“Alright, alright, alright”: How Matthew McConaughey and Other Entertainers Are Taking Name, Image, Likeness, and Sound Protection into Their Own Hands Amidst Lacking Federal AI Regulation

*Gabrielle Steinberg

  1. Introduction

In the new age of generative artificial intelligence (AI), individuals in the entertainment industry are experiencing an influx of unauthorized uses of their voices, visuals, and likenesses.[1] Deepfakes are created through the use of AI-generative models to “mimic a person’s likeness, voice, and mannerisms” in an almost undetectable manner and at an unprecedented rate.[2] The current legal framework is state-established rights of publicity, some of which do not directly address unauthorized AI usage.[3] This piecemeal framework causes inconsistencies in protections for the entertainment industry.[4] Federal legislation is necessary to establish uniformity among states.[5] Due to the lack of federal legislation, advocates are using novel legal avenues, such as trademark law, to help entertainers gain control of their brand identities.[6]

  1. The Current Era: The Limited Right of Publicity and the Piecemeal of State Legal Frameworks

Approximately thirty-five states have established a right of publicity, which offers entertainers protection from the “unauthorized commercial exploitation” of their names, images, voices, and other distinctive features.[7] There are two key issues with the current right of publicity: (1) The issue is handled at the state level, and (2) most state legislation does not provide direct protection against unauthorized use of AI.[8] Because the right of publicity is controlled at the state level, there are inconsistent levels of protection for entertainers in different states.[9] The lack of protection in the wake of growing AI abuse leaves entertainers at risk of commercial exploitation.[10]

Further, among the states that have enacted legislation, few have expanded the right of publicity in an effort to protect individuals’ names, voices, and likenesses against AI misuse.[11] On July 1, 2024, Tennessee expanded the right of publicity through the Ensuring Likeness, Voice, and Image Security (ELVIS) Act.[12] The Act established “a property right in the use of [an] individual’s name, photograph, voice, or likeness,” along with many other protective provisions for entertainers within Tennessee.[13] Shortly thereafter, Illinois and California proposed similar bills to provide protection against the unauthorized use of AI for entertainers within their states.[14]

  1. Entertainers Turn to Trademark Law for Help

Several well-known entertainers have sought trademark protection for assistance.[15] Under the Lanham Act, the crux of gaining trademark protection for entertainers is whether they can establish the distinctiveness of their marks.[16] In December 2025, Matthew McConaughey was the first entertainer to seek relief through trademark law.[17] To “bring elements of his persona within the scope of trademark protection,” McConaughey registered eight trademarks of various sound and visual clips.[18] McConaughey successfully gained trademark protection over his iconic “Alright, alright, alright” line from Dazed and Confused.[19] Lionel Richie and the Backstreet Boys have also applied for trademarks of various audio clips.[20] Notably, on April 27, 2026, Taylor Swift applied for trademark protection over (1) vocal recordings of her saying, “Hey, it’s Taylor,” and “Hey, it’s Taylor Swift,” and (2) an image of her holding her famous pink guitar.[21] Because of Swift’s massive popularity, consumers almost automatically associate both “Hey, it’s Taylor” and the image of her holding her guitar with her and her brand.[22]

  1. Challenges and Limitations of Enforcement: Where Trademark Protection May Fall Short

Unfortunately, entertainers gaining trademark protection for their marks is only the first hurdle in the journey to take back control of their brand identities.[23] Once entertainers gain protection over a sound or visual mark, they must undertake necessary enforcement measures.[24] To effectively enforce their trademark protection, entertainers need to (1) establish consistent use of their marks in commerce, (2) identify any misuse of their protected marks, and (3) swiftly seek legal action in the form of an infringement or false endorsement claim.[25] Entertainers must take these enforcement actions to fully benefit from trademark protection.[26] This is a novel use of trademark law, so it is unclear whether entertainers will efficiently enforce their protection or how courts will handle claims brought by entertainers against the prohibited use of AI by individuals or companies.[27] One possibility is that trademark law may not provide the protections entertainers are desperately looking for.[28]

Not only do enforcement challenges exist, but there are limitations to the enforcement.[29] Courts could find that the entertainers have no standing under the Lanham Act unless the AI replication or exploitation “[is] an exact imitation of the registered mark.”[30] To illustrate, for McConaughey to potentially prevail under the Lanham Act, the AI replication needs to mimic McConaughey himself saying any of his protected marks.[31] Therefore, trademark protection can only go so far to help entertainers in their fight against AI misuse.[32]

  1. Conclusion

An effective solution to protect entertainers’ brand identities is federal legislation that expands upon the right of publicity to deliberately protect against the unauthorized use of AI.[33] Federal legislatures have recognized the problem and have begun seeking solutions.[34] One attempt to address the problem is the Nurture Originals, Foster Art, and Keep Entertainment Safe (NO FAKES) Act.[35] The NO FAKES Act would establish privacy protection for entertainers and combat the unauthorized replication or exploitation of their voices, images, likenesses.[36] Until enactment, entertainers will likely address their AI concerns by applying for trademark protection over sound and visual marks.[37] While navigation of AI regulation remains unknown, it is unsurprising that many lawyers are doing all they can to assist their clients through trademark law and other novel legal theories.[38]

*Gabrielle Steinberg is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor for Volume 56 of Law Review. Gabrielle is a Distinguished Scholar of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society and a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills. This past summer she interned with Honorable Judge William Tucker at the Circuit Court for Howard County. This upcoming summer, she will be joining Venable as a Summer Associate in their Baltimore Office.


[1] See Ashton Friedman, AI Deep Fakes vs. Right of Publicity, Univ. of Denver Sports & Ent. L.J. (Nov. 17, 2025), https://duselj.wordpress.com/2025/11/17/ai-deepfakes-vs-right-of-publicity/.

[2] Id. (Deep fakes are “not actually their image or voice but rather a computer-generated fiction that mimics [entertainer’s] identity.”).

[3] See id.

[4] Id.

[5] Hailey Kozuchowski, Rethinking the Right of Publicity in Deepfake Age, Mich. Tech. L. Rev. (Sep. 24, 2025), https://mttlr.org/2025/09/rethinking-the-right-of-publicity-in-deepfake-age/.

[6] Summer Todd, How to Trademark A Guy in 8 Ways: An IP Strategy Against AI, Law360 (Feb. 6, 2026, at 13:37 EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/2435116/how-to-trademark-a-guy-in-8-ways-an-ip-strategy-against-ai.

[7] Friedman, supra note 1.

[8] Id.; Susan H. Ambramovitch et al., A New Era of Protection: Taylor Swift, AI, and Trademark Law, Gowling WLG (Aug. 12, 2026), https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2026/taylor-swift-ai-and-trademark-law.

[9] Ambramovitch et al., supra note 8; see Friedman, supra note 1.

[10] See sources cited supra note 9.

[11] See Kara Manuud, Guarding the Spotlight: Protecting Performers’ Likeness Through AI Legislation, Villanova L. Rev. (Sep. 27, 2024), https://www.villanovalawreview.com/post/2707-guarding-the-spotlight-protecting-performers-likeness-through-ai-legislation.

[12] Id.

[13] H.B. 2091, 113th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., (Tenn. 2024).

[14] See Manuud, supra note 11; H.B. 4762, 103rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ill. 2024) (agreement for digital replica of an individual’s voice or likeness is unenforceable without “a reasonably specific description of the intended uses” and if the individual was not represented by counsel or a labor union when entering the agreement); H.B. 4875, 104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ill. 2024) (it is prohibited to distribute or transmit to the public any sound recording or audiovisual if the individual has actual knowledge that it is an unauthorized digital replica); A.B. 2602, 80th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2024) (“A provision in an agreement between an individual and any other person for the performance of personal or professional services is unenforceable . . . by a digital replica of the individual if the provision meets all of the following conditions . . . .”).

[15] See Ambramovitch et al., supra note 8; Dylan Smith, Backstreet Boys Look to Decommission AI Deepfakes by Trademarking Their Voices – Joining Taylor Swift, Lionel Richie, and Others, Digit. Music News (June 26, 2026), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2026/06/26/backstreet-boys-trademark/.

[16] See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1); see Todd, supra note 6; Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 3d 348, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (denying voice actors the ability to bring a claim under Lanham Act Section 43(a)(1) because their sound marks were used as products rather than source-identifying marks).

[17] See Todd, supra note 6.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. (noting how instinctively the public associates this phrase with McConaughey).

[20] Ambramovitch, et al., supra note 8.

[21] Brad Brooks, Taylor Swift Files to Trademark Her Voice, Likeness to Ward off AI Deepfakes, Reuters (Apr. 28. 2026), https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/taylor-swift-files-trademark-her-voice-likeness-ward-off-ai-deepfakes-2026-04-27/.

[22] Id.; see sources cited supra note 16.

[23] See Steve Vondran, Celebrities Are Turning to Trademark Law to Protect Their Images and Voices From AI, JD Supra (Apr. 1, 2026), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/celebrities-are-turning-to-trademark-1842003/.

[24] See id.

[25] See id.; Todd, supra note 6.

[26] See Vondran, supra note 23.

[27] Todd, supra note 6.

[28] See id.

[29] See id.

[30] Id.; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (discussing how likelihood to cause confusion, mistake, or deceit between the plaintiff and defendant’s mark is required to bring a civil action).

[31] See sources cited supra note 25; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

[32] See discussion supra Part IV.

[33] See Kozuchowski, supra note 5.

[34] See id.

[35] See NO FAKES Act, S.1367, 119th Cong. (2025); see generally Kozuchowski, supra note 5 (discussing the gaps in the current approach to protect entertainers and the drastic need for federal legislation to establish uniformity).

[36] See Kozuchowski, supra note 5.

[37] See Ambramovitch et al., supra note 8.

[38] See Todd, supra note 6.

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, Student Gender Identity, and Administrative Agency Deference Post-Loper Bright

*Katie King

  1. Records Protections Under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) permits parents to access their children’s education records.[1] Education records are materials “maintained by an educational agency or institution” that “contain information directly related to a student.”[2] Most education records are accessible to parents, with narrow exceptions.[3] One pertinent exception is records that are kept by their author for use as a personal memory aid and are not accessible to others.[4] This may include teacher/administrative documents noting a student’s preferred name, pronouns, or gender identity so long as the record meets the exception’s criteria.[5] Fifteen states require varying degrees of disclosure to parents when their student requests the use of a different name or pronoun.[6] The Department of Education (DOE) asserts that FERPA prohibits schools from restricting parents’ access to records referencing a student’s gender transition.[7]

  1. The Scope of Transgender Identities

Transgender is a general term for an individual whose expression of gender “does not conform to that typically associated with the sex to which they were assigned at birth.”[8] Sex is the culmination of biological features including hormones, sexual and reproductive anatomy, and chromosomes.[9] Gender is based on the “roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for boys and men or girls and women.”[10]

A study from Saint Louis University School of Medicine found that out of the study’s 155 transgender participants, a majority began questioning their gender identity on average between the ages of three and seven.[11] Approximately 724,000 children in the United States aged thirteen to seventeen identify as transgender, representing 3.3% of all individuals in that age demographic.[12] The same demographic represents 25.3% of the entire transgender population of the United States.[13]

  1. The Trump Administration’s Action on Gender Identity Disclosure Under FERPA, Oppositions Thereto, and Consequences for Non-Compliance

The Trump Administration asserts that “FERPA gives parents the right to access their children’s education records.”[14] Thus, “[p]olicies that instruct teachers, counselors, and other employees to hide a child’s ‘gender transition’ records from parents infringe on parents’ rights under FERPA.”[15]  The Administration recently called upon educational agencies to “apply FERPA correctly to uphold, not thwart, parents’ rights” regarding “gender ideology.”[16] In early 2026, the DOE began a series of challenges by finding the California Department of Education in violation of FERPA for employing “tactics used to hide information from parents.”[17] Among these tactics were instituting the use of gender support plans and advocating for a student management software company to begin hiding student pronouns.[18] Likewise, in October 2026, the Department of Justice filed suit against Anne Arundel County Public Schools in Maryland, alleging violation of FERPA for directing staff to “solicit, document, and act upon a student’s self-identified name, pronouns, and gender identity without notifying parents.”[19] While California and Maryland are among the first states to face an official finding, other state education departments are under investigation.[20]

As a result of the DOE’s finding, the California Attorney General is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court to restrict the DOE’s enforcement of policies the Department claims FERPA mandates.[21] California contests the finding and notes in its complaint that it “need not be perfectly FERPA-compliant to avoid enforcement penalties.”[22] FERPA requires only that parents be allowed to inspect records upon request, not that schools proactively disclose information found in those records.[23] There is also no private right of action under FERPA, so parents cannot sue directly to enforce it.[24] One available penalty for FERPA violations, however, is the revocation of federal funding, a sanction the DOE has threatened but never imposed.[25]

  1. The End of Chevron Deference Post-Loper Bright

In 1984, the United States Supreme Court held in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. that an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute may be entitled to deference when challenged.[26] Chevron established a two-step framework to review an agency’s construction of a statute: (1) Has Congress directly addressed the question now before the court?[27] (2) If not, is the administrative agency’s policy “based on a permissible construction of the statute?”[28] In 2024, Chevron was overturned by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, when the Court held Chevron “to be fundamentally misguided.”[29] Now, courts “must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.”[30]

In the absence of mandatory deference, an administrative agency’s enforcement policies are subject to neutral statutory interpretation.[31] Had the DOE challenged school gender identity policies under FERPA prior to 2024, the DOE’s interpretation and enforcement actions would likely have been permissible, thus forcing states to comply.[32] However, post-Loper Bright, courts must simply employ independent statutory interpretation to “effectuate the will of Congress.”[33] If a court believes that the DOE has not engaged in reasoned decisionmaking as permitted by Congress, the court must correct the error.[34]

  1. Conclusion

As more educational agencies are challenged on their gender identity policies, lawsuits will make their way through federal courts.[35] Loper Bright provides little guidance beyond the principle of review with neutrality, thus each court’s interpretation of FERPA’s enforcement will inevitably be influenced by the leanings of the court.[36] The influx of federal lawsuits will likely result in circuit splits and eventually a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court.[37] As the DOE continues to investigate possible FERPA violations regarding gender identity policies, outcomes will hinge on whether the accused educational agency immediately acquiesces to the enforcement action, or whether it refuses to comply, sparking more litigation.[38]

*Katie King is a second-year evening student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor for the University of Baltimore Law Review. She serves as a Teaching Assistant for Introduction to Lawyering Skills, works as a full-time public service paralegal, and sits on the advisory board for Anne Arundel Community College’s Paralegal Studies program. Katie also holds a forty-hour mediation training certificate and is a member of the Women’s Bar Association of Maryland.


[1] 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1).

[2] Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).

[3] What Records Are Exempted from FERPA?, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/what-records-are-exempted-ferpa (last visited Aug. 30, 2026).

[4] Id.

[5] Id.; Privacy, Policy & Legality, Blurring the Binary (Sep. 2026), https://blurringthebinary.com/privacy%2C-policy%2C-legality.

[6] Equality Maps: Forced Outing of Transgender Students, Movement Advancement Project, https://mapresearch.org/equality-map/forced-outing-of-transgender-youth-in-schools/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2026).

[7] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Trump Administration Cracks Down on School Districts Secretly “Transitioning” Students and Hiding it from Parents (July 27, 2026), https://www.ed.gov/about/news/press-release/trump-administration-cracks-down-school-districts-secretly-transitioning-students-and-hiding-it-parents [hereinafter July Press Release].

[8] Understanding Transgender People, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression, Am. Psych. Ass’n. (July 8, 2026), https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbtq/transgender-people-gender-identity-gender-expression [https://perma.cc/5JZT-3CYR].

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Michael Zaliznyak et al., How Early in Life do Transgender Adults Begin to Experience Gender Dysphoria? Why this Matters for Patients, Providers, and for Our Healthcare System 2, 3 (2021) https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8766261/pdf/main.pdf.

[12] Jody L. Herman & Andrew R. Flores, How Many Adults and Youth Identify as Transgender in The United States? 2 (2025) https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Trans-Pop-Update-Aug-2025.pdf.

[13] Id. at 7.

[14] Letter from Linda E. McMahon, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., to Educators (Mar. 28, 2025) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter].

[15] July Press Release, supra note 7.

[16] Letter, supra note 14.

[17] Press Release, supra note 7; see generally Compl., California v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 3:26-cv-01259 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2026) [hereinafter Compl.] (informing the California State Superintendent of Public Instruction of the DOE’s findings in the investigation of California’s education records access policies).

[18] July Press Release, supra note 7.

[19] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Justice Department Sues to Stop Secret Gender Transitions at Anne Arundel County Public Schools (October 27, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-stop-secret-gender-transitions-anne-arundel-county-public-schools.

[20] July Press Release, supra note 7.

[21] Compl. at 23–24.

[22] Id. at 7.

[23] Cody Venzke, Reaffirming Privacy Obligations While Facing New Challenges: Guidance for States, Schools, and Universities, ACLU 19 (May 14, 2025), https://assets.aclu.org/live/uploads/2025/05/2025.05.15-FERPA-Guidance-v5b-1.pdf.

[24] See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002).

[25] FERPA: What it Means and How it Works, SPLC, https://splc.org/ferpa-what-it-means-and-how-it-works/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2026).

[26] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

[27] Id. at 842–43.

[28] Id.

[29] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 407 (2024).

[30] Id. at 412.

[31] See Dahlia Mignouna, Chy-Ching Huang & Kelsey Merrick, Loper Bright Overruled Chevron—Not Longstanding Tools of Statutory Interpretation, Tax L. Ctr. NYU L., (Apr. 2, 2026) https://taxlawcenter.org/blog/loper-bright-overruled-chevron-not-longstanding-tools-of-statutory-interpretation.

[32] See United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 814 (2002) (discussing that the term “education records” is ambiguous, noting “[i]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, this Court must defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).

[33] Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 395.

[34] See id. (citing Michigan v. E.P.A., 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015)).

[35] See discussion supra Parts III–IV.

[36] See also Alma Cohen & Rajeev H. Dehejia, Judges Judging Judges: Polarization in The U.S. Courts of Appeals 3, 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No, 32920, 2024) (evaluating an increase in the politicization of federal circuit courts and the long-term and widespread implications of partisanship on judicial decisions). See generally Circuit Courts in the Balance, Alliance for Just., https://afj.org/why-courts-matter/circuit-courts-in-the-balance/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2026) (showing the political leanings of federal circuit judges).

[37] See Kelsey Dallas, The Art of the Circuit Split: An Explainer, SCOTUSBlog (Feb. 17, 2026, at 09:30 ET), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/02/the-art-of-the-circuit-split-an-explainer/ (explaining how pervasive circuit splits influence the Court’s decision to grant certiorari).

[38] See Compl., supra note 17, at 2–4 (detailing the history of the DOE’s investigation into California’s gender identity disclosure policies and California’s noncompliance with the DOE’s demand for “corrective actions.” Noting the DOE’s threat of termination of federal education funding in the amount of $4.9 billion dollars annually, leading California to seek declaratory and injunctive relief).

Government Purpose or Possession? Moderna’s Vaccine Patent Liability Dispute and the Meaning of “For the Government” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498

*Rebekah Garrett

  1. Introduction

In August 2020, the federal government purchased 500 million doses of Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine as part of a national emergency response.[1] In 2022, Arbutus Biopharma Corporation (Arbutus) sued Moderna, alleging that the vaccine infringed its patent on lipid nanoparticle technology.[2] In response, Moderna attempted to shift patent liability to the government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).[3] Section 1498(a) allows the government to “shield a patent-infringing contractor” when a patented invention is manufactured “for the government.”[4]

While the government purchased 500 million vaccine doses, only six million were distributed to federal employees, raising the question whether the other 494 million doses were “for the government.”[5] In February 2026, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware interpreted Section 1498(a) to require that the government, rather than the public, be the intended recipient of an infringing product.[6] Thus, the district court held that Section 1498(a) did not shield Moderna from liability for the public doses.[7] Arbutus and Moderna subsequently reached a conditional settlement resolving the patent infringement dispute while preserving the Section 1498(a) dispute for appeal.[8] The Federal Circuit’s conclusion could have broader implications for future government contracts involving patent infringement claims, especially in times of emergency.[9]

  1. Shifting Liability for Patent Infringement Through Government Contracts: Understanding the Statute

Section 1498(a) operates like eminent domain.[10] Eminent domain permits the government to take private property for public use, provided that the property owner receives just compensation.[11] Section 1498(a) applies a similar principle to patented inventions because it allows the government to infringe on a patent as long as the patent holder is “fairly compensated.”[12]

Government contractors have immunity from patent infringement litigation when they act (1) for the government and (2) “with the authorization or consent of the [g]overnment.”[13] Ordinarily, a patent owner may seek monetary damages against the patent infringer and, when appropriate, an injunction against continued infringement.[14] However, under Section 1498(a), the patent owner must seek compensation from the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims—rather than from the government contractor.[15]

  1. The Tension Between Government Purpose and Public Possession

The competing interpretations of Section 1498(a) hinge on whether the “for the government” requirement primarily focuses on the purpose behind the government’s procurement or who ultimately possesses and uses the patented product.[16] One consideration in determining if the infringement was “for the government” is whether the product was for the government’s benefit in furtherance and fulfillment of government policies.[17] However, there are limits to this inquiry, because “incidental benefit[s]” to the government are insufficient to trigger liability under Section 1498(a).[18] This section first examines Arbutus’s recipient-focused argument and the district court’s adoption of that interpretation.[19] Then, this section turns to Moderna’s purpose-based arguments on appeal and the related arguments advanced by amici in support of Moderna.[20]

  1. Arbutus and the District Court’s Position: Possession

Arbutus contended that the patent infringement was for the sole benefit of the individual vaccine recipients and should not be shielded under Section 1498(a).[21] The district court adopted Arbutus’s recipient-focused interpretation of Section 1498(a), holding that “the [g]overnment, as an entity, must be the intended recipient of the infringing product, as opposed to the public that the [g]overnment represents.”[22] The district court reasoned that the present case is indistinguishable from Larson v. United States.[23] In Larson, the claims court held that Section 1498(a) did not cover Medicare providers’ use of patented splints because the providers’ care benefited patients—not the government.[24] Thus, the government’s interest in the program was too remote to make the government the true beneficiary.[25] The district court analogized the Moderna vaccine to the splints in Larson, finding that the patients were the beneficiaries in both scenarios.[26]

However, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (the AIPLA), appearing as amicus curiae in support of Moderna, argues that the present case is not like Larson because the government directly contracted for the vaccine doses whereas in Larson the government approved a passive reimbursement scheme for the splints.[27] The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of whether Larson is analogous could impact the scope of the government’s patent liability when the government directly contracts for patented products, potentially affecting how Section 1498(a) is applied in the future.[28]

  1. The Government and Moderna’s Position: Procurement and Purpose

The United States has a vested interest in the interpretation of Section 1498(a) to protect government procurement efforts.[29] Appearing as amicus curiae in support of Moderna, the United States criticizes the district court’s narrow reading of “for the government” as creating an “unworkable ultimate-recipient rule.”[30] The Government argues that the proper interpretation of Section 1498(a) considers the benefits arising from the procurement contract, not the ultimate recipients of the infringing product. [31] The United States views the analysis here as straightforward because of the express authorization-and-consent clause of the contract.[32] The government directly procured and distributed the patent-infringing vaccine to meet the goals of Operation Warp Speed, providing benefits for the government’s emergency response that were not merely incidental.[33]

The AIPLA, however, does not consider the authorization-and-consent clause sufficient on its own to establish a governmental benefit.[34] The AIPLA focuses its argument on the direct benefits of the procurement of the vaccine, like Moderna does on appeal.[35] Moderna contends that the patent infringement was for the government’s benefit because the government’s nationwide vaccination effort was supported.[36] Moderna also argues that the vaccination distribution benefited the government financially.[37] To support its purpose-based argument, Moderna relies on Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States, a case where the court found that a procured product not in United States’s direct possession satisfied Section 1498(a) because of the product’s national security benefits.[38]

  1. Implications for Future Government Patent Liability

National emergencies, like COVID-19, often require the government to act quickly, leaving little time to negotiate with patent owners before using products necessary to protect the public.[39] The pending appeal before the Federal Circuit requires the court to determine whether the government’s benefit from procuring vaccines for public distribution satisfies Section 1498(a) or whether the public’s use of vaccines makes that benefit merely incidental.[40] Making this determination will involve balancing competing interests between protecting patent holders’ rights and preserving the government’s ability to procure patented products to address urgent public needs.[41] The Federal Circuit’s decision could establish an important boundary for future interpretations of Section 1498(a).[42]

*Rebekah Garrett is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Staff Editor of the University of Baltimore Law Review. She serves as a member of the Honor Board, a UB Leads mentor, a Law Scholar for Torts and Contracts, and the Communications Director of Students Supporting the Women’s Law Center. She is also a member of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society as a distinguished scholar. Before attending law school, Rebekah earned her bachelor’s degree in Sociology from McDaniel College. In her free time, she enjoys singing, songwriting, and scrapbooking.


[1] See Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00252-JDW, 2026 WL 266389, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2026).

[2] See id. at *1, 4; Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 3d 397, 400–02 (D. Del. 2022).

[3] 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).

[4] Michael Shapiro, Moderna Vaccine Appeal Poised to Set Patent Liability Benchmark, Bloomberg L. (Aug. 13, 2026, at 05:00 ET), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/bloomberg-law-news/XBBDFJVS2H87889MBHNO09NOBL?criteria_id=f4104a6b5bc7ad075957aa02fa760e02 [https://perma.cc/GCX9-Z2KF].

[5] Id.

[6] Arbutus, 2026 WL 266389, at *5.

[7] Id. at *13.

[8] See Genevant Sciences and Arbutus Biopharma Announce $2.25 Billion Global Settlement With Moderna, Arbutus Biopharma (Mar. 3, 2026), https://investor.arbutusbio.com/news-releases/news-release-details/genevant-sciences-and-arbutus-biopharma-announce-225-billion; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. 26-1581, at 9–10 (Fed. Cir. June 19, 2026).

[9] See Shapiro, supra note 4.

[10] The Editorial Board, How the Government Can Lower Drug Prices, N.Y. Times (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/prescription-drug-costs-naloxone-opioids.html; see Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (describing Section 1498 as “essentially an Act to authorize the eminent domain taking of a patent license.”); Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (asserting that Section 1498 is “in effect, an eminent domain statute.”).

[11] See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).

[12] The Editorial Board, supra note 10.

[13] 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); see Shweta Kumar, Formulating Public Pharma, 110 Cornell L. Rev. 1369, 1413–14 (2026).

[14] See Andrew C. Michaels, Benefits of the Invention and Social Value in Patent Law, 29 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 849–51 (2022) (explaining how courts determine damages for patent infringement, with injunctions being possible but less frequently available).

[15] 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).

[16] See discussion infra Sections III.A–B.

[17] See Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 3d 397, 405 (D. Del. 2022); Kumar, supra note 13, at 1414.

[18] See Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

[19] See infra Section III.A.

[20] See infra Section III.B.

[21] Arbutus, 638 F. Supp. 3d at 407–08.

[22] Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00252-JDW, 2026 WL 266389, at *5 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2026).

[23] Id. at *6; see Larson v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 365, 368–69 (1992).

[24] See Larson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 368–69.

[25] Id. at 369.

[26] See Arbutus, 2026 WL 266389, at *6; see Larson, 26 Cl. Ct. at 369 (“Medical care is provided for the benefit of the patient, not the government.”).

[27] Brief for American Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. 26-1581, at 18 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2026).

[28] See discussion infra Section IV.

[29] Brief for United States, supra note 8, at 1.

[30] Id. at 12.

[31] Id. at 13–14 (“The benefit to the government is thus inherent in the nature of the procurement contract.”).

[32] Id. at 17.

[33] Id. at 22–23.

[34] Brief for American Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 27, at 7.

[35] Id. at 8.

[36] See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., No. 26-1581, at 1 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2026); see also Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. Moderna, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D. Del. 2022) (describing Moderna’s substantially similar argument in the underlying district court proceeding).

[37] See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 49; Shapiro, supra note 4.

[38] See generally Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding that satellites in the Skynet II satellite program, while ultimately owned by the United Kingdom, were sufficiently “for the government” because they were vital for the defense and security of the United States); see also Brief for American Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note 27, at 17 (describing Hughes as an example of a case where the procured good did not go to government employees but served a national interest, satisfying the “for the government” requirement).

[39] See Christopher J. Morten & Charles Duan, Who’s Afraid of Section 1498? A Case for Government Patent Use in Pandemics and Other National Crises, 23 Yale J.L. & Tech 1, 51 (2020).

[40] See discussion supra Section III.

[41] See Morten & Duan, supra note 39, at 91.

[42] Shapiro, supra note 4.

A New Frontier for Partisan Gerrymandering: An Analysis of Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. 85 (2026)

*Aharon Katz

  1. Introduction: The Modern Expansion of Partisan Redistricting Efforts

Partisan redistricting has been part of the national political playbook since the United States’ founding.[1] The first congressional maps drawn in 1789 show signs of manipulation in favor of specific political interests.[2] The term “gerrymander” gained notoriety after an 1812 political cartoon mocked Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry’s partisan boundary manipulation by depicting one of the bizarrely shaped districts as resembling a salamander.[3] The 1990s ushered in a new era of redistricting, as technological advances enabled precise algorithmic maps tailored to benefit particular political parties.[4] Supreme Court rulings in 2004 and 2019, holding that questions of political gerrymandering were non-justiciable due to a lack of judicially manageable standards, weakened judicial safeguards and emboldened redistricting movements.[5] Although states traditionally waited for the new census at the end of every decade to redistrict, recent mid-cycle redistricting efforts by both parties have once again elevated the gerrymandering issue to the national spotlight.[6]

  1. The Backdrop for the Callais Decision

Historically, redistricting efforts have also included a racial dimension.[7] In the post-Civil War era, Southern states frequently employed racialized redistricting efforts to dilute the influence of the Black vote.[8] The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 provided protections against racial discrimination in redistricting.[9] In its original form, Section 2 of the VRA stated that “[n]o . . . standard practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State . . . to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”[10] The Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden decided that neutral voting practices only violate Section 2 if they are “motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”[11] Backlash to this decision prompted Congress to amend Section 2.[12]

Under the newly added Section 2(b), a violation of the VRA is established when the totality of the circumstances indicate that members of a protected class “have less [of an] opportunity than other members of the electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice.”[13] Soon after, in Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court held that, regardless of racial intent, a Section 2(b) violation occurs when a government entity fails to create a reasonably constructed district that would ensure minority representation (when the minority otherwise will not be represented).[14] However, the amended Section 2 generated tension with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which guarantees equal protection under the law for any person, minority or not, under any state’s jurisdiction.[15] This tension led to the controversy raised in Louisiana v. Callais.

  1. Callais and the Racial Intent Requirement

Louisiana’s population is around one-third African-American and has six congressional districts.[16] In 2020, the Louisiana legislature drew a congressional map that had only one majority Black district.[17] Upon request for an injunction, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana held that this map likely violated the VRA and ordered that a new map be drawn with a second majority Black district.[18] After Louisiana modified the congressional map, a group of plaintiffs, led by Phillip Callais, sued the State.[19] The plaintiffs claimed that the second majority African-American district was a racial gerrymander that showed preferential treatment for a specific class in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.[20] The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the State appealed directly to the Supreme Court.[21]

The Supreme Court’s decision established a new standard for illegal gerrymandering.[22] Writing for the Court, Justice Alito explained that any law discriminating on the basis of race triggers strict scrutiny.[23] However, instead of deciding the constitutionality of Section 2 as construed by Gingles, the Court reinterpreted Section 2’s meaning.[24] Under Callais, a class “hav[ing] less [of an] opportunity than other members of the electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice” merely means that they have less of a chance of electing representatives of their choice than do other non-minority citizens of the same political affiliation.[25] The caveat is that even a Democratic-aligned non-minority community does not stand a particularly high chance of electing a Democratic candidate in a heavily Republican state and vice versa.[26] Rather, to establish a Section 2 violation under the Callais approach, a plaintiff would have to show racially motivated redistricting rather than standard partisan politics.[27]

Justice Kagan read a summary of her dissent from the bench, signaling her strong disagreement.[28] She argued that because the Subsection (b) amendment was added in response to public outcry over the Bolden decision,[29] reverting to the Bolden neutral intent standard undermines Congress’s original intent.[30] In rejecting Justice Alito’s claim that improvements in racial politics over the fifty years since the VRA’s passage made Gingles’s broad protections unnecessary, she argued that any racial advances were because of the VRA.[31] She argued that this decision essentially turns Section 2 of the VRA into a “dead letter.”[32]

  1. The Fallout

Who loses? Well, everyone.[33] Partisan redistricting only breeds more partisan redistricting.[34] To illustrate: After the Trump Administration began its mid-cycle redistricting push, California Democrats countered by redrawing an additional five seats in their favor.[35] The Maryland Legislature went even further by approving a ballot measure that, if passed, would amend the state Constitution and make it easier to eliminate the final Maryland Republican House seat.[36] This decision will likely only fuel a new wave of hyperpartisanship and divisiveness.[37] More importantly, states can now use this decision to freely discriminate against minorities and blame partisan politics as a pretext.[38] Even if states do act in good faith and redistrict only for political rather than racial reasons, minorities may still have the impression that they are being disenfranchised.[39] Thus, it appears that this new gerrymandering frontier is likely to make politics uglier and more polarizing.[40]

*Aharon Katz is a second-year evening student at the University of Baltimore School of Law and serves as a staff editor for Volume 56 of the University of Baltimore Law Review. During the day, he participates in a scholarly postgraduate program that studies Jewish law. Aharon spent the summer of 2026 as a Summer Associate for Neuberger, Quinn, Gielen, Rubin, and Gibber, P.A. In his free time, Aharon enjoys playing tennis, reading, and spending time with his wife and three children. Aharon was previously published in the University of Baltimore Law Review for authoring the Highest Case Note in the 2026 Write-On Competition.


[1] Jerald Stubbs, The Long History of Gerrymandering in American Politics, Real Clear Hist. (June 5, 2026), https://www.realclearhistory.com/articles/2026/06/05/the_long_history_of_gerrymandering_in_american_politics_1186588.html.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Benjamin Forest, The Changing Demographic, Legal, and Technological Contexts of Political Representation, PubMed Central (Oct. 17, 2005), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1266125/.

[5] Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004); Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 718 (2019).

[6] Explainer: What’s Happening with Gerrymandering in the United States—and Who Will “Win” the Redistricting Battle?, Harvard Kennedy School (May 4, 2026), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/democracy-governance/explainer-whats-happening-gerrymandering-united.

[7] Maahi Sethi, The Battle of Redistricting in the American South, ACLU Ga. (July 22, 2026), https://www.acluga.org/news/the-battle-of-redistricting-in-the-american-south/.

[8] Little, supra note 4.

[9] Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301.

[10] Id.

[11] 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980).

[12] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. 85, 96 (2026).

[13] 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

[14] See 478 U.S. 30, 48–51 (1986).

[15] U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Callais, 608 U.S. at 107.

[16] Callais, at 148 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 103 (majority opinion); see Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 766, 858 (2022).

[19] See Callais, at 106.

[20] See id.

[21] Id. at 106–07; see 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

[22] Callais at 118–21.

[23] Id. at 107.

[24] See id. at 110–11.

[25] Id. at 110; Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).

[26] Callais, at 110 (drawing an analogy between the opportunity of minority voters to elect members of their preferred party in a state dominated by the opposing party to the opportunity of a man shorter than six feet tall to play in the NBA).

[27] Id. at 113 (“[T]he focus of § 2 must be enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on intentional racial discrimination.”).

[28] Amy Howe, In Major Voting Rights Act Case, Supreme Court Strikes Down Redistricting Map Challenged as Racially Discriminatory, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 29, 2026), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/04/in-major-voting-rights-act-case-supreme-court-strikes-down-redistricting-map-challenged-as-racia/. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined Justice Kagan in dissenting. Callais at 127.

[29] See discussion supra Section II.

[30] Callais, at 172 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

[31] Id. at 168 (quoting Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 590 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[such logic is akin to] throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”).

[32] Id. at 172.

[33] See Explainer: What’s Happening with Gerrymandering in the United States—and Who Will “Win” the Redistricting Battle?, supra note 6.

[34] See id.

[35] See Explainer: What’s Happening with Gerrymandering in the United States—and Who Will “Win” the Redistricting Battle?, supra note 6 and accompanying text; DOJ and California go to Court Over New Congressional Map Designed to Favor Democrats, PBS News (Dec. 15, 2025, at 14:29 ET), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/doj-and-california-go-to-court-over-new-congressional-map-designed-to-favor-democrats.

[36] See David Collins, Maryland Question 3 Sparks Confusion as Voters Say Ballot Language is ‘Very Verbose’, WBAL-TV (Oct. 12, 2026, at 11:53 ET), https://www.wbaltv.com/article/maryland-question-3-ballot-language-confusion-tv-ads/74109301.

[37] See Alicia Bannon, The Aftermath of Callais, State Ct. Rep. (May 7, 2026), https://statecourtreport.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/aftermath-callais.

[38] Callais, 608 U.S. at 172.

[39] See generally id. (moving from the intent-neutral Gingles standard to a new specific-intent standard).

[40] See Bannon, supra note 37.

The Fight Continues: Defining Presidential Power and Protecting the Arctic

*Elena (Nutter) Taitano

  1. Introduction

In Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Trump, a coalition of eleven environmental organizations brought a multi-plaintiff lawsuit against President Trump to prevent offshore drilling.[1] The environmental coalition claimed that President Trump’s attempt to undo permanent protections of portions of the U.S. Continental Shelf exceeded his presidential power.[2] Further, the environmental coalition emphasized that oil and gas leasing activities in these areas would harm wildlife and their habitats.[3] Instead of addressing the issue of presidential power under Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska dismissed the action for lack of standing.[4] Thus, if the environmental coalition can establish an imminent injury when it brings suit again, the district court may not be able to avoid addressing the key issue: Does President Trump have the authority under the OSCLA to rescind protection on areas previously withdrawn from oil and gas leasing during past presidencies?[5]

  1. The Background and Function of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

The OCSLA was originally enacted in 1953 in response to a dispute between the federal government and the state of Texas regarding the title of 2.5 million acres of tide-land.[6] The federal government currently has jurisdiction over the regulation of oil and gas exploration in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), including lease sales.[7] The government’s jurisdiction of the OCS typically extends 200 nautical miles from the coast, totaling approximately 2.3 billion acres.[8]

Section 12(a) of the OCSLA gives presidents the authority to place moratoria suspending the land from oil and gas leasing or offshore drilling.[9] Many presidents have placed new moratoria in different regions of the OCS since the 1990s.[10] In contrast, not many presidents have attempted to rescind moratoria enacted by their predecessors.[11]

  1. The Decade-Long Fight Over Section 12(a) and the Arctic

In 2016, President Obama applied Section 12(a) to protect portions of the OCS indefinitely, including the Arctic’s Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.[12] The drilling ban protected 98% of the Arctic Ocean.[13] The following year, President Trump issued Executive Order 13795, which removed President Obama’s Arctic drilling ban to “unleash American energy.”[14] Environmental organizations quickly targeted the Executive Order, becoming the basis of litigation in League of Conservation Voters v. Trump.[15]

In League of Conservation Voters, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska was presented with the question about the scope of presidential power under Section 12(a), specifically, whether it is constitutional to apply the OCSLA to revoke land protections placed by former presidents.[16] The court held that President Trump exceeded his federal authority because the Act gives presidents only the power to add additional protection, not the power to rescind previous presidential withdrawals.[17] President Trump’s plans to open the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas for leasing were halted after the court struck down specific provisions of Executive Order 13795 that pertained to oil and gas leasing.[18] The Trump Administration appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.[19]

Before the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal, President Trump’s presidency ended, turning the litigation over to President Biden.[20] In January 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13990, “Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science To Tackle the Climate Crisis.”[21] The Executive Order reinstated President Obama’s 2016 Arctic protections, nullifying President Trump’s Executive Order 13795, which prompted League of Conservation Voters.[22] Due to President Biden’s Executive Order 13990, the Ninth Circuit held that the issue in League of Conservation Voters was moot.[23] Although the district court previously answered the question of the extent of presidential power under Section 12(a), that progress was lost when the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to dismiss the action.[24]

  1. Next Steps

The government will have to take more concrete steps toward a lease sale before the environmental coalition can successfully file a new complaint.[25] In Northern Alaska, the Government argued that although “the [A]dministration has announced a draft proposed Program that could potentially offer some of the previously withdrawn areas in future sales, no Program has yet been approved.”[26] The environmental coalition attempted to prove imminence by pointing to the government’s announcement that it plans to propose a lease sale in the Beaufort Sea by the end of the year.[27]

The environmental coalition stated its intention to bring the same claims against President Trump again “if and when any offshore activities are on the horizon.”[28] Because of the Administration’s planned sale in the Arctic by the end of this year, the next lawsuit could be near.[29] This would give the environmental coalition another chance to protect the Arctic wildlife and the court another chance to settle the age-old question of presidential power under Section 12(a).[30]

*Elena is a second-year student at the University of Baltimore School of Law, where she is a Distinguished Scholar of the Royal Graham Shannonhouse III Honor Society and serves as a staff editor for Volume 56 of the University of Baltimore Law Review. Before law school, she spent five years gaining experience in quality assurance, regulatory compliance, and pharmaceutical compounding. She holds a Bachelor of Science in Biology from The Ohio State University.


[1] Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, N. Alaska Env’t Ctr. v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-00038 (D. Alaska 2026).

[2] Id. at 2.

[3] Id. at 11.

[4] Order of Dismissal, N. Alaska Env’t Ctr. v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-00038-SLG (D. Alaska 2026).

[5] Niina H. Farah, Trump’s Offshore Drilling Revival Survives Early Court Challenge, E&E News (Aug. 24, 2026, at 17:44 EDT), https://www.eenews.net/articles/trumps-offshore-drilling-revival-survives-early-court-challenge/.

[6] OCS Lands Act History, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., https://www.boem.gov/oil-gas-energy/leasing/ocs-lands-act-history (last visited Sept. 2, 2026).

[7] Id.

[8] Outer Continental Shelf, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., https://www.boem.gov/oil-gas-energy/leasing/outer-continental-shelf (last visited Sept. 2, 2026).

[9] Adam Vann, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Legal Framework 3–4 (Cong. Rsch. Serv., 2026).

[10] Id. at 4–5.

[11] See, e.g., Kate Sheppard, Bush to Lift Executive Ban on Offshore Drilling Signed by His Father, Grist (July 15, 2008), https://grist.org/article/tanks-but-no-tanks/ (noting that President George W. Bush lifted offshore drilling ban enacted by George H.W. Bush).

[12] Tom DiChristopher, Obama Invokes 1953 Law to Indefinitely Block Drilling in Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2017, at 9:56 EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/20/obama-expected-to-invoke-1953-law-to-block-offshore-drilling.html.

[13] Court Affirms Protections Against Drilling in the Arctic and Atlantic, Earthjustice (Apr. 5, 2019) https://earthjustice.org/feature/inside-legal-case-judge-nixed-trump-attempt-drill-arctic-atlantic.

[14] Matthew Daly & Jill Colvin, Watch: Trump Signs Order Aimed at Opening Arctic Drilling, PBS News (Apr. 28, 2017, at 16:10 EDT), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-trump-signs-order-aimed-opening-arctic-drilling; Exec. Order No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (May 3, 2017).

[15] League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1016–17 (D. Alaska 2019), vacated, 843 F. App’x 937 (9th Cir. 2021), remanded to, No. 3:17-CV-00101-SLG, 2025 WL 2403127 (D. Alaska 2025).

[16] Id. at 1019–21.

[17] Id. at 1030.

[18] See War on the Offshore – President Trump Restores Areas Withdrawn by President Biden from Offshore Drilling, Vinson & Elkins (Mar. 26, 2025), https://www.velaw.com/insights/war-on-the-offshore-president-trump-restores-areas-withdrawn-by-president-biden-from-offshore-drilling/.

[19] League of Conservation Voters v. Trump (Offshore Leasing Ban), NRDC (Feb. 19, 2025), https://www.nrdc.org/court-battles/league-conservation-voters-v-trump-offshore-leasing-ban.

[20] Id.

[21] Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021).

[22] Id.

[23] League of Conservation Voters v. Biden, 843 F. App’x 937, 938 (9th Cir. 2021).

[24] Id.

[25] See Farah, supra note 5.

[26] Order of Dismissal at 13, N. Alaska Env’t Ctr. v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-00038-SLG (D. Alaska 2026).

[27] Id. at 15.

[28] See Farah, supra note 5.

[29] See Order of Dismissal, supra note 26, at 15.

[30] See discussion infra Section III.