*Joshua Gehret
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County abused its discretion when, upon request during voir dire, it declined to question prospective jurors’ willingness and ability to follow jury instructions on fundamental principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right to not testify, overruling Twining v. State. Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 223 A.3d 554 (2020).
I. Introduction
In Kazadi v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Court of Appeals) overruled its decision in Twining v. State, holding that trial courts commit an abuse of discretion when declining to ask prospective jurors whether they can follow the court’s instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify.[1] To reach this decision, the Court of Appeals determined that significant changes in the law superseded Twining.[2] The Court’s decision mandates that trial courts question prospective jurors—about the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify—if requested during voir dire.[3] The Kazadi holding adopts the presumption that jurors may be unable or unwilling to follow the law according to the trial court’s instructions, which may significantly affect how Maryland courts conduct voir dire and help ensure selection of impartial juries.[4]
II. Historical Development
A. Declining To Ask About Fundamental Law Not An Abuse of Discretion Under Twining
The United States Constitution guarantees defendants the right to an impartial jury.[5] Upon request, a trial court must question prospective jurors if and only if the question is “reasonably likely to reveal [specific] cause for disqualification[.]”[6] Trial courts are granted wide discretion while conducting voir dire.[7] In Maryland, the sole purpose of voir dire is to determine specific cause for juror disqualification, not to facilitate the exercise of peremptory challenges.[8] In Twining, the Court of Appeals heldthat a trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion during voir dire when it declined to ask prospective jurors whether they “would give the [defendant] the benefit of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.”[9]
As interpreted by the majority in the instant case,[10] the holding in Twining provided three reasons why trial courts do commit an abuse of discretion when declining to ask prospective jurors about rules of law.[11] First, the Court held that rules of law are “fully and fairly covered in subsequent instructions to the jury.”[12] Second, the Court stated it is inappropriate to question the jury about whether they will “follow or apply” rules of law.[13] And third, the court stated jury instructions in Maryland “are only advisory.”[14] Although Twining remained good law for fifty-five years, the case was only mentioned by name once in 2006, in State v. Logan.[15]
The Court reaffirmed Twining in Logan, holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when declining to ask voir dire questions regarding the defense of not criminally responsible.[16] The court determined that the question amounted to asking whether prospective jurors would follow the law as instructed, and stated that the practice was disfavored in Maryland, citing Twining.[17]
B. Power of Maryland Juries to Apply Law in Criminal Cases Limited to “Law of the Crime”
Since 1851, the Constitution of Maryland has allowed juries to judge both the law and the facts in criminal cases.[18] This provision is codified in Article 23 of the Maryland Constitution (Article 23).[19] Consequently, for more than a century, Maryland courts considered jury instructions in criminal cases as merely advisory, which jurors could permissibly disregard.[20] The Court of Appeals defined the scope of Article 23 in Stevenson v. State, holding that the jury did not have the authority to decide all matters of law; rather, a jury may only decide the definition of the crime and the legal effect of the evidence.[21] Matters such as the defendant’s privilege to remain silent, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are no longer within the jury’s ability to judge the law under Article 23.[22] In turn, the Court stated that instructions on any matter of law that were not based on the “law of the crime” bind the jury.[23]
One year after Stevenson, in Montgomery v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury that principles of law—i.e., the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the defendant’s right not to testify—were merely advisory.[24] These principles are “bedrock characteristics” that trial courts must follow to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.[25] To instruct otherwise is reversible error.[26]
C. Other Jurisdictions Divided on Questions Regarding Fundamental Rights During Voir Dire
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and a number of state courts have held in favor of asking prospective jurors whether they are willing and able to follow instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify.[27] Those courts recognize the importance of uncovering biases held regarding fundamental rights, ensuring the court empanels an impartial jury,[28] while acknowledging that counsel can only identify jurors with such prejudice during voir dire.[29] Conversely, several state courts[30] and every other federal circuit have held the opposite.[31] Courts in opposition reason that trial courts do not commit an abuse of discretion when there exists a sufficient basis to challenge empanelment of a juror which is uncovered during voir dire.[32] They also reason that questioning prospective jurors regarding concepts like the presumption of innocence unnecessarily limit a trial court’s discretion because the jury is bound to follow the law when instructed.[33]
With other jurisdictions divided[34] and changes in the law restricting juries to only deciding the “law of the crime”—rather than treating all jury instructions as advisory—[35] the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to reexamine Twining.[36]
III. Instant Case
In August 2015, Brandon Smith was shot three times.[37] Two witnesses testified that they saw the petitioner, Tshibangu Kazadi, fleeing the scene with a handgun.[38] During jury selection in January 2017, Kazadi’s counsel submitted proposed voir dire questions.[39] Four of the questions asked whether prospective jurors would be able to follow the court’s instructions and apply the law with respect to the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence that clothes a defendant, and that no adverse inference of guilt may be drawn from a defendant’s refusal to testify.[40] The Circuit Court for Baltimore City declined to propound these questions, stating: “Those are covered adequately in the instruction portion of the case and I think are covered in other questions that [I] ask.”[41] Kazadi was convicted of second-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.[42]
Kazadi’s argument on appeal challenged Twining in two respects.[43] First, that Twining was inconsistent with other Court of Appeals cases that recognized a defendant’s right to request voir dire questions designed to expose potential biases that could hinder a juror’s ability to reach an impartial decision.[44] Second, that the Twining court based its decision on the notion that jury instructions in Maryland were only advisory.[45] The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (Court of Special Appeals) applied the decision in Twining as controlling precedent.[46] The Court of Special Appeals cited Logan as evidence that the Court of Appeals had recently affirmed Twining.[47] The Court of Special Appeals did not address the extra-jurisdictional cases that Kazadi cited in his defense.[48]
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals—after reviewing the facts, controlling Maryland case law, and approaches from other jurisdictions—[49]directed its attention to countering the three arguments employed in the Twining decision.[50] The first rationale of the Twining Court was that jury instructions “fully and fairly” covered matters of law[51] and that jurors are presumed to follow instructions.[52] In rebuttal, the Kazadi Court quoted two law review articles.[53] The articles analyzed studies showing that jurors often misunderstand instructions on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof,[54] have difficulty interpreting and following jury instructions,[55] and view a defendant’s refusal to testify as incriminating.[56]
Persuaded by the jury instruction studies, the Kazadi Court adopted the presumption that, for a jury to follow instructions, each juror must be able and willing to do so.[57] Consequently, the Court reasoned that jury instructions on the law—when given later in the case—would fail to cure any prejudice if a juror was unwilling to follow the court’s instructions.[58] Since the end of trial is too late to discover a basis for juror disqualification, a defendant must be able to question prospective jury members during voir dire regarding their ability to follow fundamental instructions of law designed to protect and uphold the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.[59]
The second rationale the Twining Court gave was that questioning the jury on the law was “generally recognized as inappropriate.”[60] To support this assertion, the Twining court cited the 1947 edition of the Corpus Juris Secundum.[61] The Kazadi Court responded that even if this proposition was strong enough at the time of Twining, other jurisdictions are not currently in agreement and the inappropriateness of questioning the jury on the law is not “generally recognized.”[62] The third reason given in Twining was that the court viewed jury instructions as advisory.[63] The Kazadi Court disposed of this reasoning by citing Stevenson[64] and Montgomery,[65] stating that since Twining, Article 23’s scope has limited juries to judging only the “law of the crime,” not instructions regarding fundamental rights, which are binding.[66]
As a result, the Court of Appeals found the rationale in Twining to be inconsistent with current law and reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.[67] The Court held that voir dire questions concerning “long-standing fundamental rights” safeguard a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial, and that courts must ask jurors such questions upon the defendant’s request.[68] The court further reasoned that questions associated with protecting fundamental rights could reveal a specific cause for disqualification.[69]
Two judges filed dissents in Kazadi.[70] The first, authored by JudgeMcDonald, pointed to the wide discretion granted to circuit courts when conducting voir dire.[71] Judge McDonald argued that the majority’s holding opens the door to mandatory voir dire questions concerning “elements of the offenses . . . key defenses, and other topics[;]” that questions about fundamental and conceptually difficult rights (e.g., “reasonable doubt”) provides no reliable basis to evaluate a juror’s ability to apply the law;[72] and that the decision was contrary to Maryland’s concept of limited voir dire.[73] In the second dissent, JudgeGetty admitted that the language in Twining was antiquated,[74] but also emphasized the broad discretion given to trial courts while overseeing voir dire and expressed concern that the Court’s ruling would complicate Maryland’s voir dire process.[75]
IV. Analysis
A. Progressive Holding in Kazadi Helps Ensure Selection of Impartial Juries
The Court’s acknowledgement that some jurors are unwilling and unable to follow jury instructions[76] is extraordinary.[77] Recognizing and relying on this presumption to overrule Twining[78] opens a new avenue for the Court to reform the jury selection process, address the known problems of jurors misunderstanding instructions, and expose biases toward fundamental legal protections.[79] Adopting this presumption allows Maryland state courts to acknowledge reasons why jurors may struggle to correctly apply the law, while upholding precedent that is arguably more difficult to overrule than Twining; namely, that juries are bound to follow instructions unrelated to the “law of the crime”[80] and are presumed to follow the court’s instructions.[81]
The task of juries is both difficult and essential to our country’s theory of trial.[82] Many difficulties that jurors face when performing their civic duty have been swept under the assumption that juries correctly follow a court’s instructions.[83] However, the reality is surely more complicated.[84] Courts often ask juries to apply complex law that was likely unknown to many jurors before trial.[85] Scholars have scathingly critiqued the national presumption that jurors follow instructions,[86] calling it more “pragmatic than true” and arguing it has been inconsistently applied by the Supreme Court of the United States.[87]
By adopting the presumption that juries must be willing to follow and apply fundamental law, and requiring trial courts to question jurors about their ability to do so when requested during voir dire, the Court of Appeals recognized the difficulties created by juror biases toward fundamental principles of law and a jury’s ability to overcome them.[88] Maryland courts must recognize this juror presumption to protect the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.[89] Requiring trial courts to question a juror’s unwillingness to follow the law during voir dire[90] is an important step towards a more comprehensive solution to handling issues of juror misunderstanding.[91]
B. Court of Appeals Must Ensure Impartial Jury Selection and Maintain Efficiency of Voir Dire
The majority opinion in Kazadi offers no bright line on whether there are other fundamental rights that,[92] if left unquestioned at voir dire, would violate a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.[93] Under Article 23, Maryland jurors have the power to judge the law of the crime; thus, the Court’s holding does not open the door to extensive questioning on every possible aspect of law that could arise at trial.[94] But if, as the majority presumes, jurors may be disinclined to follow instructions, then the court must question jurors about any such disinclination to safeguard a defendant’s fundamental rights.[95] What criteria separates “fundamental” rights from other rights? Why should questioning the jury about the law be limited to only fundamental rights? If other questions are allowed, or even required, at what point does voir dire become unduly complex? The Court provides no clarification.[96]
In addition, the Court offers no justification as to why questioning during voir dire guarantees the selection of prospective jurors who truly understand instructions associated with fundamental rights.[97] The Court’s holding only guarantees that trial courts can disqualify jurors who know they are unable to follow instructions.[98] As the dissent notes, “a voir dire question about ‘reasonable doubt’ in the abstract cannot yield an intelligible response if it is not tethered to some specific statement of what must be shown . . . .”[99] While there are still additional questions as to how the presumption that jurors may be unwilling or unable to apply the law will affect Maryland’s jury selection procedures, [100] the Court will have ample opportunity to shape the process moving forward. The court can do this by further recognizing the complexities of juror misunderstanding and bias[101] while setting appropriate boundaries to ensure that trial courts do not infringe on the defendant’s fundamental rights and respecting trial judge discretion to maintain an efficient voir dire .[102]
V. Conclusion
The Court of Appeals’ holding in Kazadi recognizes the presumption that jurors may be unable or unwilling to apply the law as instructed by the judge.[103] A trial court’s failure to question prospective jurors about a defendant’s fundamental rights, when requested during vior dire, constitutes an abuse of discretion under Kazadi’s core holding.[104] The Court’s holding—that prospective jurors may hold biases that strike at the heart of a defendant’s rights and that empaneled juries can experience difficulties applying the law as instructed—[105] represents a positive step towards further protecting the criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.[106]
*Josh Gehret is a staff editor for Law Review and a proud evening student in his second year at UB Law. He currently works full time as a marketing compliance manager with the general counsel’s office at 14 West Administrative Services. Josh is a UMBC alum and after graduating was awarded a Fulbright grant to Indonesia, where he taught English.
[1] Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 36, 223 A.3d 554, 575 (2020).
[2] Id. at 8, 223 A.3d at 559.
[3] Id. at 48, 223 A.3d at 582.
[4] Id. at 36–37, 223 A.3d at 575.
[5] E.g., Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 356, 86 A.3d 1232, 1235 (2014) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI).
[6] Pearson, 437 Md. at 357, 86 A.3d at 1236 (quoting Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 663, 989 A.2d 1150, 1166 (2010)).
[7] Washington v. State, 425 Md. 306, 313, 40 A.3d 1017, 1020–21 (2012).
[8] Pearson, 437 Md. at 356–57, 86 A.3d at 1235 (citing Washington, 425 Md. at 312, 40 A.3d at 1020).
[9] Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964), overruled by Kazadi, 467 Md. 1, 223 A.3d 554.
[10] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 36, 223 A.3d at 575 (“[T]his Court identified three reasons for its holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion . . . .”). One dissenting opinion only found two reasons for the holding in Twining, stating that the third reason the majority gave—that jury instructions were merely advisory at the time of the decision—was merely dicta that strengthened the holding of Twining. Id. at 58, 223 A.3d at 558 (Getty, J., dissenting) (“This would seem to be particularlytruein Maryland . . . .” (quoting Twining, 234 Md. at 100, 198 A.2d at 293)).
[11] Twining, 234 Md. at 100, 198 A.2d at 293.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 26, 223 A.3d at 569 (citing State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 399–400, 906 A.2d 374, 386–87 (2006), abrogated by Kazadi, 467 Md. 1, 223 A.3d 554)).
[16] Logan, 394 Md. at 398, 906 A.2d at 386.
[17] Id. at 398–99, 906 A.2d at 386.
[18] Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 173, 423 A.2d 558, 561 (1980) (“[The language] was first incorporated into the constitution of [Maryland] by the adoption of Article X, section 5 [in 1851].”).
[19] Md. Const. art. 23 (“In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact . . . .”).
[20] See, e.g., Vogel v. State, 163 Md. 267, 269, 162 A. 705, 705 (1932) (stating jury instructions advisory only).
[21] Stevenson, 289 Md. at 178, 423 A.2d at 564.
[22] Id. at 188, 423 A.2d at 569–70.
[23] Id.
[24] Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 645, 658 (1981).
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] See United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding trial court erred when declining to question jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651-52 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding trial court erred when declining to question jury on right not to testify); Jones v. State, 378 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (requiring ability to question jurors on presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and right to not testify); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Ky. 2005) (holding trial court committed abuse ofdiscretion by declining to ask prospective jurors about defendant’s right to not testify); State v. Cere, 480 A.2d 195, 198 (N.H. 1984) (requiring prospective jurors be asked about presumption of innocence, right not to testify, and burden of proof); People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Ill. 1984) (holding prejudicial error occurred when trial court declined to ask prospective jurors about presumption of innocence, right to not testify, and burden of proof); State v. Hayes, 364 So. 2d 923, 924-25 (La. 1978) (holding restrictions on voir dire regarding presumption of innocence not cured by general jury instructions to follow law as stated by trial court); State v. Clement, 2 S.W.3d 156, 159-60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding defense has right to uncover juror prejudice regarding adverse inference from decision to not testify); State v. Lumumba, 601 A.2d 1178, 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding impartial jury not empaneled because jurors not questioned about essential principles of criminal trials).
[28] See, e.g., Lumumba,601 A.2d at 1187; see also cases cited supra note 27.
[29] See, e.g., Hayes, 175 S.W.3d at 585; see also cases cited supra note 27.
[30] See cases cited infra note 31. A ruling by Massachusetts’ highest court, holding that it was unnecessary to ask about the presumption of innocence during voir dire, was later superseded by statute. See Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 34-35, 223 A.3d 554, 574 (2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 349 (Mass. 1980)). Today, the same language is in effect in Massachusetts. See Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 234A, § 67A (West 2016).
[31] See United States v. Robinson, 804 F.2d 280, 281 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Rodriguez, 993 F.2d 1170, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Miller, 758 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cosby, 529 F.2d 143, 148 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1967); Grandsinger v. United States, 332 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1964); State v. Dahlgren, 512 A.2d 906, 915 (Conn. 1986); Cordero v. United States, 456 A.2d 837, 841 (D.C. 1983); McCoy v. State, 361 A.2d 241, 243 (Del. 1976); Ganas v. State, 537 S.E.2d 758, 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Bitz, 460 P.2d 374, 379 (Idaho 1969); Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 349 (Mass. 1980) see also discussion supra note 30; People v. Lambo, 154 N.W.2d 583, 584 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).
[32] See, e.g., Sababu, 891 F.2d at 1325 (“[The Seventh Circuit] will not find that a trial court abused its discretion . . . where there is . . . some basis for a[n] . . . exercise of the right of challenge.”); see also cases cited supra note 31.
[33] See, e.g., Bitz, 460 P.2d at 379 (“The main defect in [defendant’s] questions [is that they] inquire into his knowledge of the law.”); see also cases cited supra note 31.
[34] See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
[35] Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 645, 658 (1981).
[36] Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 8, 223 A.3d 554, 559 (2020).
[37] Kazadi v. State, 240 Md. App. 156, 162–63, 201 A.3d 618, 622 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2019), rev’d,467 Md. 1, 223 A.3d 554 (2020).
[38] Kazadi, 240 Md. App. at 163, 201 A.3d at 622.
[39] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 9, 223 A.3d at 559.
[40] Id. at 9-10, 223 A.3d at 559-60.
[41] Id. at 10, 223 A.3d at 559-60.
[42] Kazadi, 240 Md. App. at 156, 201 A.3d at 618.
[43] Id. at 167, 201 A.3d at 624-25.
[44] Id. at 167, 201 A.3d at 624-25 (citing State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 211-12, 798 A.2d 566, 572-73 (2002)).
[45] Kazadi, 240 Md. App. at 167, 201 A.3d at 625 (citing Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964)).
[46] Id. at 164, 201 A.3d at 623.
[47] Id. at 168, 201 A.3d at 625.
[48] Id. at 169, 201 A.3d at 625-26.
[49] Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 23–36, 223 A.3d 554, 567-75 (2020); see also cases cited supra notes 27, 31.
[50] Kazadi at 35, 223 A.3d at 574.
[51] Id. at 36, 223 A.3d at 575 (quoting Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964), overruled by Kazadi, 467 Md., 223 A.3d).
[52] Id., 223 A.3d at 575 (citing Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 360, 168 A.3d 1, 12 (2017)).
[53] Id. at 36-38, 223 A.3d at 575–76 (quoting Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and the Presumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, is Either of Them Safe?, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 237, 250 (2006); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 329, 365 (1995)).
[54] See Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 249 (citing studies of Florida jurors showing they did not understand instructions on presumption of innocence); Lauder, supra note 54, at 365 (citing studies of Michigan jurors showing they did not understand instructions on burden of proof).
[55] See Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 252 (“[T]his veritable flood of empirical evidence [shows] that juries do not generally understand, and cannot, therefore, follow their instructions[.]”); Laufer, supra note 54, at 415 (“[I]t would be naive to assume that prejudice could be overcome by the presentation of jury instructions.”) (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
[56] See Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 267 (“In both cases, jurors violated their instructions on the Fifth Amendement.”).
[57] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 36–37, 223 A.3d at 575.
[58] Id. at 38–39, 223 A.3d at 576–77.
[59] Id. at 39, 223 A.3d at 576.
[60] Id. at 39–40, 223 A.3d at 577 (quoting Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964), overruled by Kazadi v. State, 467 Md.1, 223 A.3d 554 (2020)).
[61] Twining, 234 Md. at 100, 198 A.2d at 293 (quoting 50 C.J.S. Juries § 274 (1947)).
[62] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 41, 223 A.3d at 577–78.
[63] Id. at 43, 223 A.3d at 579 (quoting Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100, 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964)).
[64] Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980).
[65] Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 437 A.2d 645 (1981).
[66] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 43–44, 223 A.3d at 579–80.
[67] Id. at 48, 223 A.3d at 582.
[68] Id. at 44–45, 223 A.3d at 580.
[69] Id., 223 A.3d at 580 (citing Collins v. State, 463 Md. 372, 376–77, 205 A.3d 1012, 1014 (2019)).
[70] See infra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
[71] Id. at 55, 223 A.3d at 586 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
[72] Id. at 55–56, 223 A.3d at 586 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
[73] Id., 223 A.3d at 586 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
[74] Id. at 60, 223 A.3d at 589 (Getty, J., dissenting).
[75] Id. (Getty, J., dissenting).
[76] Id. at 36, 223 A.3d at 575.
[77] See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
[78] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 36, 223 A.3d at 575.
[79] See generally Frank & Broschard, supra note 54;Laufer, supra note 54.
[80] Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980).
[81] Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 168 A.3d 1 (2017); see Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 252 (quoting Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 229 (2000)).
[82] Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 269 (“Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions.”) (quoting Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954)).
[83] See Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 252; see also cases cited supra note 31.
[84] See Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 269.
[85] See id.
[86] See id. at 252 (quoting Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234).
[87] See Frank & Broschard, supra note 54, at 252–54.
[88] Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 1, 223 A.3d 554, 554 (2020).
[89] See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
[90] Id.
[91] See generally Frank & Broschard, supra note 54; Laufer, supra note 54.
[92] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 38–39, 223 A.3d at 576.
[93] E.g., Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 356, 86 A.3d 1232, 1235 (2014) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI).
[94] See Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 188, 423 A.2d 558, 569–70 (1980).
[95] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 1, 223 A.3d at 554.
[96] See generally id. at 35-48, 223 A.3d at 574-582
[97] See id. at 55-56, 223 A.3d at 586-87 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
[98] See id.
[99] Id. at 55, 223 A.3d at 586 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
[100] Id. at 1, 223 A.3d at 554.
[101] See generally Frank & Broschard, supra note 54; Laufer, supra note 54.
[102] Washington v. State, 425 Md. 306, 313, 40 A.3d 1017, 1020–21 (2012).
[103] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 36–37, 223 A.3d at 575.
[104] Id. at 48, 223 A.3d at 582.
[105] Kazadi, 467 Md. at 38–39, 223 A.3d at 576–77.
[106] See supra Part IV.A.
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