans like Henry Kissinger, who argued that “universal jurisdiction [i]s a breach of . . . [s]tat[e] sovereignty that creates [a] ‘universal tyranny of judges.’”[31] Opponents also warn that these prosecutions may enable politically motivated cases against government officials, undermining diplomatic relations and national sovereignty.[32]

Furthermore, as with the ICC, critics argue that Western states have disproportionately wielded universal jurisdiction against the Global South, with a focus on African defendants, while ignoring Western abusers.[33] Notably, between 1961 and 2017, 45.9% of universal jurisdiction trials were against African defendants, while only 26.2% were against European defendants, 18% against Middle Eastern defendants, and the remainder against Asian, Central, and South American defendants.[34] Moreover, in the subsequent decade (2008–2017), the share of cases involving African defendants increased to 52.9%.[35] While African defendants continue to face prosecution, recent targets of universal jurisdiction have expanded significantly to also include Syrian officials.[36] Despite geographical expansion, the absence of Western defendants, some from the very states driving these prosecutions, further fuels the accusations of selective enforcement and neocolonial optics.[37]

V. The Future of Universal Jurisdiction and Why It Matters

According to TRIAL International’s Universal Jurisdiction Annual Report, there were 36 new cases lodged in 27 different countries involving at least 297 suspects.[38] This surge shows universal jurisdiction is no longer fringe; it is becoming an actionable mechanism of global justice when traditional avenues fail.[39] The principle’s application in cases from Pinochet to Correa illustrates how national courts can fill the gaps left by international tribunals and challenge the impunity of even the most powerful perpetrators.[40] Yet as its reach expands, so too must intention, ensuring that prosecutions are guided by fairness, rather than politics. Furthermore, the U.S. application of this principle could enhance its legitimacy and encourage broader, more balanced enforcement and narrow safe havens to war criminals.[41]

VI. Conclusion

Impunity often seems guaranteed when perpetrators of atrocities and crimes go unabated. However, universal jurisdiction represents both promise and peril: the promise of a world in which perpetrators of atrocity cannot escape accountability by crossing borders, and the peril of inconsistent or politicized enforcement.[42] As the United States cautiously joins this evolving field, the question becomes not whether universal jurisdiction will grow, but who it will reach next?

*Taylor is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor for Law Review. She serves as Vice President of the International Law Society and Historian for the Black Law Students Association. A dedicated human rights advocate, Taylor is currently an extern with Ipas, a global reproductive rights organization, and with Perseus Strategies, an international law firm. She aims to bring her passion and advocacy skills to the field of international criminal law to protect and promote human rights.

[1] Universal Jurisdiction, Hum. Rts. Watch, https://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice/universal-jurisdiction (last visited Jan. 29, 2026); accord Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction, Hum. Rts. Watch (Oct. 19, 2009, at 08:45 ET), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction.

[2] US Trial Against Gambian Accused of Torture, Hum. Rts. Watch (Apr. 7, 2025, at 13:00 ET), https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/07/us-trial-against-gambian-accused-torture.  

[3] The United States previously tried and convicted the son of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, Chuckie Taylor, in 2008 for war crimes; he was the first U.S. citizen to be convicted for “overseas torture”. The second U.S. conviction was against Ross Roggio, also a U.S. citizen, for committing torture and conspiracy to commit torture in Iraq. See US Trial Against Gambian Accused of Torture, supra note2. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. U.S. Att’y Off., Middle Dist. of Pa., Man Convicted of Torture and Exporting Weapons Parts and Related Services to Iraq (May 22, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/man-convicted-torture-and-exporting-weapons-parts-and-related-services-iraq.

[4] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Archives: Off. of Pub. Affs., Gambian Man Indicted on Torture Charges (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/gambian-man-indicted-torture-charges (noting that the conviction marked the first application of the Torture Act to a foreign national based solely on presence in the United States); TRIAL International, Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, at 10–15 (2025), https://trialinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/03_TRIAL_UJAR_2025_FINAL_DIGITAL.pdf (documenting increased global reliance on universal jurisdiction prosecutions).

[5] Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, Hum. Rts. Watch (Sep. 2, 2020, at 00:00 ET), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/02/qa-international-criminal-court-and-united-states (describing longstanding U.S. resistance to international criminal jurisdiction); See Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 Foreign Affs. 86, 86–87 (2001) (warning that universal jurisdiction threatens sovereignty);  Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10–15 (noting increasing reliance on domestic courts to prosecute international crimes); TRIAL International, Universal Jurisdiction Law and Practice in the United States at 3–4 (May 2022), https://trialinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/UJ-USA-1.pdf (explaining how U.S. courts have operationalized and prosecuted international crimes domestically).

[6] Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10–12; Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, supra note 5; Factsheet: Universal Jurisdiction, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/factsheet-universal-jurisdiction.

[7] Customary International Law, Corn. L. Sch.: Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law (last visited Jan. 22, 2026).

[8] Martin Willner, Customary International Law: Can UN Guidelines Affect Domestic Laws?, COUNCIL on FOREIGN RELS. (July 30, 2013, at 10:11 ET), https://www.cfr.org/blog/customary-international-law-can-un-guidelines-affect-domestic-laws.

[9] Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44,  ¶  64; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46 [provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties].”).

[10] Genocide was later established as well. International Criminal Justice Since Nuremberg, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/simon-skjodt-center/work/ferencz-international-justice-initiative/transitional-justice/international-criminal-justice-since-nuremberg (last visited Jan. 22, 2026); see also Cleo Meinicke, Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes – Introduction, Pub. Int’l L. & Pol’y Grp. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/lawyering-justice-blog/2019/3/7/domestic-prosecution-of-international-crimes-introduction-of-series (discussing the established crimes enforcement through the modern International Criminal Court).

[11] See Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-Third Session, ch. IV, U.N. Doc. A/77/10 (2022), https://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2022/english/chp4.pdf (explaining that peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) give rise to obligations owed to the international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes), in relation to which all States have a legal interest).

[12] Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10.

[13] Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10; see also Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des Völkerstrafrechts [Act on the Further Development of International Criminal Law], July 30, 2024, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl I] at 255 (Ger.) (the asserted goals of the amendments are to “close gaps in criminal liability, strengthen victims’ rights and improve the broad impact of international criminal law judgments”).

[14] Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10.

[15] 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091, 2340–2340A, 2442.

[16] Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 § 1, Pub. L. 100–606, 102 Stat. 3045 (1988), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-102/pdf/STATUTE-102-Pg3045.pdf#page=3; Hum. Rts. & Special Prosecutions Section, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Crim. Div., Guide to Human Rights Statutes (2022).

[17] Note there have been no prosecutions under this statute to date. United States Submission: Information and Observations on the Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, UN.ORG (May 10, 2024),  https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/79/universal_jurisdiction/us_e.pdf; 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (amending the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, notably expanding those that fall within the jurisdiction of the statute); U.S. Expands Potential for War Crimes Cases, Syria Just. & Accountability Ctr. (Jan. 18, 2023), https://syriaaccountability.org/u-s-expands-potential-for-war-crimes-cases/; Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10; Karen Sokol, The First Prosecution Under the War Crimes Act: Overview and International Legal Context, CONGRESS.GOV (Dec. 22, 2023), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/LSB11091.

[18] Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: Questions and Answers, AI Index IOR  53/020/2001 (Dec. 2001), https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ior530202001en.pdf.

[19] Belgium, France, and Switzerland too sought his extradition for these crimes.  Id.

[20] Id; Jonathan Kandell, Augusto Pinochet, Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies at 91, New York Times (Dec. 11, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/americas/augusto-pinochet-dictator-who-ruled-by-terror-in-chile-dies.html; The Pinochet Precedent How Victims Can Pursue Human Rights Criminals Abroad, Hum. Rts. Watch (Nov. 1, 1998), https://www.hrw.org/report/1998/11/01/pinochet-precedent/how-victims-can-pursue-human-rights-criminals-abroad.

[21] Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 58–59.

[22] This is the first such conviction relating to the Assad regime after Raslan was arrested in 2019 having successfully sought asylum in Germany. Jenny Hill, German Court Finds Syrian Colonel Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity, BBC (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59949924; Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 58–59.

[23] The highest-ranking official ever tried under universal jurisdiction in Europe. Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10, 91.

[24] Id. at 40. Crimes included murder, enslavement, rape, torture, and cannibalism.

[25] The Junglers were a death squad that answered directly to President Jammeh and served as one of the regime’s most brutal enforcement arms from 1994 to 2016. The UN special rapporteur on torture found they carried out Jammeh’s most repressive abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial killing. US Trial Against Gambian Accused of Torture, supra note 2; Former Jungler Sentenced to Over 67 Years for Torture, TRIAL International (Aug. 22, 2025), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/former-jungler-sentenced-to-over-67-years-for-torture/.

[26] Prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 23240–2340A. In December 2023, Correa moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Congress lacked authority to enact the Torture Act and that prosecuting a noncitizen for crimes committed abroad violated due process. Both motions were denied. Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 98; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Just. Archives: Off. of Pub. Affs., Gambian Man Indicted on Torture Charges (Feb. 5, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/gambian-man-indicted-torture-charges.

[27] See US Trial Against Gambian Accused of Torture, supra note 2. The 2008 prosecution of Chuckie Taylor, son of Liberian president Charles Taylor and a U.S. citizen, was the first use of the Torture Act. Correa’s case marks its first application to a foreign national with no U.S. ties beyond physical presence. Laura Richardson Brownlee, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United States: American Attitudes and Practices in the Prosecution of Charles “Chuckie” Taylor Jr., 9 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 331, 332–33 (2010).

[28] Sentencing Hearing for Michael Correa Scheduled, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY,  https://cja.org/u-s-jury-finds-gambian-death-squad-member-guilty-of-torture-2-2/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2026).

[29] Sabreen Tuku, Former Jungler Sentenced for Torture, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY (Aug. 22, 2025), https://cja.org/u-s-jury-finds-gambian-death-squad-member-guilty-of-torture-2-2-2/.

[30] See U.S. Trial Against Gambian Accused of Torture, supra note 2.

[31] Rose Mahdavieh, Beyond the Borders: The Rise of Judicial Corruption and Universal Jurisdiction, 14 U. Mia. Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 188, 221 (2024) (quoting Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 Foreign Affs. 86, 86 (2001)).

[32] While active head of state immunity is accepted, the concern of judicial reprisal for officials after leaving office still poses a threat. Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 1.

[33] A large majority of the prosecuting states are from Europe, namely France, Germany, Spain, and Belgium. Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 104–11; Melissa Hendrickse, A Chance for Africa to Counter the Pitfalls of International Criminal Justice?, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 22, 2024), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/a-chance-for-africa-to-counter-the-pitfalls-of-international-criminal-justice/; Edmarverson A. Santos, The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction in Human Rights Enforcement, Dipl. & L., https://www.diplomacyandlaw.com/post/the-evolution-of-universal-jurisdiction-in-human-rights-enforcement?utm_source (last visited Feb. 22, 2026).

[34] Maximo Langer & Mackenzie Eason, The Quiet Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction, 30 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 1779, 812–813 (2019).

[35] Id. at 812.

[36] Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 104–11.

[37] Hendrickse, supra note 33; Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, supra note 5.

[38] There was a thirty-two percent increase from the year prior. Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10, 13.

[39] See Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review, supra note 4, at 10.

[40]  Tuku, supra note 29.

[41] A past example is the Center for Constitutional Rights’ effort to have former President Bush tried in Canada and Switzerland for detainee abuses. Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin has avoided countries likely to enforce arrest warrants while traveling to meet President Trump in 2025. Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, supra note 5. 

[42] Factsheet: Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 6.

Changes to the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Could Declare Non-Profits, State and Local Government Jobs as “Substantially Illegal”—21 States, 5 Cities and Counties, and 9 Nonprofits Are Fighting Back

*Madeline Stewart

I. Changes to PSLF and Subsequent Lawsuits

 On November 3, 2025, two complaints were filed against the U.S. Department of Education and Linda McMahon, the Secretary of the Department of Education[1], following the Department of Education’s announcement of a rule change to the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program (PSLF) on October 31.[2] The new regulation, going into effect on July 1, 2026, has added provisions to “exclude employers that engage in specific enumerated illegal activities such that have a substantial illegal purpose” from the program to avoid the cost of subsidizing “employees of organizations that undermine national security and American values through criminal activity.”[3] The plaintiffs, including twenty-one states and the District of Columbia, nine nonprofits, and five cities and counties, allege that the new regulation targets organizations and governments whose policies conflict with the Trump Administration’s positions on “immigration, race, gender, free speech, and public protest[.]” [4]

Beginning July 1, 2026, payments made by student loan borrowers who are employed by organizations the Secretary of Education determines are “engaged in illegal activity” will not qualify for PSLF credit.[5] An additional amendment states that a student loan borrower cannot request reconsideration of the Secretary’s decision after the Secretary has determined that an employer has a substantial illegal purpose.[6] If an employer is found to have a substantial illegal purpose, the employer will be ineligible to participate in PSLF unless “the Secretary approves a corrective action plan[,]” or ten years have passed from the Secretary’s determination.[7]

II. History of PSLF

PSLF was created under Title IV of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, which cancels the remaining loan balance owed by student loan borrowers who have made 120 payments to their student loan balance after October 1, 2007, while employed in public service jobs.[8] These public service jobs include roles in government, teaching, nursing, policing, 501(c)(3) non-profits, and public interest law.[9]

The first batch of borrowers applying for loan forgiveness after 120 payments, or ten years of monthly payments, became eligible in 2017, during the first Trump Administration.[10] The program’s complex eligibility requirements were difficult to interpret, and the company hired to manage the program was not provided with an instructional manual, hindering its ability to provide clarification.[11] “[B]orrower[s] who [we]re. . . ‘confused’ by the program’s requirement[s could not get answers on] whether their employment [wa]s eligible,” and the system in place made “errors in [count]ing [the amount of loan] payments,” with the responsibility falling “on. . . borrowers to catch. . . mistakes.”[12] As a result of these issues, only ninety-six out of the 28,000 borrowers who submitted applications between October 2017 and September 2018 were approved for loan forgiveness.[13]

In 2019, the American Bar Association (ABA) and four individual plaintiffs employed in public interest law sued the Department of Education over the denial of PSLF to ABA and to public interest lawyers working for certain non-profit classifications.[14] Three of the individual plaintiffs were successful in arguing that the changes the Department of Education had made to PSLF, which rendered them ineligible for loan forgiveness, violated the Administrative Procedure Act.[15]By October 2024, over a million borrowers had more than $70 billion in student debt forgiven through the program. [16]

III. Plaintiffs’ Concerns in the November 2025 Complaints

 Both complaints filed against the Department of Education in November 2025 raised concerns that, without PSLF, high student loan debt will prevent top talent from pursuing nonprofit and government careers, opting to work for higher-paying private corporations instead.[17] The plaintiffs are also concerned that “illegal” activities will include activities that, while legal, do not align with the Trump Administration’s policy agendas, and that the illegal purposes outlined in the rule are pretextual and target “support for immigrants, gender affirming care, diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives, and political protest.”[18] This rule would allow the Secretary of Education to single-handedly select which employers have engaged in a “substantial illegal purpose,” a term that is overbroad and vague.[19]

IV. Conclusion

If these changes to PSLF take effect, current and future students may be hesitant to pursue career paths that incur high student debt for modestly paying jobs, such as government and non-profit work.[20] Those who can work elsewhere for higher pay to manage student debt may do so, effectively gutting organizations that have relied on PSLF to entice new hires.[21] Furthermore, current and prospective students may be disincentivized from pursuing careers in causes that they believe in if their beliefs do not align with an Administration’s agenda.[22]

*Madeline Stewart is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor for Volume 55 of Law Review. Madeline is a member of the mock trial team and the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. Prior to law school, she attended Towson University, majoring in Journalism and Women’s Studies.  This summer, she will join Semmes, Bowen & Semmes as a Summer Associate. 

[1] Complaint, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-13244 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2025) [hereinafter No. 1:25-cv-13244 Complaint]; Complaint, Nat’l Council of Nonprofits v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-13242 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2025).

[2] William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 90 Fed. Reg. 48966 (Oct. 31, 2025) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 685).

[3] William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 90 Fed. Reg. at 48966.

[4] No. 1:25-cv-13244 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 19;Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3, 30–31.

[5] William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 90 Fed. Reg. at 48966.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 48966–67.

[8] College Cost Reduction and Access Act § 401, 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (requiring eligible borrowers to have made 120 payments, to be employed in a public service job during the 120 payments, and to be employed in a public service job at the time of loan forgiveness).

[9] See Qualifying Public Services for the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Program,Fed. Student Aid, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service/qualifying-public-services (last visited Jan. 28, 2026).

[10] Stacy Cowley, 28,000 Public Servants Sought Student Loan Forgiveness. 96 Got It., N.Y. Times (Sep. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/business/student-loan-forgiveness.html.

[11] Id.  

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] A.B.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10, (D.D.C. 2019).

[15] Id. at 34; Qualifying Public Services for the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) Program, supra note 9.  

[16] Making Public Service Loan Forgiveness Work for Borrowers and the American People, The White House: Council of Economic Advisors (Oct. 17, 2024), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/cea/written-materials/2024/10/17/making-public-service-loan-forgiveness-work-for-borrowers-and-the-american-people/.

[17] No. 1:25-cv-13244 Complaint, supra note 1, at 8; Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.

[18] No. 1:25-cv-13244 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2; see Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3.

[19] No. 1:25-cv-13244 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3; Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.

[20] See PSLF: A Crucial Tool for Recruiting and Retaining Legal Professionals, ABA (Aug. 26, 2025) https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/legaleducation/pslf-homepage/pslf-overview-and-purpose/ (“81% of surveyed public-interest attorneys aware of PSLF reported that the program’s promise significantly influenced their decision to take their current job, and over half said that they likely would not have taken the job at all if PSLF didn’t exist.”)

[21] See No. 1:25-cv-13244 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1; Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.

[22] See No. 1:25-cv-13244 Complaint, supra note 1, at 8, 19; Nat’l Council of Nonprofits Complaint, supra note 1, at 9, 30.

YouTube’s AI ‘Likeness Detection’ Tool and the Emerging Law of Digital Identity

*Ian Drury

I. Introduction — “The New Deepfake Dilemma”

On September 30, 2025, OpenAI introduced its new Sora 2 video generation model.[1] Sora 2 is a generative AI video model that enables users to input text or an image to generate a realistic video with accompanying audio.[2] Less than a month later, OpenAI announced a partnership with Brian Cranston and SAG-AFTRA to combat fake videos (“deepfakes”) using Cranston’s likeness and strengthen internal tools around unapproved AI-generated videos.[3]

These developments expose a mismatch between how synthetic media is produced and how it is regulated.[4] Deepfakes routinely evade copyright enforcement because they often do not copy-protected expression at all.[5] In response, YouTube has introduced a “likeness detection” tool to supplement its Content ID system, signaling a shift in platform governance toward identity-based protection.[6] While deepfakes have been identified as an issue for some time, the introduction of Sora 2 and the subsequent statement featuring Brian Cranston mark an escalation in the ease—and therefore the proliferation—of deepfakes that can “spread false information and easily manipulate public opinion.”[7] The problem is that deepfakes sidestep existing copyright protections on content platforms and blur the boundary between creative expression and deception.[8] The ease of creating fake videos only increases the challenges creators and public figures face in protecting their image and voice from unauthorized AI-generated content.[9]

YouTube’s likeness detection initiative may signal an escalation in the AI arms race, in which tech companies seek to build greater public trust and thus lessen public pressure for AI regulation.[10] Google and other tech companies have assumed a quasi-regulatory role in overseeing AI-generated content.[11] Still, it remains uncertain whether the implementation of such tools aligns with the existing regulatory framework surrounding privacy, likeness, and free expression.[12]

II. Background — From Content ID to Content Identity

Deepfakes present a new challenge to platforms trying to moderate copyright issues on their platforms because a deepfake video is not a duplicate of copyrighted work, but rather a new composition utilizing another’s likeness.[13] This slight difference in how likeness detection works allows Google to combat the proliferation of deepfake content in a way that Content ID does not.[14] As concerns about rights related to likeness and the harms caused by deepfakes continue to rise,[15] legislatures have enacted laws criminalizing certain uses of deepfakes.[16] These laws create an incentive for content platforms, such as YouTube, to increase moderation to mitigate violations that harm the image of their revenue-generating content creators.[17]

YouTube’s Content ID system automatically scans all uploaded videos and compares them to a database of content submitted by copyright holders.[18] If the system identifies a match, YouTube either blocks the videos from public view, demonetizes them, or shares statistics with the rightsholder.[19] Content ID is an appeasement to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (“DMCA”) copyrighted material handling requirements of content platforms such as YouTube.[20] Content ID adds an intermediary step between uploading a video containing copyrighted material and receiving a DMCA violation notice.[21] Content ID’s effectiveness is limited because it relies solely on existing content for comparison with new uploads.[22]

As AI-generated deepfakes proliferated and likeness-related rights legislation emerged, YouTube introduced a likeness detection tool to supplement its Content ID system.[23] Likeness detection works by having eligible creators upload a facial scan and a government-issued ID, which serve as references for the system.[24] Using that information, the likeness detection tool will scan all newly uploaded videos on the platform for any use of that likeness and flag those videos for review by the original creator.[25] The creator is then “empowered to submit a removal request” to protect their image.[26]

III. The Legal Gray Zone — Platform Policing vs. User Rights

YouTube’s likeness detection raises legal issues concerning the intersection of likeness rights and First Amendment–protected expression.[27] A system such as  likeness detection is susceptible to errors, including false positives.[28] If a platform allows the suppression of a video based on a false positive, then it forgoes the broad immunity that §230 of the Communications Act of 1934 affords it.[29] This means that suppressing protected speech through likeness detection could expose YouTube and other content platforms to liability that §230 would otherwise shield.[30] By exercising editorial control through likeness detection, the platforms risk being treated more like traditional publishers rather than neutral platforms.[31] Additionally, when creators anticipate that their content may be wrongly flagged or removed, they may refrain from posting lawful material.[32] This dynamic would create a chilling effect on the platform by discouraging posts that may run afoul of the automated moderators, even without direct government involvement.[33]

Legal recourse for creators would be limited as §230, and the DMCA’s safe-harbor provisions broadly immunize platforms from good-faith moderation decisions, even when those removals suppress free speech.[34] Because platforms are private entities, creators generally lack standing to bring First Amendment claims.[35] However, because platforms such as YouTube functionally operate as a “modern public square,”[36] scholars have suggested that these platforms should be scrutinized when they restrict or block certain content.[37]

IV. Conclusion

YouTube’s likeness detection marks a new phase in the governance of AI-generated media.[38] As platforms assume greater responsibility for moderating synthetic content, they also inherit complex questions about liability, privacy, and free expression.[39] By analyzing likeness detection in the context of the shift to synthetic content moderation, this issue shows unresolved tensions among intellectual property, likeness-related rights, and free expression. Whether courts and policymakers permit this self-regulation to stand or impose new duties on digital gatekeepers will define the evolving landscape of platform accountability.

*Ian Drury is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law where he is a Staff Editor for Law Review and a member of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. Prior to law school, Ian earned a Bachelor of Science in Political Science from the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago, IL and a Master of Business Administration from Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, Baltimore. Next summer he will be working as a Law Clerk for Silverman Thompson.

[1] Sora 2 is Here, OpenAI (Sep. 30, 2025), https://openai.com/index/sora-2/.

[2] Laura Ramsay, Sora 2 Lands on Artlist, ARTLIST: Blog (Jan. 29, 2026), https://artlist.io/blog/sora-2-ai-announcement/.

[3] Jaures Yip, OpenAI Cracks Down on Sora 2 Deepfakes After Pressure from Bryan Cranston,SAG-AFTRA, CNBC (Oct. 20, 2025, at 15:24 ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/20/open-ai-sora-bryan-cranston-sag-aftra.html.

[4] See What Legislation Protects Against Deepfakes and Synthetic Media?, HALOCK, https://www.halock.com/what-legislation-protects-against-deepfakes-and-synthetic-media/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2026) (listing recent federal and state legislation aimed at combating the rise of synthetic media).

[5] Paven Malhotra, Michelle Ybarra & Matan Shacham, Report on Deepfakes: What the Copyright Office Found and What Comes Next in AI Regulation, Reuters (Dec. 18, 2024, at 08:55 ET), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/report-deepfakes-what-copyright-office-found-what-comes-next-ai-regulation-2024-12-18/.

[6] Stevie Bonifield, Youtube’s AI ‘Likeness Detection’ Tool Is Searching for Deepfakes of Popular Creators, The Verge (Oct. 21, 2025, at 17:17 ET), https://www.theverge.com/news/803818/youtube-ai-likeness-detection-deepfake.

[7] See Don Philmlee, Practice Innovations: Seeing Is No Longer Believing — the Rise of Deepfakes, Thomas Reuters (July 18, 2023), https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/technology/practice-innovations-deepfakes.

[8] Ben Gross, Unmasking Deepfakes: Navigating the Copyright Quagmire, CARDOZOAELJ (Apr. 5, 2024), https://cardozoaelj.com/2024/04/05/unmasking-deepfakes-navigating-the-copyright-quagmire/.

[9] See Id.

[10] Melissa Heikkilä, AI Companies Promised to Self-Regulate One Year Ago. What’s Changed?, MIT Tech. Rev. (July 22, 2024), https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/07/22/1095193/ai-companies-promised-the-white-house-to-self-regulate-one-year-ago-whats-changed/; see generally Justin B. Bullock et al., Public Opinion and The Rise of Digital Minds: Perceived Risk, Trust, and Regulation Support, 48 Pub. Performance & Mgmt. Rev. 1357 (2025) (studying how individuals with a greater trust in AI companies are less inclined to support regulation of AI).

[11] Guido Perboli, Nadia Simionato & Serena Pratali, Navigating the AI Regulatory Landscape: Balancing Innovation, Ethics, and Global Governance, 13 ECON. & Pol. Stud. 367, 377, 389 (2025) (discussing Google’s and Microsoft’s self-adopted AI regulation frameworks).

[12] Felipe Romero-Moreno, Deepfake Detection in Generative AI: A Legal Framework Proposal to Protect Human Rights, in 58 Computer Law & Security Review 1, 3, 10, 28 (2025). 

[13] See David E. Weslow, Deepfakes, Deep Claims: Using Intellectual Property to Combat Artificial Intelligence’s Digital Deception, wiley (Nov. 24, 2025), https://www.wiley.law/article-Deepfakes-Deep-Claims-Using-Intellectual-Property-to-Combat-Artificial-Intelligences-Digital-Deception.

[14] See Zach Vallese, YouTube’s New AI Deepfake Tracking Tool Is Alarming Experts and Creators, CNBC (Dec. 2, 2025, at 11:06 ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/02/youtube-ai-biometric-data-creator-deepfake.html.

[15] See e.g. Barbara Ortutay,President Trump Signs Take It Down Act, Addressing Nonconsensual Deepfakes. What Is It?, AP News (May 20, 2025, at 16:08 ET), https://apnews.com/article/take-it-down-deepfake-trump-melania-first-amendment-741a6e525e81e5e3d8843aac20de8615 (discussing congressional efforts to address non-consensual AI-generated likenesses and the harms associated with deepfakes).

[16] See, e.g.,Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West) (establishing liability for any person who knowingly commercially uses another’s likeness without their consent).

[17] Amjad Hanif, New Tools to Protect Creators and Artists, YouTube Official Blog (Sept. 05, 2024), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/responsible-ai-tools/.

[18] Katharine Trendacosta, Unfiltered: How YouTube’s Content ID Discourages Fair Use and Dictates What We See Online, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.eff.org/wp/unfiltered-how-youtubes-content-id-discourages-fair-use-and-dictates-what-we-see-online.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] YouTube Content ID Explained for Video Creators, MUSICBED, https://www.musicbed.com/articles/resources/youtube-content-id/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2026).

[23] Sarah Perez, YouTube Expands Its ‘Likeness’ Detection Technology, Which Detects AI Fakes, to a Handful of Top Creators, TechCrunch (Apr. 9, 2025, at 09:45 PT), https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/09/youtube-expands-its-likeness-detection-technology-which-detects-ai-fakes-to-a-handful-of-top-creators/.

[24] Nick Warner, Exploring YouTube’s New Likeness Detection Tool, Hey Gen: Blog (Oct. 21, 2025) https://www.heygen.com/blog/exploring-youtube-likeness-detection.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] David K. Young, John Gardner & PJ Tabit, Me, Myself, and IP: AI and the Deepfake Problem, THE CONFERENCE BOARD (Nov. 05, 2025), https://www.conference-board.org/research/ced-policy-backgrounders/me-myself-and-ip-ai-and-the-deepfake-problem.

[28] Nathaniel Lacsina, YouTube Launches ‘Likeness-Detection’ to Help Creators Fight AI Impersonation, GULF NEWS (Oct. 22, 2025, at 15:47 ET), https://gulfnews.com/technology/media/youtube-launches-likeness-detection-to-help-creators-fight-ai-impersonation-1.500317044.

[29] Valerie C. Brannon & Eric N. Holmes, Section 230: An Overview, CONGRESS.GOV (Jan. 04, 2024), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46751 (“Courts have interpreted Section 230 as creating broad immunity that allows the early dismissal of many legal claims against interactive computer service providers, preempting lawsuits and statutes that would impose liability based on third-party content”).

[30] See O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1157–60 (9th Cir. 2023) (analyzing if a platform’s actions were coerced by a government official, leaving open the door for a First Amendment challenge to a platform’s moderation).

[31] Ashley Gold & Ina Fried, Grok’s Explicit Images Reveal AI’s Legal Ambiguities, AXIOS (Jan. 7, 2026), https://www.axios.com/2026/01/07/grok-bikini-images-legal-elon-musk.

[32] Anastasia Kozyreva et al., Resolving Content Moderation Dilemmas Between Free Speech and Harmful Misinformation, 120 Procs. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. (2023), https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.2210666120 %5Bhttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2210666120%5D.

[33] See, e.g.,Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2006) (“This Court has recognized that a chilling effect on the exercise of a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights may amount to a judicially cognizable injury in fact, as long as it ‘arise[s] from an objectively justified fear of real consequences.’” (quoting D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2004))).

[34] Thomas J. Cunningham & Michael J. McMorrow, Platforms Face Section 230 Shift from Take It Down Act, troutman pepper locke (June 9, 2025), https://www.troutman.com/insights/platforms-face-section-230-shift-from-take-it-down-act/.

[35] Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 812 (2019).

[36] Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 99 (2017).

[37] Dawn Carla Nunziato, Protecting Free Speech and Due Process Values on Dominant Social Media Platforms, 73 Hastings L.J.1255, 1302 (2022).

[38] See generally Sarah A. Fisher, Jeffrey W. Howard & Beatriz Kira, Moderating Synthetic Content: The Challenge of Generative AI, 37 Phil. & Tech. 133 (examining AI content moderation challenges with respect to free speech).

[39] See Lacsina, supra note 28.

Comedy Under Siege: FCC Retaliation and the Chilling of Political Satire

*Nikkie Navarro

I. Introduction

Two of the most famous late-night talk show hosts in modern American television faced severe consequences after speaking out against the Trump administration.[1] One host facing consequences was Stephen Colbert, who hosted The Late Show for the last ten years.[2] After Colbert spoke out about CBS’s $16 million settlement with the Trump administration regarding a “‘60 Minutes’ interview with then-Vice President Kamala Harris,” Colbert announced that CBS would be cancelling the show in May 2026.[3] Coincidentally, after announcing the cancellation, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) subsequently approved an $8 billion merger deal between Paramount Global, CBS’s owner, and Skydance Media.[4] Another host, Jimmy Kimmel,  was also suspended following his remarks “on the [recent] shooting [of a known Trump ally,] right-wing [political] activist Charlie Kirk.”[5] Many suspect that the FCC used political pressure to coerce media networks to comply with the Trump administration’s agenda.[6] Although the networks cited financial strain and an attempt “to avoid further inflaming a tense situation” as the reasons behind their decisions regarding the shows,[7] the FCC’s political pressure constituted government action that renders those decisions unconstitutional.[8]

Continue reading “Comedy Under Siege: FCC Retaliation and the Chilling of Political Satire”