Surveillance Pricing, Its Effects on Consumers, and New Legislation amid the Airline Ticket Pricing Scandal

*Isabella DiDonato

  1. Introduction

When purchasing an airline ticket, consumers likely assume that the cost reflects the base fare, baggage fees, and perhaps their seat selection.[1] Recently, however, consumers have begun to question whether airlines consider more than just these factors when calculating airfare.[2] Specifically, consumers are asking whether airlines have been using their personal data to determine the price that each passenger pays for a ticket.[3] This practice, known as surveillance pricing, has raised serious concerns about fairness and transparency—particularly in the airline industry.[4]

  1. What Is Surveillance Pricing and How Is It Harmful?

Surveillance pricing occurs when companies use personal data and consumer behavior to set individualized prices for potential buyers.[5] Surveillance pricing differs from dynamic pricing because it relies on personal information about the individual consumer.[6] While dynamic pricing adjusts fares based on broader factors like demand, timing, and market competition, surveillance pricing goes a step further.[7] First, companies use personal data—such as browsing history, location, purchasing history, device type, or even income—to estimate the maximum amount that a particular consumer is willing to pay.[8] Then, based on the data, a price is set specifically for that individual.[9] Using surveillance pricing, companies can manipulate buyers into paying the highest price possible, which undermines consumers’ ability to assess whether a price is fair.[10] This personalized pricing practice gives corporations an advantage over consumers and allows them to exploit buyers’ personal data to maximize profits.[11]

  1. How Airlines May Use Surveillance Pricing and Why Consumers Are Concerned

Airlines have access to vast amounts of personal data, which is used to improve flight schedules, plan maintenance, enhance security, and provide customer service.[12] Although airlines claim that this data helps them “offer tailored experiences” to fliers, it may also be used as a way to boost profits.[13] Concerns about this practice intensified after Andrew Phillips sued JetBlue Airways, accusing the airline of using consumer information to determine airfares.[14] This lawsuit, along with another filed days later, stemmed from a social media interaction in which the airline advised a consumer to “clear their browser data” or use “incognito” browsing to avoid higher fares.[15]

Beyond the JetBlue allegations, consumers continue to suspect that airlines use surveillance pricing, citing reports of travelers receiving drastically different prices for the same flight when searching at the same time.[16] Advancements in technology and airlines’ growing ability to analyze consumer behavior have further heightened these concerns.[17] There is still no concrete evidence proving that airlines set ticket prices according to individual consumers’ willingness to pay.[18] However, the possibility raises significant concerns about fairness and transparency in the market.[19]

  1. Legislative Responses to Surveillance Pricing amid Airline Pricing Allegations

In January 2025, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released preliminary findings from its ongoing study of surveillance pricing.[20] The FTC found that personal information, including an individual’s precise location, demographics, and browsing history, is frequently used to target specific consumers with different prices for identical goods and services.[21] In response, lawmakers across the United States have drafted bills to “restore fairness to the marketplace” by limiting the use of individualized pricing practices.[22]

States have taken various approaches to regulating surveillance pricing.[23] North Carolina has proposed prohibiting the practice for essential goods, while Maryland has enacted a prohibition covering food retailers and third-party delivery service providers.[24] Other states, like New York, have pursued legislation that would completely prohibit corporations from using surveillance pricing.[25]

In June 2026, New York passed the One Fair Price Act (the Act), becoming the first in the nation to pass legislation of this kind.[26] If enacted, the Act will amend New York’s Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act, which merely requires the disclosure of surveillance pricing practices.[27] At the federal level, similar legislation was introduced in Congress by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand last year.[28] Since then, the FTC has continued to study surveillance pricing, informing Congress in April 2026 that it was considering whether companies should be required to disclose when they use the practice.[29]

  1. Conclusion

As airlines become better able to analyze consumer data, suspicions about airline pricing practices are prompting legislatures across the country to respond.[30] New York, North Carolina, and Maryland, for example, have provided models for other states seeking to prohibit surveillance pricing.[31] As more states continue to push back, it remains to be seen whether the federal government will pass legislation addressing this concerning use of personal data.[32]

*Isabella DiDonato is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor of the University of Baltimore Law Review. She serves as a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills, Secretary of the Business & Tax Law Association, and Publications Chair of the Women’s Bar Association. She is also a member of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society. Before attending law school, Isabella earned her bachelor’s degree in financial management from Clemson University. In her free time, she enjoys spending time with friends and family, boating, and watching college football.


[1] Emma Lewis, Airline Surveillance Pricing: Should You Be Worried?, Aerospace Glob. News (July 12, 2026), https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/airline-surveillance-pricing-worried.

[2] See id.

[3] Id.; Jake Hardiman, JetBlue Faces Federal Lawsuit over Alleged ‘Surveillance Pricing’ with Customer Data, Simple Flying (Apr. 24, 2026, at 09:07 EDT), https://simpleflying.com/jetblue-lawsuit-surveillance-pricing/.

[4] Natalie Campisi, Are Airlines Spying on You? The Hidden Costs of Surveillance Pricing and How to Avoid Them, Forbes (Dec. 9, 2024, at 08:09 EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2024/12/09/are-airlines-spying-on-you-the-hidden-costs-of-surveillance-pricing-and-how-to-avoid-them/.

[5] Lewis, supra note 1; Tay Belgeri, What Is Surveillance Pricing? Here’s How Airlines Try to Overcharge for Tickets, Travel Awaits (Apr. 28, 2026), https://www.travelawaits.com/3024835/what-is-surveillance-pricing-from-airlines-and-how-does-it-work/.

[6] Lewis, supra note 1.

[7] Campisi, supra note 4.

[8] Id.; Finya Swai, Top Commerce Committee Democrat Presses Airlines over AI ‘Surveillance Pricing’, The Hill (Aug. 13, 2026, at 18:24 ET), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/6028921-house-commerce-committee-democrat-investigates-airlines/; Shannon Harwood, Surveillance Pricing Probe Targets Eight Airlines with August 25 Deadline, msn (Aug. 15, 2026), https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/economy/surveillance-pricing-probe-targets-eight-airlines-with-august-25-deadline/ar-AA2abW3o.

[9] See sources cited supra note 8.

[10] Prohibiting Surveillance Prices and Wages, towards just. 9 (Feb. 2025), https://towardsjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Real-Surveillance-Prices-and-Wages-Report.pdf. 

[11] Id.

[12] Lewis, supra note 1.

[13] Campisi, supra note 4.

[14] Hardiman, supra note 3.

[15] Id.; see Patricia Graham, JetBlue Surveillance Pricing Lawsuit: New Jersey Bans Practice This Week, Travelers Today (July 4, 2026, at 18:11 EDT), https://www.travelerstoday.com/articles/60335/20260704/jetblue-surveillance-pricing-lawsuit-new-jersey-bans-practice-this-week.htm (explaining that there are two simultaneous class action lawsuits that have been filed against JetBlue).

[16] U/moltenclocks, Reddit (r/delta), My sister and I are traveling together in December. The same flight/time/day was $200 more on my app then it was on hers. And I fly less. It’s absolutely deplorable that DA gets away with such predatory practices. (Oct. 1, 2026, at 14:14 ET), https://www.reddit.com/r/delta/comments/1wv22ah/comment/pd97b1s/ [https://perma.cc/8328-BMSV].

[17] Lewis, supra note 1.

[18] Id.  

[19] Campisi, supra note 4.

[20] FTC Surveillance Pricing Study Finds Personal Data Is Used to Set Individualized Consumer Prices and Generate Higher Profits for Companies, McCarter & English (Feb. 2, 2025), https://www.mccarter.com/insights/ftc-surveillance-pricing-study-finds-personal-data-is-used-to-set-individualized-consumer-prices-and-generate-higher-profits-for-companies/.

[21] FTC Surveillance Pricing Study Indicates Wide Range of Personal Data Used to Set Individualized Consumer Prices, Fed. Trade Comm’n: Press Releases (Jan. 17, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-surveillance-pricing-study-indicates-wide-range-personal-data-used-set-individualized-consumer.

[22] Christopher Elliott, Your Airline Might Be Spying on You – and It Should Be Illegal, Elliott Rep. (Feb. 22, 2026), https://www.elliott.org/blog/your-airline-might-be-spying-on-you-and-it-should-be-illegal/; see Surveillance Pricing Laws by State, AI L. by State, https://www.ailawsbystate.com/tools/surveillance-pricing-tracker (last visited Aug. 26, 2026) (“40+ bills [were] introduced across 24 states in 2026.”).

[23] See Surveillance Pricing Laws by State, supra note 22.

[24] Id.  

[25] See Elliot, supra note 22; Troutman Pepper Locke State Attorneys General Team, New York Passes One Fair Price Act Banning Surveillance Pricing, Regul. OVERSIGHT (June 17, 2026), https://www.regulatoryoversight.com/2026/06/new-york-passes-one-fair-price-act-banning-surveillance-pricing/; see also Robbie Sequeira, States Begin Banning ‘Surveillance Pricing’ That Uses Personal Data to Charge More, Stateline (Aug. 4, 2026, at 14:44 ET), https://stateline.org/2026/08/04/states-begin-banning-surveillance-pricing-that-uses-personal-data-to-charge-more/ (describing different approaches that Maryland, New Jersey, and Connecticut have taken in banning surveillance pricing).

[26] Gillibrand Introduces Bill to Crack Down on Surveillance Pricing, Gillibrand (Dec. 12, 2025), https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/news/press/release/gillibrand-introduces-bill-to-crack-down-on-surveillance-pricing/; Troutman Pepper Locke State Attorneys General Team, supra note 25.

[27] New York Moves to Ban Surveillance Pricing with the One Fair Price Act, Ashurst Perkins Coie (July 21, 2026), https://www.ashurstperkinscoie.com/en/insights/new-york-moves-to-ban-surveillance-pricing-with-the-one-fair-price-act/; see Surveillance Pricing Laws by State, supra note 22.

[28] Gillibrand Introduces Bill to Crack Down on Surveillance Pricing, supra note 26.

[29] Sunil Raj Kumar, Surveillance Pricing: Should Passengers Be Worried?, Travel Radar (July 18, 2026, at 09:31 ET), https://travelradar.aero/surveillance-pricing-should-passengers-be-worried/.

[30] See Lewis, supra note 1.

[31] See Elliot, supra note 22.

[32] See Gillibrand Introduces Bill to Crack Down on Surveillance Pricing, supra note 26.

The Supreme Court’s Next Voting Rights Case: Do State Show-Your-Papers Laws Violate the National Voter Registration Act?

*Rachael Bostian

  1. Introduction

In its upcoming term, the Supreme Court will hear Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota, in which the Court will consider whether requiring voter registrants to provide documentary proof of their citizenship violates the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).[1] Many states across the country have implemented show-your-papers laws in response to the heightened fear, however unreasonable, of noncitizens voting.[2] Thus, the decision in this case may determine the statutory bounds of voter registration requirements.[3]

  1. House Bill 2492 and House Bill 2243: The Arizona Show-Your-Papers Laws on the Line

In 2022, the Arizona legislature enacted House Bill 2492 and House Bill 2243.[4] House Bill 2492 requires state officials to reject any registrants that submit a state voter registration form without documentation proving their citizenship.[5] The rejected registrant would not be permitted to vote in federal or state elections, departing from previous law.[6] House Bill 2492 also contains a mail-in-voting provision that prevents federal-only voters from voting by mail.[7] House Bill 2243 requires election officials to verify a federal-only voter’s citizenship status if they have “reason to believe” the voter is not a U.S. citizen.[8] The officials must cancel the voter’s registration if they cannot confirm the voter’s status.[9] Together, these statutes are often referred to as show-your-papers laws.[10]

  1. How Did We End Up Here? A Brief Look at the Procedural History of Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota

On March 31, 2022, Mi Familia Vota and Voto Latino filed suit against the Arizona secretary of state, the Arizona attorney general, and the county recorders, alleging that Arizona’s voting laws violated the NVRA and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.[11] The Republican National Committee (RNC), the Petersen petitioners, and Arizona’s senate president and house speaker, intervened as defendants.[12]

On a motion for summary judgment, the district court found that the state voter registration form rejection provision was preempted by the NVRA.[13] In February 2024, the district court held a ten-day bench trial, during which it resolved the remaining claims.[14] The court issued a final order granting the plaintiffs a permanent injunction, preventing the state-form rejection provision and mail-voting provision from going into effect.[15] The Petersen petitioners appealed to the Ninth Circuit, requesting that the court stay portions of the injunction.[16] The Ninth Circuit granted the petitioners’ request in part, staying only the state-form rejection provision.[17] The petitioners then sought an emergency stay from the Supreme Court, in light of the upcoming election.[18] The Court upheld the stay of the state-form rejection provision.[19] The case returned to the Ninth Circuit for a full hearing on the merits.[20] The Ninth Circuit affirmed the relevant portions of the district court’s permanent injunction and held that the NVRA required applicants who failed to provide proof of citizenship to be registered as federal-only voters.[21] The petitioners then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on February 19, 2026.[22] The Court granted the petition on June 29, 2026.[23]

  1. Arizona Is Not Alone: Other States’ Show-Your-Papers Laws Are Being Challenged

The South Dakota legislature recently approved a law requiring registrants to prove their citizenship to vote in local and state elections.[24] A registrant who fails to provide the required documentation is registered as a federal-only voter and is barred from voting for local or state offices.[25] In August 2026, the South Dakota chapter of the League of Women Voters and a Sioux Falls man filed suit against the South Dakota secretary of state, the state board of elections, and each individual board member, challenging the law’s implementation.[26]

Last year, Ohio’s legislature passed a law similar to Arizona’s House Bill 2243.[27] The law requires the Ohio secretary of state to conduct monthly comparisons of the state’s voter rolls with Ohio’s Bureau of Motor Vehicles database, and orders the cancellation of any registration flagged as that of a potential noncitizen.[28] The League of Women Voters of Ohio and the Council on American-Islamic Relations–Northern Ohio sued the Ohio secretary of state earlier this year to block those provisions from taking effect.[29] Separately, in its transportation budget, Ohio also passed a show-your-papers provision that applies only to people registering to vote at its Bureau of Motor Vehicles.[30] But a district judge issued a preliminary injunction in response to a challenge in federal court, barring enforcement of the provision and suggesting that it conflicts with the NVRA.[31]

Similarly, opponents of New Hampshire’s show-your-papers law prevailed in federal district court.[32] In May, the federal district court struck down the law as unconstitutional because it made voting more burdensome by no longer allowing potential voters to prove their citizenship via a sworn affidavit.[33] However, unlike Ohio, New Hampshire is “one of only six states exempt from the requirements of the [NVRA]” because it still allows voter registration on Election Day.[34]

  1. The Future of Show-Your-Papers Laws Under the NVRA Rests in the Supreme Court’s Hands

Since 2020, concerns about voter eligibility have become more widespread.[35] Many states have responded by enacting show-your-papers laws, requiring voter registrants to provide citizenship documentation.[36] But the validity of these laws under the NVRA may be undercut when the Supreme Court renders its Mi Familia Vota opinion. [37]

*Rachael Bostian is a second-year law student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she is a Staff Editor for Law Review, Staff Editor for the Global Observer, and a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills. She earned her bachelors in Philosophy, Politics, and Law from Binghamton University in 2025.

[1] Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota, SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/republican-national-committee-v-mi-familia-vota-2/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2026).

[2] See Andrew Garber & Connie Wu, States Already Enacting Harmful SAVE Act Policies, Requiring Proof of Citizenship to Vote, Brennan Ctr. For Just. (June 3, 2026), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/states-already-enacting-harmful-save-act-policies-requiring-proof.

[3] Jim Saksa, Supreme Court Will Hear Arizona Case That Could Badly Weaken Key Federal Law Protecting Voter Registration , Democracy Docket (June 29, 2026), https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/supreme-court-will-hear-arizona-case-that-could-badly-weaken-key-federal-law-protecting-voter-registration/.

[4] Brief in Opposition For Democratic Nat’l Comm. and Ariz. Democratic Party at 4–5, Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Mi Familia Vota, Nos. 25-1017, 25-1019 (U.S. 2026).

[5] Mi Familia Vota and Voto Latino Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 6, Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Mi Familia Vota, Nos. 25-1017, 25-1019 (U.S. 2026).

[6] See id.

[7] Id. at 7.

[8] Brief in Opposition For Democratic Nat’l Comm. and Ariz. Democratic Party, supra note 4, at 4–5.

[9] Id.

[10] Garber & Wu, supra note 2.

[11] Mi Familia Vota and Voto Latino Respondents’ Brief in Opposition supra note 4, at 7–8. Other organizations filed their own suits, which were consolidated into the Mi Familia Vota action.

[12] Id.

[13] Id. at 8–9.

[14] Id. at 9.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 9–10.

[20] Id. at 10.

[21] Id.

[22] SCOTUSblog, supra note 1.

[23] Id.

[24] John Hult, State of South Dakota Faces Lawsuit Over Proof-of-Citizenship Voter Registration Law, S.D. Searchlight(Aug. 24, 2026, at 19:21 ET), https://southdakotasearchlight.com/2026/08/24/state-of-south-dakota-faces-lawsuit-over-proof-of-citizenship-voter-registration-law/.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] See Greta Bedekovics & Devon Ombres, The SAVE Act Might Be Stalled in Congress, But State Versions Are Being Advanced All Across the Country, Ctr for Am. Progress (June 29, 2026), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-save-act-may-be-stalled-in-congress-but-state-versions-are-being-advanced-all-across-the-country/.

[28] Yunior Rivas, Voting Rights Groups Sue to Block Ohio Law that Purges Voters Without Warning, Democracy Docket (Feb. 13, 2026), https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/voting-rights-groups-sue-to-block-ohio-law-that-purges-voters/.

[29] Id.

[30] Nick Evans, Federal Court Blocks Ohio’s Proof of Citizenship Requirements for Voter Registration, Ohio Cap. J. (Sept. 1, 2026, at 4:00 ET), https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2026/09/01/federal-court-blocks-ohios-proof-of-citizenship-requirements-for-voter-registration/.

[31] Id.

[32] See Todd Bookman, A Judge Struck Down NH’s ‘Proof of Citizenship’ Voting Law. Here’s What to Know., NHPR (June 1, 2026, at 15:45 EDT), https://www.nhpr.org/nh-news/2026-05-29/nh-newhampshire-voting-elections-citizenship-proof.

[33] New Hampshire Youth Movement v. Scanlan, 833 F. Supp. 3d 93, 98–100, 101–02 (D. N.H. 2026).

[34] Id. at 101. See also The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) U.S. Dep’t of Just.: Civ. Rts. Div. (last visited Oct. 1, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra.

[35] Matt Loffman, Americans Are Increasingly Worried About Voting, New Poll Shows, PBS News (Mar. 11, 2026, at 5:00 EDT), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/americans-are-increasingly-worried-about-voting-new-poll-shows.

[36] See discussion supra Section IV.

[37] See discussion supra Section IV.

Citizen Suits vs. Executive Power: Article II Implications to Watch in NAACP v. X.AI Corp.

*Isabelle Pardew

  1. Introduction

On February 13, 2026, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a sixty-day notice of intent to sue X.AI Corp. (xAI) and its subsidiary MZX Tech for violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA).[1] The NAACP alleged that xAI installed twenty-seven combustion turbines for a planned data center in Memphis, Tennessee, without the permits required by the CAA.[2] On April 14, 2026, after xAI took no action to curtail data center operations, the NAACP filed suit.[3] The NAACP brought its action under the CAA’s citizen suit provision, which enables private citizens or organizations to file suit in federal court to enforce the CAA where government enforcement is lacking.[4] Under the CAA, the government may still pursue its own action or intervene in the ongoing citizen suit.[5]

The case’s most notable development occurred on June 15, 2026, when the Department of Justice (DOJ) moved to intervene and dismiss the action pursuant to its asserted authority under Article II of the United States Constitution.[6] In September 2026, the DOJ filed a notice of appeal and moved to stay the proceedings pending review of its motion to intervene and dismiss.[7]

Thus, while the original dispute centered on alleged CAA permitting violations, NAACP v. X.AI Corp. presents the broader question of whether the Constitution provides the Executive ultimate control over federal enforcement despite congressional authorization of private actions.[8]

  1. The Citizen Suit Provision

The CAA is among several federal environmental statutes that permit private plaintiffs, under statutorily defined circumstances, to bring civil actions against alleged violators rather than solely relying on government enforcement.[9] The precise requirements vary by statute, but generally citizen suit plaintiffs must satisfy procedural prerequisites, such as pre-suit notice and demonstration of an ongoing or continuing violation.[10] Citizen enforcement may not proceed if the government is already actively prosecuting the same violation.[11] Despite legislative and judicial limitations that have diminished their potency, citizen suits remain a key component of modern environmental law, supplementing government enforcement and enabling private participation within boundaries expressly established by Congress.[12]

  1. Article II’s Absorption of “Citizen” Enforcers
  1. Moving Beyond Enforcement Discretion Toward Dismissal Authority

The DOJ’s motion to intervene and dismiss the case presents a novel assertion of executive power.[13] The DOJ grounds its authority to intervene and dismiss in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Executive’s inherent Article II powers.[14] As to the former, the DOJ’s amended motion emphasizes Rule 41 as an independent basis for dismissal.[15] Separately, the DOJ argues that Article II provides the Executive with authority to assume control over citizen suit litigation when private enforcement conflicts with federal policy or the Executive’s decision not to enforce.[16] The DOJ further contends that the NAACP’s claims threaten national security because the private enforcement action seeks to eliminate “the power supply for artificial-intelligence innovation that supports the Department of War’s military operations.”[17]

More broadly, the DOJ invokes Article II as authority to assume control over enforcement where “a citizen’s attempted civil enforcement action is inconsistent with federal policy and the public interest,” including where the Executive deliberately chose not to pursue enforcement.[18] Significantly, the DOJ asserts that citizen suits are unconstitutional or, alternatively, that the CAA authorizes citizen suits only with the government’s consent.[19] The DOJ also contends that the NAACP’s request for civil penalties, payable to the Treasury, seeks relief that closely resembles an enforcement action brought by the government and “bears only the most attenuated relationship, if any, to the plaintiff’s own asserted injuries.”[20]

The DOJ does not dispute Congress’s authority to create private causes of action, including those under the Civil Rights Act or the Clayton Act.[21] Instead, its constitutional objection focuses on citizen plaintiffs seeking generalized enforcement relief on behalf of the public rather than compensatory monetary relief, which the DOJ characterizes as an exercise of “quintessentially executive power.”[22] In developing its argument, the DOJ relies on dissenting opinions and attempts to distinguish majority precedent recognizing private enforcement.[23]

  1. Constitutional Challenges to Citizen Suit Provisions

Citizen suit provisions have historically faced constitutional challenges under both Article II and Article III, including arguments that private enforcement impermissibly encroaches upon the Executive’s authority to enforce the law.[24] NAACP v. X.AI Corp. elevates the tension between the Executive’s Article II authority over enforcement of federal law and congressional authority to create private causes of action.[25]

The Supreme Court has yet to definitively resolve the constitutionality of citizen suit provisions, and lower courts have regarded such constitutional challenges with mixed results.[26] The DOJ now advances a broader concept of Article II authority, where the Executive is empowered to intervene and terminate a private action that Congress has expressly authorized but the government elected not to pursue.[27] If accepted, this theory would extend enforcement discretion beyond an affirmative decision to prosecute and instead impede, or eliminate altogether, independently authorized citizen suits.[28]

  1. Conclusion

Citizen suit provisions reflect Congress’s decision to permit private participation in the enforcement of environmental laws and other statutory schemes.[29] Yet if the DOJ succeeds in both intervention and dismissal, the availability of citizen enforcement may depend entirely on Executive judgment.[30] NAACP v. X.AI Corp. therefore implicates more than just compliance with the CAA.[31] This case foreshadows the simmering question of whether citizens may invoke congressionally created enforcement mechanisms to address environmental and public health concerns when regulators do not act, or whether the Executive ultimately retains unilateral authority to prevent those actions from proceeding.[32]

*Isabelle Pardew is a second-year part-time day student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor for Volume 56 of the University of Baltimore Law Review. Isabelle is a Law Scholar for Civil Procedure I and Secretary of the Environmental Law Society. Prior to law school, she earned master’s degrees in both mathematics and communication. She works with a climate education nonprofit and manages environmental advocacy initiatives focused on modern infrastructure and its impact on migratory wildlife. In summer 2026, Isabelle was a judicial intern for the Honorable Dan Friedman at the Appellate Court of Maryland. In her free time, she enjoys spending time with her family, reading, and doing crossword puzzles.


[1] Complaint at 4, Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. X.AI Corp., No. 3:26CV00074 (D. Miss. Apr. 14, 2026).

[2] Id. at 2.

[3] Id. at 1.

[4] See Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19; Roger A. Greenbaum & Anne S. Peterson, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Citizen Suits and How They Work, 2 Fordham Env’t Rep. 79, 79 (1991).

[5] Jeffrey G. Miller & Brooke S. Dorner, The Constitutionality of Citizen Suit Provisions in Federal Environmental Statutes, 27 J. Env’t L. & Litig. 401, 454 (2012).

[6] Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Intervention and Dismissal at 1, 8, Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. X.AI Corp., No. 3:26CV00074 (D. Miss. June 15, 2026).

[7] Notice of Appeal at 1, Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. X.AI Corp., No. 3:26CV00074 (D. Miss. Sept. 18, 2026); Motion to Stay All Proc. Pending Appeal at 1, Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. X.AI Corp., No. 3:26CV00074 (D. Miss. Sept. 21, 2026).

[8] See discussion infra Part III.

[9] David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Reevaluating Environmental Citizen Suits in Theory and Practice, 91 U. Colo. L. Rev. 385, 394 (2020).

[10] Greenbaum & Peterson, supra note 4, at 82, 84.

[11] Miller & Dorner, supra note 5, at 454.  

[12] Lia Cattaneo, Wrinkling Citizen Suits: California v. EPA (9th Cir. 2020) and Clean Air Act Underenforcement, 45 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 503, 506–08 (2021).

[13] See discussion infra Part III.B.

[14] Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Intervention and Dismissal, supra note 6, at 1–2; Reply Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Amended Motion for Intervention and Dismissal at 1, 16, National Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. X.AI Corp., No. 3:26CV00074 (D. Miss. July 24, 2026).

[15] Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Intervention and Dismissal, supra note 6, at 9; Reply Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Amended Motion for Intervention and Dismissal, supra note 14, at 16.

[16] Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Intervention and Dismissal, supra note 6, at 10.

[17] Id. at 1.

[18] Id. at 8, 10, 12.

[19] Id. at 11.

[20] Id. at 19.

[21] Id. at 23; Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing that parties subject to a violation of federally-protected civil rights can sue for damages, an injunction, or declaratory relief); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2012) (providing that parties harmed in business or property by antitrust violations can sue for private enforcement and injunctive relief).

[22] Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Intervention and Dismissal, supra note 6, at 23; Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 9, at 387 (discussing critics’ argument that citizen-suit provisions allow independent environmental organizations to exploit the legal system for their own “extreme ends” and disrupt the regulatory balance struck by more knowledgeable federal agencies).

[23] For example, DOJ invokes Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) to suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court has already foreshadowed the precarious constitutionality of citizen suit provisions that interfere with Government enforcement discretion. But Gwaltney dealt solely with past violations, holding them beyond the reach of citizen suits. Rather than establishing authority to extinguish an otherwise permissible citizen suit, Gwaltney defined the statutory limits that Congress itself placed on citizen enforcement.

[24] Cattaneo, supra note 12, at 518–20; Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental Citizen Suits, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 383, 383–85 (2001).

[25] See discussion supra Part III.A.

[26] In Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better Env’t, Justice Stevens observed in concurrence that “it is hard to see . . . how the EPCRA’s citizen-suit provision impinges on the power of the executive,” potentially indicating the highest court’s view on the provisions. 523 U.S. 83, 129 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring). Steel Co. ultimately resolved the case on Article III standing grounds and therefore did not reach the question of whether citizen suits allow for the enforcement of purely historical violations. Justice Stevens’s concurrence nevertheless demonstrates that the potential tension between citizen enforcement and executive authority has reached the Court long before the more direct challenge presented today. More recently, in 2025, the Court declined to hear challenges concerning available remedies in citizen-suit actions, leaving the lower court decisions, and the challenged applications of citizen-suit authority, undisturbed for the moment.

[27] See Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Intervention and Dismissal, supra note 6, at 18.

[28] See id.

[29] See Miller & Dorner, supra note 5, at 458; Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom: A Comparison of Government and Citizen Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995-2000, 29 Colum. J. Env’t L. 359, 363 (2004).

[30] See discussion supra Part III; Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Intervention and Dismissal, supra note 6, at 11–12.

[31] See discussion supra Part III.B.

[32] See discussion supra Part III.

Highest Case Note from Write-On 2026: Martinez v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 338 A.3d 636 (Md. 2025).

*Aharon Katz

The Supreme Court of Maryland Held that the De Minimis Doctrine Applies to the Maryland Wage Laws. Martinez v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 338 A.3d 636 (Md. 2025).

I. Introduction

In Martinez v. Amazon.com Services LLC, the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed whether the de minimis doctrine applies to the Maryland Wage Laws.[1] The de minimis doctrine states that “the law does not concern itself with trifles” and has deep roots in common law.[2] The appellant contended that the plain language of the statute indicated that the legislature did not intend for the de minimis rule to become Maryland law.[3] The appellee argued that because the Maryland legislature intended to incorporate federal law into Maryland law, the federal de minimis doctrine applied to Maryland law.[4] The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the appellee, finding the state legislature’s silence indicative of acceptance of federal precedent.[5]

II. Historical Development

A. Federal Laws

In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to eliminate poor working conditions[6] and establish a national minimum wage.[7] The act required employers to pay their employees a minimum wage per hour worked[8] and no less than one and a half times that rate for time worked over forty hours in any given workweek.[9] The FLSA did not define the terms “work” and “workweek.”[10]

The Supreme Court sought to define these terms in the 1946 case of Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company.[11] The Court defined “workweek” as all the time “during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty, or at a prescribed workplace.”[12] However, the Court also held that the FLSA did not preclude the application of a de minimis rule for the small amount of time that employees spent walking to and from their workplaces.[13] According to the Court, the workweek must be calculated “in light of the realities of the industrial world.”[14] Therefore, when the matter at issue concerned mere “seconds or minutes of work, . . . such trifles may be disregarded.”[15]

In response, Congress amended the FLSA via the Portal-to-Portal Act (PPA) to address Anderson’s overly broad definition of workweek.[16] The PPA specified that certain activities, such as walking or traveling to and from the location of the work activity, and other preliminary or postliminary activities, were not included in the workweek.[17] The PPA did not in any way abrogate the de minimis portion of the Anderson decision.[18] In 1961, the federal government once again acknowledged the existence of the de minimis doctrine.[19] A regulation issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) stated that employers may disregard certain “insignificant periods of time” that cannot, as a practical matter, be precisely recorded.[20]

Recently, the Supreme Court held in Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corporation that the de minimis doctrine did not apply to a specific FLSA statute governing employees being paid for time spent changing clothes.[21] In Sandifer, the petitioners argued that, pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, they should be paid for “time spent donning and doffing protective gear.”[22] The Court held that protective articles of clothing (such as a snood or work gloves) counted as clothes that were not legally compensable under their collective bargaining agreement.[23] However, “time spent donning and doffing” non-clothing items (such as glasses or earplugs) could be compensable.[24] The Court rejected the argument that the non-clothing items were covered by the de minimis doctrine, explaining that the FLSA statute was specifically crafted to compensate the seconds and minutes employees spent changing outfits.[25]

B. Maryland Laws

In 1965 and 1966, the Maryland State Legislature enacted the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL)[26] and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (MWPCL)[27] (collectively, “Maryland Wage Laws”). The Maryland Wage Laws govern minimum wage and the timing of wage payments, among other laws.[28] Both statutes define “wages” as “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment.”[29] The Maryland Wage Laws mirror the FLSA in many ways,[30] most notably by declining to define what counts as compensable “work.”[31]

In Amaya v. DGS Construction, LLC, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether Maryland had adopted the federal limitations on compensable work codified in the PPA because the state’s general assembly had remained silent on this issue.[32] The Court answered no.[33] The Court explained that, although Congress enacted the PPA to amend the FLSA,[34] there was no indication that the general assembly intended to incorporate the later-enacted PPA into Maryland law.[35] If that had been the general assembly’s intent, it would not have left such a significant piece of text out of its legislation.[36] While Amaya ruled that the Maryland legislature’s silence regarding the PPA was indicative of its intent to disregard it, the Supreme Court of Maryland had yet to address whether this logic applied to the FLSA in its entirety.[37] 

III. Instant Case

A. Facts

Appellee Amazon.com Services LLC (Amazon) employed appellant Estefany Martinez from June 2017 to November 2021.[38] While Martinez was employed, Amazon required its employees to undergo a security screening on their way out of the facility, which they were not compensated for.[39] Martinez retained an expert witness who calculated that—based on the data provided by Amazon—Martinez was owed $161.61 for the time she spent waiting in line for security screenings.[40] Martinez filed suit against Amazon in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City on behalf of herself and a putative class consisting of 23,914 current and former Amazon employees.[41] Amazon removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which then granted Martinez’s motion for class certification.[42] Amazon moved to dismiss, claiming that time spent waiting in line was de minimis.[43] Because Maryland law lacked clear guidance regarding the de minimis rule, the District Court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Maryland, asking it to clarify Maryland’s approach to this issue.[44]

B. Court’s Analysis

In a majority opinion written by Justice Biran, the Court held that the de minimis doctrine applies to claims brought under the Maryland Wage Laws.[45] The Court first addressed Martinez’s argument that the statute’s definition of “wages” as “all compensation that is due to an employee for employment” indicates that all compensation, no matter how small, is included in the definition of “wages.”[46] The Court dismissed this approach, reasoning that “all” merely operates to describe the payment necessary for whatever is “due”; it does not answer the threshold question of what is, in fact, “due.”[47] The outcome of that question rests on whether the de minimis rule applies.[48]

Having concluded that the plain language of the statute did not indicate whether the de minimis rule applied, the Court turned to other evidence of the legislature’s intent in enacting the Maryland Wage Laws.[49] In that vein, the Court held that because the MWHL was meant to mirror the FLSA,[50] “compensation due” meant whatever compensation was due under the FLSA.[51] Because the MWPCL immediately followed on the heels of the MWHL and used the same definition for “wages,” the Court held that it would be illogical for the MWPCL to refer to something different from the MWHL without the state legislature explicitly saying so.[52] Therefore, any compensation due under the FLSA should be similarly applied to the MWHL and the MWPCL.[53]

Federal law had already recognized the de minimis doctrine by 1946, when the Supreme Court held in Anderson that the FLSA’s labor laws did not “preclude the application of a de minimis rule.”[54] The de minimis doctrine further solidified its place in federal law in 1961, when the DOL issued regulations stating that insignificant amounts of time that cannot be precisely recorded may be disregarded.[55] Because the Maryland Wage Laws mirror the FLSA, which had previously been interpreted to include a de minimis rule, the Supreme Court of Maryland reasoned that the general assembly intended the de minimis doctrine to apply to Maryland legislation as well.[56]

The Court further rejected the argument that this ruling contradicts precedent in Amaya.[57] Amazon argued that while in Amaya the Court held that legislative silence showed no intent to adopt the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exceptions, the Court here was treating the legislature’s silence as acquiescence to the de minimis doctrine.[58] The Court distinguished these two cases as follows: Because the MWHL was created to mirror the original FLSA of 1938, it only made sense that it would incorporate the de minimis rule, “which is part and parcel of the original FLSA.”[59] Conversely, the PPA was an amendment added later and was not an integral part of the original FLSA.[60] Therefore, by mirroring the original FLSA, the Maryland legislature could not be assumed to have adopted the PPA as well.[61] For these reasons, the Court answered the certified question from the District Court in the affirmative, holding that the de minimis doctrine applies to the Maryland Wage Laws.[62]

Justice Watts filed a dissenting opinion along with Justice Eaves.[63] They argued that, absent any de minimis rule in the statutes’ plain language, the words “all compensation that is due” should not be understood as excluding otherwise compensable time.[64] The dissent also referenced Amaya as Maryland precedent because Amaya had ruled that the Maryland legislature’s silence regarding the PPA did not indicate its intent to incorporate it into the Maryland Wage Laws, and there was no reason to treat the de minimis doctrine differently.[65] Furthermore, they explained, considering that the general assembly had demonstrated a long trend of making employment law more employee-friendly,[66] it did not make sense for its silence to be interpreted as a desire to undercut workers’ rights.[67] The dissent also noted that several other state courts, when presented with similar questions, had declined to incorporate the de minimis rule into its legislation.[68] Maryland’s approach contradicts a growing trend among states that have chosen not to adopt the de minimis doctrine into their judicial interpretations.[69]

IV. Analysis

A. The Court’s Holding Insulates Businesses from Lawsuits over Minute Periods of Work Time That Are Difficult, if Not Impossible, to Calculate.

Ever since Anderson, the de minimis doctrine has been applied on the federal level to shield employers from lawsuits over “[s]plit second absurdities.”[70] Although states may raise the standard of wage compensation over the federal minimum, such legislation is not always advisable.[71] Here, the Supreme Court of Maryland established that the Maryland legislature did not intend to provide protections beyond the federal minimum.[72] This decision limits liability for both large and small businesses, which would otherwise need to defend themselves against lawsuits over negligible amounts of time.[73] This decision specifically protects smaller employers who otherwise would not have the technological sophistication to properly track every second of the workday.[74]

B. This Ruling, Although Seemingly Inconsistent with Amaya, Is Distinguishable.

While this decision seems facially incompatible with Amaya’s holding that the PPA does not apply in Maryland, the Court illustrates a critical difference between the two cases.[75] The Court explained that while Maryland’s wage law was modeled after the 1938 FLSA—which implicitly included the de minimis doctrine—it made no indication that it also accepted the later amendments added by the PPA.[76] Therefore, its silence could be interpreted as acquiescence to all the interpretations of the 1938 laws, but not to the PPA amendments.[77]

C. The Court’s Decision Places the Burden of Absorbing the Costs of De Minimis Time on Low-Wage Employees Rather Than on Large Corporations.

The Court explained that, because the de minimis doctrine applied under Maryland law, employees of larger businesses would receive no greater protection than employees of smaller businesses.[78] While this is logical on a certain level, its practical effect is to shift the cost of uncompensated work time from large corporations to low-income employees.[79] This is true even if large corporations have access to advanced tracking technology.[80] As Martinez argued in her brief, a company as large and technologically sophisticated as Amazon, which is capable of tracking the most minute movements of millions of packages worldwide, can surely find a way to calculate the time its employees spend in a security screening.[81] This anecdote illustrates that even when companies have the resources to calculate and compensate de minimis time, they are not required to do so under Maryland law.[82]

D. This Ruling Goes Against the Modern Trend from Other Jurisdictions.

As the dissent points out, this ruling contradicts a growing trend among jurisdictions nationwide that have been reluctant to apply a de minimis rule to legislation that has not explicitly stated it.[83] While the majority found the cases from other jurisdictions distinguishable,[84] these cases still underline a growing trend away from this doctrine, which the Supreme Court of Maryland has now embraced.[85]

V. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Maryland’s ruling in Martinez v. Amazon.com Services LLC provides protection to employers regarding de minimis time.[86] The majority’s analysis turned on the general assembly’s intent to mirror the original FLSA and its subsequent interpretations.[87] The result is the adoption of a more streamlined approach that makes it easier for employers to keep track of work time.[88] This will especially benefit smaller employers who otherwise may not have the resources to track such time.[89] The consequence of this approach is that employees will now be forced to absorb the loss of extra seconds and minutes that are harder to calculate.[90]

* Aharon Katz is a second-year evening student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and serves as a staff editor for Volume 56 of the University of Baltimore Law Review. During the day, he participates in a scholarly postgraduate program that studies Jewish law. Aharon spent the summer of 2026 as a Summer Associate for Neuberger, Quinn, Gielen, Rubin, and Gibber, P.A. In his free time, Aharon enjoys playing tennis, reading, and spending time with his wife and three children.


[1] 338 A.3d 636, 638 (Md. 2025).

[2] Id. at 655 (Watts J., dissenting) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)).

[3] See infra text accompanying note 46.

[4] See infra text accompanying notes 50–56.

[5] Id.

[6] 29 U.S.C. § 202.

[7] Id. § 206(a).

[8] Id.

[9] Id. § 207(a).

[10] Martinez v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 338 A.3d 636, 642 (Md. 2025).

[11] See generally 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (defining terms “work” and “workweek”).

[12] Id. at 690–91.

[13] Id. at 692.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Amaya v. DGS Constr., LLC, 278 A.3d 1216, 1234 n.14 (Md. 2022) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 251); see also Martinez, 338 A.3d at 643–44 (explaining that Anderson’s rule creating liability for employers for the time they spent walking to and from their workplaces, motivated Congress to pass the PPA to limit that liability).

[17] 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).

[18] See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

[19] See 29 C.F.R. § 785.47 (1961).

[20] Id.

[21] 571 U.S. 220, 234 (2014); 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (“In determining . . . the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes . . . which was excluded . . . under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement. . . .”).

[22] See Sandifer, 571 U.S. at 223 (arguing that protective gear is not “clothes”).

[23] Id. at 233.

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 234 (“A de minimis doctrine does not fit comfortably within the statute at issue here. . . [as] there is no more reason to disregard the minute or so necessary to put on glasses, earplugs, and respirators, than there is to regard the minute or so necessary to put on a snood.”).

[26] Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-401 to 3-431 (2026).

[27] Id. §§ 3-501 to 3-509.

[28] See Martinez v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 338 A.3d 636, 645 (Md. 2025).

[29] Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-401(d); 3-501(c)(1).

[30] Martinez, 338 A.3d at 650.

[31] Id. at 645.

[32] 278 A.3d 1216.

[33] Id. at 1239–40.

[34] See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

[35] Amaya v. DGS Constr., LLC, 278 A.3d 1216, 1240 (Md. 2022).

[36] Id.

[37] See infra text accompanying note 44.

[38] Martinez v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 338 A.3d 636, 639 (Md. 2025).

[39] Id.

[40] Id. at 641.

[41] Id. at 655.

[42] Id. at 641.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Id. at 638–39.

[46] Id. at 649.

[47] Id. at 650.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] See, e.g., Marshall v. Safeway, Inc., 88 A.3d 735, 744 (Md. 2014) (describing portions of the MWHL as “the Maryland equivalent of [the] FLSA”); Martinez, 338 A.3d at 650 (“[W]hen the General Assembly enacted the MWHL in 1965, it replicated many of the FLSA’s features – such as setting a minimum wage, requiring employers to preserve employment records, and protecting employees from retaliation for whistleblowing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[51] Martinez, 338 A.3d at 651.

[52] Id. at 652 n.9.

[53] Id.

[54] See supra Section II.A.

[55] See supra Section II.A.

[56] Martinez, 338 A.3d at 652.

[57] Id.

[58] Id.; see supra Section II.B.

[59] Martinez, 338 A.3d at 652.

[60] Id.

[61] Id.

[62] Id. at 655.

[63] See id. at 655–75 (Watts, J., dissenting).

[64] See id. at 658–61.

[65] Id. at 672.

[66] See id. at 661–65; see, e.g., Friolo v. Frankel, 819 A.2d 354, 363–64 (Md. 2003) (explaining that in response to difficulties in enforcing the MWHL and MWPCL, the Maryland legislature adopted a policy that if an employee won an unpaid wage claim where the wages were not withheld due to a bona fide dispute, the court would automatically award treble damages, even though the majority of claims were for between $150 and $200).

[67] Martinez, 338 A.3d at 661 (Watts, J., dissenting) (asserting that laws ensuring that employees are fairly compensated for all the work they have performed “spans the laws’ approximately sixty-year history.”).

[68] See id. at 667–70. See, e.g., In re Amazon.com, Inc., 255 A.3d 191, 193 (Pa. 2021) (“[T]here exists no de minimis exception to the [Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act]”); Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 421 P.3d 1114, 1120 (Cal. 2018) (“Nothing in the language of the [California] wage orders or Labor Code shows an intent to incorporate the federal de minimis rule [as] articulated in Anderson.”).

[69] See Martinez, 338 A.3d at 667–70 (Watts, J., dissenting).

[70] See id. at 654 (majority opinion) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946)).

[71] See id. at 659 (Watts, J., dissenting) (citing Lab. & Emp. § 3-413(b)).

[72] See id. at 651–52 (majority opinion).

[73] See id. at 654.

[74] See also id. (stating that the Maryland Wage Laws equally “apply to employers of all sizes and that have access to varying levels of technology and other resources.”).

[75] See id. at 652.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Id. at 654.

[79] See id. at 674 (Watts, J., dissenting).

[80] See id. (majority opinion).

[81] Id. at 653–54.

[82] Id. at 654.

[83] See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

[84] Martinez, 338 A.3d at 653.

[85] See also In re Amazon.com, Inc., 255 A.3d 191, 208 (Pa. 2021) (asserting that in light of the Sandifer decision, even the Supreme Court’s “view of the relevance of the de minimis doctrine in the interpretation of the federal FLSA going forward is no longer certain.”).

[86] See supra Section IV.A.

[87] See supra Section III.B.

[88] See supra Section IV.A.

[89] See id.

[90] See supra Section IV.C.

The Maternal Trap: How the Loss of Access to Hospitals Presents a Reproductive Justice Issue for Incarcerated Women in Rural Areas

*Alexis Berry

I. Introduction

Cuts to Medicaid following the passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) in July 2025[1] are expected to result in the closure of many rural hospitals, leading to higher healthcare costs and limited access to essential medical care.[2] With “almost 60% of people in prisons and 25% of those in local jails [being held] in rural counties,” rural hospital closures will likely present a public health care crisis for incarcerated individuals.[3] Incarcerated women requiring reproductive health services may encounter additional difficulties due to rural hospital closures, which may implicate their constitutional Eighth Amendment rights to adequate medical care.[4]      

Continue reading “The Maternal Trap: How the Loss of Access to Hospitals Presents a Reproductive Justice Issue for Incarcerated Women in Rural Areas”