Erosion by ICE: How Immigration Enforcement Undermines the Fair Housing Guarantee

*Sophie Alemi

I. Introduction: Fair Housing Under Attack

            Under the Trump administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents are conducting ongoing raids of schools, workplaces, and residential neighborhoods in major U.S. cities, searching for immigrants to arrest and prosecute.[1] In response to the Trump administration’s deportation agenda, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) started targeting landlords for their tenants’ “leases, rental applications and identification cards.”[2] Oftentimes, DHS uses subpoenas to intimidate landlords into revealing their tenants’ information; however, there have been multiple reports of such subpoenas being served without a judge’s signature.[3] Even when the subpoenas are unsigned,[4] they contribute to the pressure that DHS is exerting on landlords, which is likely to exacerbate existing discrimination.[5]

II. Immigration Enforcement Practices Undermine Fair Housing Protections

            President Johnson signed the Fair Housing Act (FHA) into law in 1968,[6] following years of support from civil rights activists.[7] The FHA prohibits landlords from discriminating against tenants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, and disability.[8] However, the FHA does not protect against discrimination on the basis of immigration status.[9] The gaps in the fair housing framework permit landlords to request immigration documentation from applicants for tenancy, provided they follow the same procedure for every applicant; otherwise, it may constitute unlawful discrimination based on national origin.[10] Some states, such as California, Illinois, and Oregon, have explicitly encoded protection for immigration status into their housing laws.[11] In other states, like Colorado, the judicial system acts as an additional safeguard for tenants’ privacy rights, such as when a Colorado judge issued a preliminary injunction against a landlord who threatened to notify immigration enforcement of his tenants’ pending immigration status.[12] The Fair Housing Act’s protections are falling short when immigration enforcement pushes the boundaries of acceptable housing practices. [13] 

III. The Current Legal Framework for Immigration Status Protection

            Currently, threatening to report a person to ICE in retaliation for reporting housing discrimination is illegal under the FHA.[14] However, immigration status is not a protected class under the FHA; therefore, the law protects only individuals who report housing discrimination based on race or national origin, rather than immigration status.[15] This allows landlords to discriminate against immigrants who are here on a temporary visa or who are undocumented.[16]

If landlords bow to the pressures of ICE and turn immigrants away from housing opportunities, immigrants will have few choices for housing left, leading them to accept housing arrangements in shared housing spaces, which are often illegal or on a no-lease basis.[17] These housing arrangements leave immigrants with limited legal options to address certain wrongs committed against them, such as eviction or the violation of their right to quiet enjoyment of the premises.[18] The FHA grants fair housing rights to everyone in the U.S., not just citizens.[19] The lack of protection for immigration status under the FHA, coupled with a potential resort to makeshift housing arrangements with reduced legal oversight, highlights the vulnerability of the FHA. However, strengthening fair housing rights will require legal recourse.[20] One option is to make discrimination based on immigration status explicitly illegal under the FHA.[21] Another option would be for states to take the matter into their own hands and join California, Illinois, and Oregon in recognizing immigration status as a protected class under their state fair housing laws and state constitutions.[22]   

IV. Conclusion

            The rights guaranteed by the FHA apply to every person in the United States, not solely to citizens.[23] Given the current climate of immigration enforcement and its potential impact on housing practices, the nation’s current legal framework won’t be sufficient to guarantee nondiscriminatory housing for immigrants of all legal statuses.[24] The FHA not only prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of a protected class,[25] but also provides legal recourse when a housing provider violates its provisions.[26] The federal government, or alternatively, the states, should enshrine protections for immigration status to realize the goal of protecting fair housing rights for all.

*Sophie Alemi is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law where she is a staff editor for Law Review, Vol. 55 and a student advocate on the National Mock Trial Team. Previously, she was a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills and an intern at the Maryland Office of the Public Defender. She looks forward to a career protecting indigent defendants and civil rights.

[1] See Sophia Tareen, Immigration Agents Become Increasingly Aggressive in Chicago, PBS NEWS (Oct. 6, 2025, at 14:07 ET),  https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/immigration-agents-become-increasingly-aggressive-in-chicago; The ICE Raids — What You Need to Know,HIAS (June 27, 2025), https://hias.org/news/ice-raids-what-you-need-know/.

[2] Jesús Jank Curbelo, Pressuring Landlords to Hand over Tenant Records: Trump’s New Strategy to Track Migrants, EL PAÍS (July 18, 2025, at 6:27 ET), https://english.elpais.com/usa/2025-07-18/pressuring-landlords-to-hand-over-tenant-records-trumps-new-strategy-to-track-migrants.html.

[3] Id.

[4] ACLU, Know Your Rights: Immigration Administrative Subpoenas, https://assets.aclu.org/live/uploads/2025/04/ACLU-KYR-on-ICE-administrative-subpoenas-4.17.25.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2026) (“[F]or ICE subpoenas, there are no consequences for an initial failure to comply. Only if a court orders you to comply and you subsequently fail to do so can penalties be imposed.”).

[5] Curbelo, supra note 2.

[6] Fair Housing Act §§ 801–901, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631.

[7] History, The Fight for Fair Housing in the House: A ‘Long, Tortuous, and Difficult Road,’ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Apr. 28, 2021), https://history.house.gov/Blog/2021/April/4-28-FHA/.

[8] Fair Housing Act §§ 801–901, 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

[9] Francis Nguyen, For Immigrant Households, Fear of Arrest and Deportation Erodes Tenants Rights, SHELTERFORCE (Sep. 5, 2025), https://shelterforce.org/2025/09/05/for-immigrant-households-fear-of-arrest-and-deportation-erodes-tenants-rights.

[10] Id.

[11] See Nguyen, supra note 9.

[12] Id.

[13] See Id.

[14] Immigration Protections in Housing, Fair Hous. Just. Center, https://fairhousingjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/FHYA-Handout-Immigration.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2026).

[15] Id.

[16] See id.

[17] Mekonnen Firew Ayano, Tenants Without Rights: Situating the Experiences of New Immigrants in the U.S. Low-Income Housing Market, Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y, 159, 161 (2008), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/25/2021/07/159-Ayano-Tenants-Without-Rights.pdf.

[18] Id. at 162, 167.

[19] Fair Housing & Citizenship: Can You Deny an Applicant?,Fair Hous. Institute, https://fairhousinginstitute.com/fair-housing-citizenship-deny-applicant/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2026).

[20] See Nguyen, supra note 9.

[21] See Fair Hous. Institute, supra note 19; see also Nguyen, supra note 9 (demonstrating that states can effectively protect immigrants through their fair‑housing laws, thereby creating a model for potential federal action).

[22] See Nguyen, supra note 9.

[23] See Fair Hous. Institute, supra note 19.

[24] See Nguyen, supra note 9.

[25] See Nguyen, supra note 9.

[26] Fair Housing Act §§ 801–901, 42 U.S.C. § 3631.

From Inclusion to Exposure: The New Risks of DEI Initiatives in the Workplace Under Title VII

*Macy Hamlett

I. Introduction

In Chislett v. New York City Department of Education, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that mandatory implicit bias training may give rise to race-based hostile work environment claims.[1] With the Second Circuit’s decision strengthening claims, the surge of hostile workplace cases centered around Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives have the potential to survive the summary judgment stage.[2] Chislett represents a shift in the legal framework of race-based hostile work environment claims and DEI.[3] This rapid change stems from the Supreme Court’s June 2025 decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services and recent actions from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).[4] The guidance from the Supreme Court and the EEOC has led to unchartered waters for employers and lower courts.[5]

II. Rapidly Changing Field

A. Ames Opinion

On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ames, holding that Title VII applies equally to all persons, no matter their status as a member of a “majority-group” or “minority-group.”[6] Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services (hereinafter agency) since 2004, earning promotions all the way up to a program administrator.[7] In 2019, Ames applied for a new management position, but the agency hired a lesbian woman for the role.[8] A few days after her interview for the position, the agency demoted her to an executive secretary—the position she was hired for in 2004—and hired a gay man to fill her now vacant position.[9] Ames filed suit under Title VII alleging sexual orientation discrimination.[10] The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of the agency.[11] The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating Ames had failed to show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the [agency] is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”[12] The Supreme Court held that the “background circumstances” test disregarded Title VII’s lack of “distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.”[13] The Supreme Court remanded for application of the proper prima facie standard.[14] Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit then vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.[15] With this holding, the Supreme Court eliminated the need for majority group plaintiffs to show “background circumstances” thereby reducing their evidentiary burden to one more closely aligned with that faced by minority group plaintiffs.[16]

B. EEOC Guidance

Even before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ames, the EEOC published “two technical assistance documents” addressing unlawful discrimination arising from workplace DEI initiatives.[17] The EEOC reminded readers, in its guidance, that DEI is “a broad term that is not defined in Title VII.”[18] The guidance explicitly stated that DEI initiatives may be unlawful under Title VII if the initiatives involve an “employment action motivated—in whole or in part—by an employee’s or applicant’s race, sex, or another protected characteristic.”[19] Further, the guidance denied Title VII’s application only to minority groups.[20]

C. Second Circuit’s Opinion in Chislett

Leslie Chislett served as Executive Director of the “AP for All” program within the New York City Department of Education’s Office of Equity & Access, where she supervised fifteen employees.[21] Early on in her role, Chislett felt “racial tension” inside and outside her team.[22] During her tenure, she participated in bias trainings where instructors referenced the “values of [w]hite culture are supremacist[,]” had executive directors declaring “[t]here is white toxicity in the air[,]” and was singled out by co-workers in a fifteen-minute confrontation at a staff retreat.[23] Throughout the course of her employment, Chislett continued to express her concerns with management, many of which were shared by her white co-workers, yet her concerns were consistently ignored.[24] Chislett resigned and brought suit under Section 1983, asserting race discrimination.[25] The district court granted the department’s motion for summary judgment.[26]

The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of Chislett’s hostile work environment claim, holding that a reasonable juror could find there were “racially-charged statements expressed during trainings, in meetings, and about another employee in her presence.”[27] The court noted it was not ruling implicit bias trainings as being “per se racist[,]” but instead when they are conducted in a manner to “discuss any race ‘with a constant drumbeat of essentialist, deterministic, and negative language [about a particular race], [employers] risk liability under federal law.’”[28]

III. Current Status of Cases Pending

The Second Circuit is not the only court to be faced with these issues, as both the Ninth and Third Circuit currently have related matters pending before them.[29] In the Third Circuit, Zack De Piero, a white man who worked as a writing professor at Pennsylvania State University, is appealing the dismissal of his hostile work environment claim.[30] In the Ninth Circuit, Joshua Diemert, a white man who worked for Seattle’s Human Resource Department, is appealing the grant of the City’s motion for summary judgment.[31]

IV. Conclusion

With the EEOC and Supreme Court affirming that Title VII applies to all classes of people, and the Second Circuit suggesting that DEI workplace trainings may create a hostile work environment, the legal landscape is poised for change.[32] The language used by the Second Circuit may provide persuasive authority for other jurisdictions to evaluate hostile work environment claims involving DEI trainings.[33] Numerous appellate cases could divide courts on interpretations of DEI training, but one thing is clear: Employers must address workplace concerns or risk liability.[34]

*Macy Hamlett is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor for Volume 55 of Law Review. Macy is a member of Honor Board, a Distinguished Scholar of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society, a UB LEADS Mentor, and a Law Scholar for Property. In the summer of 2025, Macy worked as a Summer Associate for Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz PC. This summer, she will join DLA Piper LLP (US) as a Summer Associate in their Baltimore office. 

[1] Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 157 F.4th 172, 191 (2d Cir. 2025);see also Khorri Atkinson, Implicit Bias Training Ruling Gives Anti-DEI Plaintiffs Foothold, Bloomberg L. (Oct. 2, 2025, at 05:15 ET), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/bloomberg-law-news/BNA%2000000199-9adc-d6ea-a1f9-dbdc34a90000 (explaining how Chislett offers “new leverage to bolster allegations from workers challenging diversity initiatives on similar grounds.”).

[2] See infra Part II.

[3] See generally Patrick Dorrian, White Athletic Director Lacks Bias Suit over Administration Jobs, Bloomberg L. (Oct. 20, 2022, at 18:17 ET), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/bloomberg-law-news/XALAU8IC000000#jcite (discussing Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of the district court granting summary judgment against a white athletic director in Groves v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 51 F.4th 766 (7th Cir. 2022)).

[4] See infra Sections II.A–B.

[5] See infra Part II.

[6] Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 309 (2025) (“Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.”).

[7] Id. at 306.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., No. 2:20-cv-05935, 2023 WL 2539214, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2023).

[12] 605 U.S. at 306–07 (quoting Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 87 F.4th 822, 825 (6th Cir. 2023)).

[13] Id. at 309–11.

[14] Id. at 311–13.

[15] Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., No. 23-3341, 2025 WL 2554965, at *1 (6th Cir. Sep. 2, 2025).

[16] See supra note 6at 307–08.

[17] Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC and Justice Department Warn Against Unlawful DEI-Related Discrimination (Mar. 19, 2025), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-and-justice-department-warn-against-unlawful-dei-related-discrimination.

[18] What You Should Know About DEI-Related Discrimination at Work, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-dei-related-discrimination-work (last visited Oct. 18, 2025).

[19] Id.

[20] Id. (answering in the negative to “Do Title VII’s protections only apply to individuals who are part of a ‘minority group’. . . ?”).

[21] Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 157 F.4th 172, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2025).

[22] Id. at 179.

[23] Id. at 180–83 (citations omitted) (“Several of Chislett’s Caucasian coworkers began to perceive the environment as hostile.”).

[24] See id. at 180–83.

[25] Id. at 183.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 190.

[28] Id. at 191 (quoting De Piero v. Pa. State Univ., 711 F. Supp. 3d 410, 424 (E.D. Pa. 2024)).

[29] See Notice of Appeal, De Piero v. Pa. State Univ., No. 25-0152 (3d Cir. Mar. 16, 2025) [hereinafter De Piero Notice of Appeal]; Notice of Appeal, Diemert v. City of Seattle, No. 25-1188 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2025).

[30] See De Piero Notice of Appeal, supra note 29; De Piero v. Pa. State Univ., 769 F. Supp. 3d 329, 333, 357 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (finding “no reasonable jury could determine that the twelve incidents . . . warrants his hostile work environment claims to go to trial.”).

[31] Diemert v. City of Seattle, 776 F. Supp. 3d 922, 951 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (finding an “isolated incident is not enough to show a ‘longstanding practice or custom’ of exclusion” (citation omitted)).

[32] See supra Part II.

[33] See supra Section II.C; Chislett, 711 F. Supp. 3d at 191 (holding that when implicit bias trainings address “any race ‘with a constant drumbeat of essentialist, deterministic, and negative language [about a particular race], [employers] risk liability under federal law.’” (quoting De Piero v. Pa. State Univ., 711 F. Supp. 3d 410, 424 (E.D. Pa. 2024)).

[34] See supra Section II.C, Part III.

The Great Regression: Immigration Law in Crisis

Title: The Great Regression: Immigration Law in Crisis 

Date and Time: Friday, March 27, 2026, from 9am – 4:15pm

Location: John and Frances Angelos Law Center, 1401 N. Charles St. Baltimore, MD 21201

Click Here to Register 

Continue reading “The Great Regression: Immigration Law in Crisis”

Buy Now, Pay Later, Regulate Never: The CFPB’s Failed Attempt to Govern BNPL Lending

*Colin Livingston

I. Introduction

“Buy now, pay later” programs have quickly become a popular interest-free credit option, with disproportionately high use “among financially vulnerable consumers.”[1] Retailers offer these programs “through payment platforms like Afterpay, Klarna, and Affirm[,]” allowing consumers to pay for “online or in-store purchases. . . [through] installments over a short period” of time.[2] According to a 2025 survey, about one in three U.S. adults has used a “buy now, pay later” service for at least one purchase.[3] Furthermore, the global “buy now, pay later” (BNPL) market is projected “to reach $560.1 billion in 2025. . . [and] expand. . . to approximately $911.8 billion” by the end of 2030, reflecting its rapid growth in how consumers finance and purchase products.[4] Despite the development of this credit option, BNPL programs are not subject to the same regulatory requirements governing traditional credit card companies, including Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act.[5]

II. Consumer Vulnerability and Financial Risk in BNPL Lending

Debt related to traditional credit card purchases is already a serious problem for many Americans,[6] and BNPL programs only add to this issue.[7] Those who use these programs tend to be in financially vulnerable positions, with lower credit scores and a greater incidence of thirty-day delinquencies on other loans.[8] Moreover, these consumers are more likely to be denied traditional credit, carry revolving balances on their credit cards, and hold higher levels of debt with “fewer liquid assets.”[9] To make matters worse, BNPL loan “providers [do not] run. . . hard credit check[s],” making these loans more attractive to those with limited or poor credit history.[10]

 The structure of these programs makes consumers vulnerable to overextending their credit by “loan stacking and sustained usage.”[11] Those using BNPL lenders are likely to spend more on purchases than they would have without BNPL credit.[12] As a result, a borrower may take on multiple BNPL loans from different providers simultaneously, increasing the risk of repayment failure.[13] Furthermore, sustained usage of these lenders may risk “borrowers’ ability to meet non-BNPL financial obligations such as rent,. . . mortgages, or auto loans.”[14] Although marketed as an interest-free credit option,[15] borrowers also risk accumulating “hidden interest.”[16] This cost may arise in the form of late fees for missed payments or by accruing revolving interest if they use a credit card to make an installment payment, negating many of the supposed benefits of interest-free credit.[17]

Although BNPL programs operate as a new form of credit, they remain outside the regulatory framework governing traditional credit cards.[18] In the absence of consumer protection restrictions, BNPL lenders can exploit regulatory gaps that could leave already vulnerable consumers in an even worse financial position.[19]

III. Regulatory Failures and the Limits of the TILA

Congress sought to protect consumers from the risks inherent in credit markets through the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).[20] TILA is designed to protect consumers by requiring clear, standardized “disclosure of credit terms, enabling borrowers to compare” offers across financial institutions and make informed credit decisions.[21] The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) created Regulation Z to implement TILA.[22] However, BNPL lending has exposed new shortcomings in this decades-old framework.[23] In May 2024, the CFPB issued an interpretive rule under Regulation Z determining that digital credit accounts offered by BNPL lenders are subject to some of the same consumer protection requirements under TILA that govern traditional credit options.[24]

The CFPB’s interpretive rule faced immediate scrutiny when the Financial Technology Association (FTA) filed suit against the Bureau in October 2024.[25] The FTA argued that the rule bypassed “key procedural and substantive requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act” and that BNPL services do not fall within the lending categories covered by TILA.[26] As a result of the FTA’s challenges, the CFPB and FTA agreed in March to stay the case while the Bureau worked to revoke its interpretive rule on BNPL programs.[27] During the stay, the CFPB was required to provide status reports on its progress to the court every thirty days.[28] In its final status report before the FTA filed a stipulation of dismissal, the CFPB agreed with many of the FTA’s arguments and stated that it “does not intend to issue a revised rule” concerning BNPL lenders.[29] Ultimately, the CFPB’s first attempt at regulating BNPL lenders failed to withstand legal challenge, and its interpretive ruling was revoked.[30]

The revocation of this interpretative rule falls in line with a “series of regulations and lawsuit defenses the agency has abandoned as the [Bureau’s new] director, Russel Vought, seeks to shrink the [CFPB]. . . and reverse [actions of the] Biden administration.”[31] Consequently, BNPL programs will continue to operate in a largely unregulated space.[32] The CFPB effectively leaves consumers using BNPL lenders without standardized disclosure requirements, dispute-resolution mechanisms, and a plethora of other protections afforded to those who use traditional credit cards.[33] Consumers using BNPL credit will continue to struggle with these “operational hurdles,” and BNPL lenders will continue to take advantage of those who are most vulnerable.[34]

IV. Conclusion

BNLP programs have grown rapidly, with many consumers taking advantage of a new short-term interest-free credit option.[35] These programs, however, have raised concerns that their users are typically in financially vulnerable positions and risk overextending their credit.[36] With the CFPB’s attempt to regulate BNPL lenders failing, new regulations will be needed to protect consumers from the risks associated with BNPL credit.[37]

*Colin Livingston is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law where he is a Staff Editor for Law Review and a Distinguished Scholar of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. Prior to law school, Colin earned a Bachelor of Arts in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland, College Park. Next summer he will be working as a Law Clerk for Eccleston & Wolf.

[1] Joanna Stavins, Buy Now, Pay Later: Who Uses It and Why, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos.: Current Policy Perspectives (May 23, 2024), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2024/buy-now-pay-later-who-uses-it-why.

[2] Id. (“typically four installments over six weeks.”).

[3] Lauren Nowacki, Survey: About Half of Buy Now, Pay Later Users Have Experienced Issues like Overspending and Missing Payments, Bankrate (May 5, 2025), https://www.bankrate.com/loans/personal-loans/buy-now-pay-later-survey/.

[4] Globe Newswire, Buy Now Pay Later Global Business Report 2025: BNPL Payments to Grow by 13.7% to Surpass $560 Billion this Year, Driven by Klarna, Afterpay, PayPal, and Affirm – Forecast to 2030, FINTECH FUTURES (Feb. 24, 2025), https://www.fintechfutures.com/press-releases/buy-now-pay-later-global-business-report-2025-bnpl-payments-to-grow-by-13-7-to-surpass-560-billion-this-year-driven-by-klarna-afterpay-paypal-and-affirm-forecast-to-2030.

[5] See John L. Culhane, Jr. & John D. Socknat, CFPB Will Not Issue Revised BNPL Rule, Ballard Spahr LLP: Consumer Finance Monitor  (June 20, 2025), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2025/06/20/cfpb-will-not-issue-revised-bnpl-rule/; see infra Part III.

[6] Jessica Dickler, Credit Card Debt Reaches $1.21 Trillion — In Line With Last Year’s All-Time High, NY Fed Finds, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2025, at 14:49 ET), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/05/ny-fed-credit-card-debt-second-quarter-2025.html (showing that Americans collectively hold $1.21 trillion in credit card debt, a number that is growing alongside rising credit card delinquency rates).

[7] See infra text accompanying notes 11–17.

[8] Stavins, supra note 1, at 3; Felix Aidala, Daniel Mangrum & Wilbert van der Klaauw, Who Uses “Buy Now, Pay Later”?, FED. RSRV. BANK of N.Y. (Sep. 26, 2023), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2023/09/who-uses-buy-now-pay-later/.

[9] Stavins, supra note 1; Aidala, Mangrum & van der Klaauw, supra note 8.

[10] Maya Benjamin, What Is Buy Now, Pay Later?, CNBC SELECT (Aug. 8, 2025), https://www.cnbc.com/select/buy-now-pay-later-what-is-it/.

[11] Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Buy Now, Pay Later: Market Trends and Consumer Impacts 64–69 (2022), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_buy-now-pay-later-market-trends-consumer-impacts_report_2022-09.pdf.

[12] See Dionysius Ang & Stijn Maesen, Research: How “Buy Now, Pay Later” Is Changing Consumer Spending, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 26, 2024), https://hbr.org/2024/11/research-how-buy-now-pay-later-is-changing-consumer-spending.

[13] Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 11, at 65–66.

[14] Id. at 66.

[15] Id. at 3, 6.

[16] Id. at 22.

[17] Id. at 21–23 (exhibiting that 10.1% of consumers making purchases with BNPL programs used a credit card to make an installment payment in 2021); Matt Schulz, BNPL Tracker: 41% of Users Late in Past Year, More Using Loans for Groceries, lendingtree (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.lendingtree.com/personal/buy-now-pay-later-loan-statistics/ (showing that 54% of users who responded to the survey have been “late on a BNPL loan in the past”).

[18] See discussion infra Part III.

[19] See infra text accompanying notes 31–34; supra text accompanying notes 6–17.

[20] Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; Nat’l Credit Union Admin., Federal Consumer Financial Protection Guide: Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) (2025), https://ncua.gov/regulation-supervision/manuals-guides/federal-consumer-financial-protection-guide/compliance-management/lending-regulations/truth-lending-act-regulation-z.

[21] See sources cited supra note 20.

[22] Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2024); Nat’l Credit Union Admin., supra note 20 (explaining that the TILA is implemented through Regulation Z by the CFPB).

[23] See infra text accompanying notes 25–30.

[24] Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2024) (concluding that BNPL providers operate as both “creditors” and “card issuers”).

[25] Complaint, Fin. Tech. Ass’n v. CFPB, No. 1:24-cv-2966 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2024).

[26] Id. at 1–3.

[27] John L. Culhane, Jr. & Joseph J. Schuster, CFPB Plans to Revoke BNPL Interpretive Rule, Ballard Spahr LLP: Consumer Finance Monitor (Mar. 28, 2025), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2025/03/28/cfpb-plans-to-revoke-bnpl-interpretive-rule/; Status Report and Joint Motion to Stay, Fin. Tech. Ass’n v. CFPB, No. 1:24-cv-2966 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2025).

[28] See sources cited supra note 27.

[29] John L. Culhane, Jr. & John D. Socknat, CFPB Will Not Issue Revised BNPL Rule, Ballard Spahr LLP: Consumer Finance Monitor (June 20, 2025), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2025/06/20/cfpb-will-not-issue-revised-bnpl-rule/; Status Report, Fin. Tech. Ass’n v. CFPB, No. 1:24-cv-2966 (D.D.C. June 2, 2025).

[30] See Culhane, Jr. & Socknat, supra note5; supra text accompanying notes 24–28.

[31] Justin Bachman, CFPB Plans to Spike BNPL Rule, PAYMENTS DIVE (Mar. 31, 2025), https://www.paymentsdive.com/news/cfpb-plans-to-spike-bnpl-rule/743933/.

[32] See Culhane, Jr. & Socknat, supra note 5.

[33] Id. (“These Regulation Z requirements included account-opening disclosures, billing statements, change in terms disclosure, payment processing, treatment of credit balances, issuance of cards, liability for unauthorized use, merchant disputes, billing disputes, crediting of returns, advertising . . . .”); see also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2024) (implementing TILA regulations).

[34] Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 11, at 4; see discussion supra Part II.

[35] See discussion supra Part I; Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 11, at 3, 6.

[36] See discussion supra Part II.

[37] See discussion supra Part III.

Unscripted Gains and Unseen Losses: How Reality TV Stars Could Win in Court but Still Lose the Fight for Employee Status

*Chauncey Bellamy

I. Introduction

Lawsuits have been piling up against the makers of reality TV.[1] From Bravo’s The Real Housewives franchise to Netflix’s Love Is Blind, reality TV stars have taken their complaints about unsafe working conditions and substandard pay to the courts.[2] For instance, Leah McSweeney, former star of The Real Housewives of New York City, alleges that producers “mocked her sobriety, egged on castmates to push her buttons, and created an environment that made it nearly impossible to stay sober.”[3] Stephen Richardson, a former contestant on Love Is Blind, alleges in a recent class action that producers took away contestants’ phones, wallets, and ID cards and told staff not to give contestants any food.[4] Jeremy Hartwell, another former Love Is Blind castmate, “revealed that contestants were paid $1,000 per week,” amounting to “roughly $7 per hour for working 20 hours a day and seven days a week.”[5]

To resolve these complaints, three potential solutions include (1) courts granting reality TV participants “employee” status, (2) participants unionizing to protect themselves from future harm,[6] and (3) stars funding shows on their own.[7] Due to the profit motive inherent in the television industry, however, each solution could yield unintended and undesirable consequences, presenting obstacles to meaningful change.[8]

II. Independent Contractor or Employee?

Some reality TV productions classify stars and contestants as independent contractors.[9] Thus, in contrast to employees, reality TV participants do not “benefit from workplace safety regulations” or “receive additional perks such as health insurance, retirement plans, and paid leave.”[10] In response, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has alleged in a complaint against Love Is Blind producer Kinetic Content that contestants should be classified as employees because “the show exercised significant control over their lives, including rigorous schedules and behavior restrictions, extending beyond filming.”[11] The NLRB also alleges that the contestants’ daily stipend entitles them to overtime pay, unemployment insurance, and other benefits.[12] If a judge rules in favor of the NLRB, Kinetic might have to pay penalties and reclassify contestants as employees.[13] Other reality TV shows might have to follow suit.[14]

Accordingly, the consequences of this potential reclassification could “force networks to . . . rethink the way they make [reality] shows entirely.”[15] At the moment, reality shows are watchable and cheap to produce, especially compared to fictional shows, which is why Netflix has dedicated a significant portion of its content library to the format.[16] To illustrate, Netflix paid about ten times more per viewing hour for the fourth season of fiction series Stranger Things than for the first season of reality series The Ultimatum.[17] Because non-fiction storytelling, including reality TV, is “the most cost-effective form of entertainment,” reality shows like The Ultimatum do not need to attract the same number of viewers as megahit fiction shows like Stranger Things to be profitable.[18] But reclassifying reality stars as employees could change that.[19] The consequences of the increase in production costs range from producers moving production overseas to releasing fewer shows.[20] As a result, reality stars and other workers could have fewer employment opportunities,[21]which could counteract the benefits of better working conditions and pay.

III. Obstacles to Unionization

In addition to being reclassified as employees, reality stars could unionize to further protect themselves from abusive working conditions.[22] But there are obstacles to this goal.[23] First, because of the high turnover rate of reality contestants and the backstabbing tendencies of reality stars, banding together to unionize is unlikely.[24] Second, even if the contestants and stars manage to unionize, producers do not have to employ them.[25] Third, the protection of a union and improved safety conditions might lead to phonier storylines that bore audiences because the “unavoidable contradiction of reality programming” is that people are drawn to the abusive and exploitative parts that make it “undeniably real.”[26] Ethics and reality TV do not mix.[27]

 IV. When a Star Becomes a Producer

If achieving employee and union status fails, reality contestants and stars might have another option: taking control by funding their own shows.[28] As producers, they would theoretically have the power to decide the kind of working conditions and pay their shows provide.[29] The challenge, however, would be the price tag of such an endeavor.[30] For example, when twenty-six-year-old YouTube content creator MrBeast used his own money to help fill in the funding gaps in his Amazon reality show, Beast Games, he lost tens of millions of dollars on a show that featured contestants racing in potato sacks and climbing towers on the road to the biggest prize in television and streaming history.[31] But reality participants probably would not be able to take the same kind of financial risk to produce their own shows because they have much less wealth than MrBeast, which is a major reason why they want to be classified as employees.[32] This is true even of the highest-paid reality stars.[33] In addition, even if they were to band together to pool their money, their high turnover rate and penchant for backstabbing would likely present an obstacle in this context as well.[34]

V. Conclusion

The increasing number of lawsuits against reality TV producers could change the status of reality TV participants from independent contractors to employees.[35] Even still, employee status may not be enough to improve reality TV’s poor working conditions and pay, and the reason why is not simply the producers’ profit motive.[36] Because the participants’ best chance of success is to band together, their frequently combative behavior could prove to be the obstacle that makes a win in court a loss in reality.[37]

*Chauncey Bellamy is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where he is a Distinguished Scholar of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society and serves as a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills and a Staff Editor for the Law Review. He received a Bachelor of Fine Arts in Theatre, with honors, from New York University and spent this past summer as a summer associate at Whiteford, Taylor & Preston LLP. In spring 2026, he will intern with Chief Justice Fader of the Supreme Court of Maryland and then work as a summer associate at Ballard Spahr LLP.

[1] See Winston Cho, Ex-‘Love Is Blind’ Contestant Files Class Action over Inhumane Working Conditions on Reality Shows, THE Hollywood REP. (Sep. 16, 2025, at 16:07 ET), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/ex-love-is-blind-contestant-files-class-action-over-inhumane-working-conditions-on-reality-shows-1236373084/.

[2] Id.

[3] JJ Palmer, Leah McSweeney’s Lawsuit Could Reshape Reality TV, law.monthly (Apr. 4, 2025), https://www.lawyer-monthly.com/2025/04/leah-mcsweeney-reality-tv-lawsuit/.

[4] Cho, supra note 1.

[5] Id.

[6] See David M. Prager, Adriana Levandowski & April Hua, NLRB Challenges Love Is Blind over Contestant Rights, NIXON PEABODY (Dec. 23, 2024), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/insights/alerts/2024/12/23/nlrb-challenges-love-is-blind-over-contestant-rights.

[7] See Sherin Shibu, MrBeast Says He Lost ‘Tens of Millions of Dollars’ on His Hit Amazon Reality TV Show ‘Beast Games,’ Entrepreneur (Feb. 24, 2025), https://www.entrepreneur.com/business-news/how-much-mrbeast-paid-to-create-amazons-beast-games/487540.

[8] See Prager, Levandowski & Hua, supra note 6.

[9] Cho, supra note 1.

[10] Prager, Levandowski & Hua, supra note 6.

[11] Id.; see also Cho, supra note 1 (“One of the factors used by courts to decide the classification question is whether the employer, in this case Kinetic and Delirium, exercised a certain degree of control over their workers.”); Palmer, supra note 3 (“When someone is told where to be, what to wear, what they can and can’t say—and when they’re being filmed nearly every waking hour—it starts to look a lot more like a job than a gig. Courts are beginning to take notice of that.”).

[12] Prager, Levandowski & Hua, supra note 6.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Palmer, supra note 3.

[16] See Daniel Parris, How Netflix Built a $200B Business on Reality Shows and Docuseries. A Statistical Analysis, Stat Significant (Dec. 13, 2023), https://www.statsignificant.com/p/how-netflix-built-a-200b-business.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] See Prager, Levandowski & Hua, supra note 6.

[20] See Andy Dehnart, The Reality TV Industry Is in Chaos and People Are in Despair. Producers Explain Why., reality blurred (Sep. 29, 2024), https://www.realityblurred.com/realitytv/2024/09/reality-tv-producers-state-of-the-industry/.

[21] See id.

[22] Emma Bowman, ‘Love Is Blind’ Cast Are Employees, Labor Board Says. Could a Reality TV Union Be Next?, npr (Dec. 17, 2024, at 05:00 ET), https://www.npr.org/2024/12/17/nx-s1-5229111/love-is-blind-housewives-reality-labor-union.

[23] See Katie Kilkenny, These Unionized Reality TV Workers Have Been Seeking a Contract for More Than a Decade, THE Hollywood REP. (Mar. 6, 2025, at 12:09 ET), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/itv-unions-reality-tv-workers-call-first-contracts-1236156010/.

[24] See Bowman, supra note 22; see also Louis Staples, 2023 Was the Year of the Reality TV Villain, RollingStone (Dec. 24, 2023), https://www.rollingstone.com/tv-movies/tv-movie-features/reality-tv-backstabbing-2023-tom-sandoval-vanderpump-rules-squid-game-real-housewives-1234935716/ (noting that villainous reality stars on television shows including Vanderpump Rules, The Traitors, Below Deck, and The Real Housewives franchise create good television by “lying, cheating, [and] backstabbing”).

[25] See Kilkenny, supra note 23.

[26] David Brancaccio & Ariana Rosas, The Origins — and Moral Conundrums — of Modern Reality TV, MARKETPLACE (June 25, 2024), https://www.marketplace.org/story/2024/06/25/relativity-tv-emily-nussbaum.

[27] See id.

[28] See Shibu, supra note 7.

[29] See Palmer, supra note 3; Cho, supra note 1 (“[B]y classifying contestants as independent contractors rather than employees, the productions can avoid minimum wage and overtime obligations, among other things.”).

[30] See Shibu, supra note 7.

[31] Id.

[32] See id.; Cho, supra note 1.

[33] See Barclay Palmer, Reality TV’s Financial Appeal: Low Costs, High Returns for Networks, Investopedia (Dec. 8, 2025), https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0410/why-networks-love-reality-tv.aspx (“[S]alaries for popular reality stars have shot up exponentially. . . . Denise Richards reportedly made $1 million per season on . . . The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills.”); Shibu, supra note 7.

[34] See sources cited supra note 24.

[35] See Cho, supra note 1.

[36] See Bowman, supra note 22.

[37] See id.